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THESIS ABSTRACT 
For many Indigenous societies, ‘rebuilding’ means adapting to the modern ways of capitalism.  
While a significant and disturbing number of First Nations continue to be subjected to intractable 
penury, high levels of unemployment, and welfare dependency in contemporary Canada, there 
are some First Nations who have become, and continue to be, economically successful through 
economic and business development.  Of these economically successful First Nations, the global 
capitalist system has become the ‘new hunting grounds’ in their cultural and modern survival in 
Canada.  Although the participation of First Nations in the global capitalist economy as a way to 
improve their socioeconomic circumstances have been the focused of many academic, state, and 
independent conceptual studies, few have yet to contribute to the understanding of the nascent 
discipline of AED through empirical research within Canadian First Nations contexts.  This case 
study attempts to fill this gap.  Using Frog Lake First Nation (FLFN) as an instrumental case 
study, this thesis explores the ways in which FLFN’s economic arm, Frog Lake Energy 
Resources Corporation (FLERC), employs the joint venture model—as its new buffalo—to 
promote, create, and sustain economic development with the aim of generating substantial 
wealth, creating jobs as well as other economic benefits for its community members and non-
members alike.  It also identifies a set of factors that contribute to the economic success of 
FLFN.  Furthermore, it employs the Harvard Project’s Nation-Building Model (NBM) as its 
theoretical framework, where each of the NBM elements is applied to ascertain its theoretical 
applicability within the context of the successful economic development of FLFN.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1. Aboriginal1 Economic Development: The Context 
As distinct yet colonized societies, Indigenous peoples are struggling to reassert their 
nationhood, cultural survival and place within modern states.  In Canada and elsewhere in the 
world, their struggle is about rebuilding their nations; it is a ubiquitous and collective act to 
reclaim their right to self-determination.  In the postimperial era, Indigenous societies of what is 
now North America—who occupied their ancestral homelands for millennia—were redoubtable 
yet vulnerable in the relentless pursuit of European quest for land and resources (Dickason & 
McNab, 2009).  Unaware of the intentions of permanency of imperial states, Indigenous societies 
entered a new era—colonialism.  Under this omnipotent imperialistic program, the systematic 
process of colonization subjugated Aboriginal societies, traditions, and belief systems—a process 
which still remains largely unaltered in modern times.  Though some would postulate that the 
current era is based on neocolonialism, while others vehemently assert the postcolonial thesis, 
the fact remains: Indigenous societies—in indigenous-occupied regions of the world—must 
continue to live, adapt, and persevere under the umbrella of colonialism.  In spite of the resultant 
conditions experienced by Indigenous peoples worldwide, the incredible adaptability of many 
Indigenous nations has sought, and continues to seek, the ways in which they can improve their 
socioeconomic circumstances and conditions within the global capitalist system. 
In the modern era, there is, however, a perceptible number of Indigenous communities 
rebuilding their nations through participation in the global capitalist economy, while a huge 
                                                          
1
 In this thesis, the term ‘Indigenous’ will refer to native groups of peoples in a global context; ‘Native American’ 
will refer to native peoples in the United States context; ‘Aboriginal’ will refer to the collective entities of Canada’s 
Indian, Metis and Inuit peoples as recognized in the Constitution Act, 1982; and ‘First Nation’ will be used 
exclusively to refer to the peoples and communities recognized by the Canadian federal Indian Act, 1985. 
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majority of Indigenous peoples still remain among the poorest in the world (Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs UNSPFII, 2009, p. 21).  In the field of international human rights, 
the United Nations has made considerable efforts in the past two decades to address the extreme 
poverty of Indigenous peoples through various international instruments.  Among those 
instruments is the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was 
adopted as international law on 13 September 2007.  Although Canada, along with the United 
States, Australia, and New Zealand, first voted against the Declaration before finally adopting it, 
the Declaration stands as a powerful global force for the “advancement and recognition” 
(Fontaine, 2010, p. 8) of Indigenous peoples.  Article 3 of the Declaration states:  
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. 
Canada’s opposition to the Declaration was based on its alleged incompatibility with 
Canada’s Constitution and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  In response to the 
Harper Government’s position, “UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and former Supreme 
Court of Canada Justice, Louise Arbour, publicly expressed her ‘astonishment’ and ‘profound 
disappointment’” (Open Letter, 2008; cited in Hartley, Joffe & Preston, 2010, p. 205).  
Nevertheless the Declaration has fundamentally transformed State-Indigenous relations; at the 
same time, it provides a global framework for the development and progression of Indigenous 
societies—economically, culturally, socially, and politically.  As well, the events leading to the 
Declaration were within the backdrop of the first International Decade for Indigenous Peoples 
(1995-2004) followed by a second UN-designated International Decade (2005-2014).  Globally, 
Indigenous peoples number about 370 million.  Moreover, “[w]hile they constitute 
approximately 5 per cent of the world’s population, indigenous peoples make up 15 per cent of 
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the world’s poor. They also make up about one-third of the world’s 900 million extremely poor 
rural people” (Department of Economic and Social Affairs UNSPFII, 2009, p. 21). 
In 1996, the Government of Canada published a five-volume comprehensive report called 
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP).  This Report, which examined a wide 
range of social and economic issues and made numerous recommendations on those issues, has 
been the most in-depth, comprehensive study on Aboriginal issues in contemporary Canada.  
Due to the rapid increase of the Aboriginal population of which 56 per cent are under 24 years of 
age (compared with 34 per cent of all Canadians), the Commissioners said the following 
regarding employment:  
…our estimate is that more than 300,000 jobs will need to be created for 
Aboriginal people in the period 1991 to 2016 to accommodate the growth 
in the Aboriginal working-age population and to bring employment 
levels among Aboriginal people up to the Canadian standard (RCAP, 
1996, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 775).   
While the Commission called for federal economic development policy and programs to be 
consistent with the needs and aspirations of Aboriginal people, the approach to Aboriginal 
economic development, the commission favoured: 
…integrated, holistic approaches to development. Economic 
development must be accompanied by activities that, while not focusing 
directly on economic development, still have a significant effect on it. 
These activities include education, improving overall levels of health, 
developing positive cultural identities, and building and maintaining 
infrastructure and services for communities and families. In the absence 
of improvements in these other areas, economic development will be 
curtailed (RCAP, 1996, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 800). 
Clearly, the historical and current deplorable circumstances upon which Aboriginal 
people find themselves are the result of Canadian policies primarily since in the introduction of 
the Indian Act, 1876.  This has become common knowledge.  Whether today or in the past, “First 
Nations people are the poorest in the nation and, on average, have incomes well below the 
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poverty line” (Frideres, 2011, p. 67).  During the post-White Paper era, the concept of Aboriginal 
self-determination was never more pronounced; arguably, the sociopolitical landscape of Canada 
had been significantly altered as more and more Aboriginal nations and their organizations were 
demanding for increased autonomy so that they could begin to address widespread and abject 
poverty experienced by their people.  The pursuit of Aboriginal self-determination was also 
implicit to economic self-sufficiency; Aboriginal nations were well aware of the need to 
participate more fully in the wider Canadian economy (Cardinal, 1969).  To that end, an 
emerging Aboriginal economic development project was demanding space in the political 
economy in Canada.   
Thus far you may well have noticed that this case study supports the thesis that 
capitalism—through the participation in the global economic system—can be an effective 
survival mechanism for Indigenous peoples worldwide.  While it is acknowledged that not all 
Indigenous people will embrace the seemingly foreign system of capitalism as a modern way of 
survival, Aboriginal nations—particularly those in the Canadian context—are adapting the 
fundamental precepts of capitalism into their realities (Newhouse, 2009, p. 110).  Today, many 
First Nations desire to improve their socioeconomic circumstances; arguably, this desire is 
manifested in the process of ‘rebuilding’ their nations on their own terms and to a level they find 
acceptable.  In turn, that process of rebuilding includes—and must include—a calculated 
participation in the wider economic system in their approaches to sustainable economic 
development.  In effect, the sphere of the capitalism is now the modern hunting grounds for those 
Aboriginal nations who choose to participate.   
Before we continue any further, let us briefly frame the unique set of socioeconomic 
circumstances upon which Aboriginal people find themselves today.  Though tautological, it will 
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provide an undeniable generalized perspective on the magnitude of the socioeconomic conditions 
subject to Aboriginal peoples in their daily lives.  These social, economic, and health issues are 
well-documented in Canada.  On average, the Aboriginal person in Canada must endure: 
poverty, overcrowded living situations, overt and covert racism, ill-health, diabetes, a state of 
joblessness, intergenerational problems such as the effects of the residential schools, the high 
suicide rate among their youth, a welfare economy, and so forth.  As well, the Aboriginal person 
will likely experience: a shorter life expectancy, alcoholism, violence, abuse of drugs, low-
paying employment, a disproportionate chance of incarceration, little or no education or training, 
an urban way of life, loss of language and culture, teenage parenthood, and so forth.  For First 
Nations communities, they will likely be subject to the restrictive nature of the Indian Act 
system, welfare economies, lack of capital for economic development, a growing and young 
population, lack of appropriate and adequate institutions, and so on.  And the list goes on.  This 
set of circumstances is further compounded with a growing population, where “[t]he Aboriginal 
population is the fastest growing, and youngest segment of the Canadian population.”  
Specifically, “[b]etween 2001 and 2006, the Aboriginal population grew four times faster than 
the non-Aboriginal population and, with a median age of 26.5 years, is 13 years younger, on 
average, than the rest of the Canadian population” (DIAND, 2009, p. 3).  Almost half (48 per 
cent) of the entire Aboriginal population is under the age of 25 years (Statistics Canada, 2006).  
In terms of the unemployment rate, the Aboriginal population figure at 14.8 percent while the 
non-Aboriginal population is at 6.3 percent.  The average income for the Aboriginal population 
is $23,888 whereas non-Aboriginal incomes are considerably higher at $35,872 (Statistics 
Canada, 2006).   
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In an amazing display of resiliency, Aboriginal people have participated, and will 
persistently continue to participate, in the wider economic system to improve their current 
socioeconomic circumstances.  To fully understand the dynamics of this observation and other 
economic activities employed by Aboriginal people is to appreciate the distinct form of 
Aboriginal economic development (AED) as a necessary and valid field of inquiry.  Such a 
discipline is both required and possible so that it can inform federal and provincial economic 
policies and programs that can properly address the unique set of circumstances experienced by 
Aboriginal peoples and their communities.  It can also assist policy-makers in developing 
appropriate economic development strategies unique to a region or industry.  Equally important, 
it can effectively begin to predict outcomes that may otherwise be unwanted or not desired.   
In spite of this incredible scenario of indigence among the Aboriginal Peoples in Canada 
and the socioeconomic disparities between them and the rest of Canada, there is hope.  Whether 
through federal economic development funding and programs, the settlement of comprehensive 
and specific land claims, partnerships in the private sector, or entrepreneurship in the knowledge 
economy, the resiliency of Aboriginal leaders and their communities is a testament to their 
efforts to rebuild their nations.  In the process of rebuilding, several improvements are occurring: 
Aboriginal economic ventures are creating jobs and opportunities; investments are showing high 
human, social and financial returns; the development of institutional capacities is creating 
conducive local environments for sustainable businesses and economies; alliances are created 
with outside economic partners; and a shared benefit is realized while contributing to local, 
regional and national economies.  Undeniably, Aboriginal economic development is the means 
by which Aboriginal peoples and their communities can improve their circumstances, while 
maintaining their cultural identities, languages and ways of life.  Among recent First Nations 
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economic successes in Canada is the story of Frog Lake First Nation (FLFN)—a story that has 
prompted the decision to produce this study.  Though this study focuses on just one First Nation 
community, it is nonetheless an economically successful story worthy of analysis to determine 
the factors and practices that account for the success.  Perhaps this one story can serve as a 
model for other First Nations in similar circumstances that will encourage them to explore 
economic possibilities within the global capitalist system. 
1.1 Statement of Thesis 
This case study will advance the thesis that the most effective approach to economic 
development employed by FLFN—through its band-owned oil company, the Frog Lake Energy 
Resources Corporation (FLERC)—is the joint venture model applied in the oil extraction 
programs on its reserve lands.  The resultant state of their approach to development has created a 
unique yet belated opportunity for FLFN to begin the process of rebuilding their community 
including language, culture, policy development, education, and so forth.  Through economic 
development, FLFN has become a successful First Nation community in Canada.  It is successful 
to the extent that FLFN now possesses the financial capacity from its economic development 
program to provide adequate funding for on-reserve service delivery programs as well as new 
housing projects, per capita distributions for community members, and increased funding for 
post-secondary students.  Furthermore, it is also successful because its economic development 
program is sustainable, viable and diversifiable.  It is within this context that FLFN is defined as 
successful in this case study.  Before this current state of economic success which they now 
enjoy, FLFN was, without question, heavily reliant on federal funding to sustain all on-reserve 
programs; in fact, new housing projects and per capita distributions were, idiomatically, few and 
far between.  FLFN—which was once in an almost complete state of dependence on federal 
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funding—is now increasingly progressing towards economic self-reliance and self-
determination.  Their economic success is the result of FLFN’s approach to development through 
the joint venture model; in fact, as will be demonstrated, the joint venture model has been the 
most effective economic model for FLFN.  Let me deconstruct this position so that one can fully 
appreciate what is presented and how the thesis is developed in this case study.   
Upon closer examination one will detect four interconnected elements that must be 
emphasized to fully comprehend the thesis advanced in this case study: economic development, 
joint venture model, lands, and industry.  Let me succinctly explain each in turn to demonstrate 
how these elements comprise and interplay in FLFN’s approach to development that are critical 
to improving and sustaining the overall quality of life among the community of FLFN.  
Economic development can be described as the vision of the community; it is a shared goal that 
is part of their aspirations of self-determination, nationhood, and economic self-sufficiency.  To 
achieve these goals, the joint venture model is employed as the primary vehicle in the 
development process.  To create (or attract) joint ventures, reserve lands are used as a form of 
assets (or collateral equity) in the joint partnership process.  To create wealth and opportunities 
from reserve lands, the oil industry is targeted in the approach to development.  Hence, this 
process in FLFN’s approach to development has created, and will continue to create, sustained 
economic development including wealth generation, job creation, and other community 
economic benefits, while improving the quality of life among the people of FLFN.   
1.2 Objective, Purpose, and Research Questions of Case Study 
The primary objective of this inquiry is to examine the perspectives, experiences, and 
strategies of Frog Lake First Nation during the course of its successful economic development 
program.  As well, the purpose of the study is twofold: first, the FLFN economic development 
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approach can serve as a model and practical guide for other First Nation communities in similar 
circumstances; and second, this case study will not only contribute to the newly emergent body 
of literature on AED, but it will also increase our current state of knowledge and understanding 
through the empirical nature of this research and application of economic theory in a uniquely 
Canadian First Nation context.  At the outset it is important to note that the case study is about a 
celebration of economic self-determination, where it seeks to accentuate the ways in which 
FLFN has determined, and continues to determine, its future, economically. 
The central research question that has guided this inquiry is: what factors contribute to 
the economic success of FLFN?  The subsidiary questions are: (1) what strategic economic 
model contributes to the successful economic development of FLFN? and (2) to what degree 
does the nation-building model (NBM) apply to the successful economic development within the 
context of FLFN? 
1.3 Frog Lake First Nation: The Case Site 
1.3.1 Community Profile 
Frog Lake First Nation is a Plains Cree community in Alberta, Canada (see Map 1-1).  
Recognized as an Indian band pursuant to the Indian Act, FLFN is comprised of two reserves 
called Unipouheos (#121) and Puskiakiwenin (#122).  In September 1876, hereditary Chiefs 
Puskiakiwenin and Tustukiskwes (father of Unipouheos) on behalf of their bands respectively, 
signed and thus became signatories of Treaty Six at Fort Pitt, near present-day Onion Lake, 
Saskatchewan.  Before Chief Tustukiskwes had the opportunity to select the location of his 
reserve, he passed away and left his chieftainship to his son, Unipouheos.  Though independent 
bands before the signing of Treaty Six, the two chiefs chose land adjacent to Frog Lake.  While 
Chief Puskiakiwenin chose land directly west of Frog Lake, Chief Unipouheos chose land 
generally south of the lake.  In 1914, the two reserves of Unipouheos and Puskiakiwenin were 
 10 
 
amalgamated into one band: Frog Lake First Nation.  Geographically, FLFN, along Secondary 
Highway 897, is located in east-central Alberta and approximately 300 kilometers east of 
Edmonton, Alberta. 
MAP 1-1 First Nations in Alberta 
 
Source: First Nations in Alberta, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2009. 
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In terms of governance, FLFN is democratically governed by one chief and six councilors 
who are elected on two-year terms.  As an Indian Act band government, it provides governance 
and administration for programs and services primarily for on-reserve residents.  To a significant 
extent, the institutional framework of FLFN is largely based on the Indian Act system; for 
instance, FLFN does not have its own constitution, sets of laws or codes, custom membership 
and election codes, community-designed land use policy, and so forth.  As a result, it must rely 
on the policy frameworks and processes pursuant to the Indian Act in order, for example, to 
conduct elections.  In terms of tribal council and organization affiliations, FLFN is a member of 
the Tribal Chiefs Ventures Inc., which assists member First Nations in human resource 
development, technical services, and various other services.  The FLFN is also a member of the 
Confederacy of Treaty Six First Nations, an advocacy political organization that promotes, 
protects, and advances Treaty rights for its member First Nations.  In another organization, 
FLFN is one of eight members of the Blue Quills College, where a designate serves as a voting 
member on the Board of Governors.  Since 1971 Blue Quills College provided quality adult and 
higher education programs for its member First Nations and others in a unique academic 
framework based on partnerships with numerous academic institutions such as Athabasca 
University.   
FLFN, one of 45 First Nation communities in Alberta (see Map 1.1), has a registered 
population of 2,896 as of June 2012.  Of this population, 1,597 live on-reserve, 1,035 live off-
reserve, while 260 live in other First Nation communities (AANDC, 2012).  Due to the gross 
lack of community records and statistics, the unemployment level, for example, could not be 
ascertained.  However, we can demonstrate that the estimate of the unemployment rate is high.
2
  
                                                          
2
 This analysis does not include the Morning Sky Health Centre as it receives separate funding from Health Canada 
and has its own policies.  
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With an on-reserve working age population of roughly 1,100, FLFN—the biggest employer of 
the band—employs approximately 150 people in total.  One-third is employed at the local K4 to 
Grade 12 school, while the remaining is employed in various band-related programs such as 
finance, housing or daycare (Price, personal interview, June 2012).  The core area—which 
includes the Band administration and the majority of departmental offices, Head Office of the 
Frog Lake Energy Resources Corporation (FLERC), Portage College, newly-constructed ice 
arena, water treatment plant, lagoon, community hall, convenience store, trailer court, and 
Sundance and pow-wow grounds—is located on the southern section of the reserve.  Located in 
proximity to the old school on the north end of the reserve, Chief Napewaew Comprehensive 
School is a relatively new educational facility, which offers standard programs from kindergarten 
to Grade 12, with a student enrollment of approximately 300 students on a given academic year.  
While two primary core areas concentrate band facilities, residential units are evenly distributed 
throughout the reserve.  The number of units has increased substantially to 376 due to recent new 
housing projects.  Accessible primarily by a secondary highway, FLFN sits on 18,845.40 
hectares of land alongside the southern and western parts of Frog Lake. 
 On its official website, it describes the community as follows:  
Frog Lake is rich in natural resources and has its own oil and gas drilling 
facilities. We believe that when armed with appropriate resources, our 
Community holds the capacity and ingenuity to ensure the sustainable 
economic future which includes the preservation of our spiritual and 
cultural ways for all community members. This has enabled us to 
approach our challenges with determination and confidence 
Our progressive leadership has developed strong relationships with 
industry. The vision we have for our community involves a proactive 
community-led economic and business development strategy. It is 
supported by the knowledge and resource stewardship traditions of our 
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members partnered with the best knowledge and expertise of today’s 
society.
3
 
1.3.2 Financial History and Context 
After approximately 30 years of some form of financial co-management imposed by 
DIAND, FLFN has recently got its ‘financial house in order’ (Price, personal interview, June 
2012).  But before this attainment, FLFN was in a continual state of financial chaos and reached 
a critical point in 2005.  In fact, FLFN was in a deficit of approximately $5 million, 
characterized, for example, by constant vendors’ requests for outstanding payments, potential 
litigation as well as local financial institutions or cheque-cashing stores unwilling to negotiate 
band cheques often due to the band’s accounts being insufficient.  For FLFN, the issue was 
financial management; there were no clear, defined financial policies in place; and more 
importantly, there lacked enforcement mechanisms in the policy on the expenditure of federal 
funding and capital trust funds.  Increasingly, FLFN was moving away from co-management to 
third-party management because it continued to produce annual deficits.  Though third-party 
management was never imposed, DIAND remained intrusive in its approach to resolve FLFN’s 
state of financial chaos.  In fact, at one point, it was almost in receivership.  Current FLFN 
Councilor Wayne Faithful, who took the lead role in the opposition of the application of 
receivership, claims: “When we were in co-management or pretty much ‘third-party’, the co-
manager Kelly Chow wanted to put Frog Lake under receivership so that he can control 
everything. These were very difficult times for Frog Lake. We didn’t want co-management nor 
receivership because it would’ve stopped or shut down FLERC’s oil operations, it would’ve 
placed barriers on us Council, and the people would’ve suffered even more just to please Indian 
Affairs” (Faithful, personal interview, June 2012).  It was recommended by the co-manager and 
                                                          
3
 Frog Lake First Nation. Refer to www.froglake.ca  
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DIAND that FLFN be placed in receivership so that its assets and properties would be protected 
(or preserved) during litigation.  Receivership never reached the courts. 
While the period in the preceding discussion characterizes a governance system without 
effective financial policies, the situation today is considerably different.  FLFN now sits in a 
surplus position as opposed to a deficit one.  In fact, “FLFN has over $250 million in assets; it 
has substantial capital in both the capital and revenue trust accounts and has lucrative 
investments” (Price, personal interview, June 2012).  With effective financial controls now in 
place along with key positions at the band’s administrative level, FLFN operates under this 
sound financial system based on accountability, transparency, and redress.  As a result, this move 
towards capacity development and institution-building at the administrative level not only 
created an effective management team including a qualified financial controller, director of 
operations, and other qualified individuals in key positions, but it also resulted in a healthy 
institutional environment where the spheres of administration and politics complement each 
other.  No longer encumbered by an imposed interventionist system (or a set of unfavourable 
conditions) at the administrative level, the FLFN government and community can pursue 
economic, political, and social goals in their aspirations of increased self-determination, 
economic self-sufficiency, and an enhanced quality of life. 
1.3.3 Band Revenues and Expenditure 
Excluding its own source funding, FLFN receives annual block funding in the 
approximate value of $10 million under the Comprehensive Funding Agreement (CFA) from the 
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC; formerly known as 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development [DIAND]).
4
  While the CFA’s 
financial contribution to the total operating budget of the band is roughly half—which is 
                                                          
4
 To avoid confusion, the common acronym ‘DIAND’ will be used interchangeably with AANDC. 
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intended to support basic services such as social assistance programs, education or housing—the 
other half is supported through other sources (as indicated in the breakdown below).  To fully 
support the growing population and its demand on services and programs, the CFA funding is 
completely inadequate or not enough (Price, personal interview, June 2012).  Consequently, 
other sources of funding must be explored and exploited.  In the three primary sources of 
revenue for each fiscal year are as follows: 
(1) CFA Funding  
(2) Band Trust Funding 
a. Capital  
b. Revenue 
(3) Shareholder Dividend Payment / Investment Return 
a. IMI Brokerage 
b. Pimee Well Services Inc. 
c. Seven Lakes Drilling 
d. Four Lakes Drilling 
e. Frog Lake Energy Resources Corporation (FLERC) 
f. Frog Lake Oilfield Services 
g. Savanna Drilling 
h. Fosters Construction 
i. Impact Benefit Agreements 
In terms of expenditure, the total operating budget for FLFN is approximately $20 
million per year.  The major expenditure items for the Band are:   
(1) Wages and benefits 
(2) Capital-based Projects 
(3) Program-related Services 
 
1.3.4 Economic Development 
The socioeconomic picture of FLFN has generally improved.  Until recently, FLFN was 
among numerous First Nations in Canada with no sustained economic development in sight.  
Before FLERC’s involvement as an active participant in the petroleum industry, FLFN relied 
heavily on federal CFA funding, and royalty revenues generated via extraction of oil and gas by 
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non-Aboriginal oil companies such as Husky Oil Operations (Husky) and Canadian Natural 
Resources Limited (CNRL) were very limited to the Band.  FLFN’s economic development 
approach was limited to leasing its reserve lands for natural resource exploitation to outsider oil 
companies.   
  This all changed when FLFN created and incorporated Frog Lake Energy Resources 
Corporation (FLERC) in 2000. The objective was to create self-generating wealth for the 
community with the aim of creating economic opportunities and benefits for its members.  To the 
elected leadership, they saw economic opportunities in the petroleum industry.  Within a decade, 
FLERC has not only reached institutional and operational capacity as an operating oil company, 
but it has generated approximately $55 million in royalties for FLFN (FLERC, 10 Year Review, 
2012), and perhaps more importantly, it has built a net worth of $175 million (Dion, personal 
interview, June 2012).  In terms of royalties generated through oil and gas activities on reserve 
lands, over $288.6 million has been deposited in the FLFN’s trust account since 1990.  As 
indicated above, FLERC’s royalty contribution has been unprecedented and substantial, 
comprising almost one-fifth of the total royalty revenues generated to date.  And, what is even 
more important is that the generation of capital will continue to increase exponentially if on-
reserve oil production programs are accelerated and if the demand and price of oil in the global 
markets remains relatively strong.  In addition to the generation of capital via royalties, capital is 
also significantly generated through other lucrative revenue sources as a result of the Band’s 
investments, ownerships, and strategic partnerships with various businesses—outside the 
business framework of FLERC.   
 To reiterate, this thesis generally argues that the most effective way to create a healthy, 
viable, and self-sustaining community in FLFN is by means of economic development.  As will 
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be demonstrated, self-managed economic development is the primary vehicle by which FLFN 
can begin to improve socioeconomic circumstances faced by its members, while retaining 
significant control over their natural resources on its reserve lands.  Furthermore, the approach to 
economic development is creating substantial wealth through business development; economic 
returns through investments; and dividend payments through shareholder ownerships.  Arguably, 
economic development is paving the way to prosperity for the people of FLFN, and will continue 
to do so for generations to come.  
1.4 Theoretical Framework 
1.4.1 Nation-Building Model 
Since the creation of Frog Lake Energy Resources Corporation, the community of 
FLFN—primarily due to the employment of the joint venture model—has achieved an 
unprecedented level of economic prosperity, while maintaining the sustainability of its economic 
development enterprise as well as the creation of jobs and other economic benefits.  To critically 
examine and analyze the set of circumstances unique to the successful economic development of 
FLFN, this qualitative case study has employed the nation-building model (NBM) as its 
theoretical model.  Due in large part to its acceptance and popularity in Indigenous-occupied 
regions of the world, the considerable flexibility—if not universality—of this multifaceted 
conceptual framework as well as the vernacular manner in its presentation, the NBM, while 
unique in many respects and seemingly theoretically sound, has been subject to rigorous 
application in the context of FLFN.  At the outset of the inquiry, it was anticipated that the NBM 
would possess a certain degree of applicability within the FLFN context.  To determine the 
degree of its applicability, one of three research questions for this case study is devoted to this 
particular theoretical issue.  In other words, using FLFN as a case study, the NBM was, in a 
sense, on trial in a uniquely Canadian First Nation context.   
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To be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, below is a list of the components that 
comprise the NBM.  They are: 
 De facto sovereignty (i.e., local autonomy or decision-making) 
 Effective institutions (i.e., established rules and mechanisms and reliable bureaucracies) 
 Cultural match (i.e., legitimacy between the community and governance systems) 
 Strategic orientation (i.e., long-term and forward-looking vision) 
 Leadership (i.e., First Nation leaders should be nation-builders and mobilizers) 
1.5 Organization of Thesis 
While this current Chapter provided the context and framework for the thesis, Chapter 
Two discusses the methodology employed in this case study project.  Chapter Three is a 
literature review that incorporates academic, state, and independent research on the subject of 
Aboriginal Economic Development (AED).  It begins with an historical assessment of AED; it is 
then followed by an analysis of the recent emerging literature including the identification of 
relevant themes and gaps.  Chapter Four identifies the four factors that contribute to the 
economic success of FLFN—thus answering the case study’s central research question.  
Furthermore, this chapter also provides an answer to the first of two subsidiary research 
questions posed in this case study.  In its contribution to theory as well as the expanding body of 
knowledge, Chapter Five ascertains the theoretical applicability of the Harvard Project’s nation-
building model in the context of FLFN—thus answering the last subsidiary research question.  
Finally, in Chapter Six, I present the findings of this case study.  I also provide some reflective 
commentary on the research contributions, implications for research, and final thoughts of this 
inquiry.    
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CHAPTER TWO 
Research Methodology 
2. Introduction 
The intent of this qualitative inquiry is twofold: one, ascertain what (and how these) 
factors contribute to the economic success of Frog Lake First Nation through the economic 
strategies employed by FLERC; and two, determine the degree of theoretical applicability of the 
NBM within the unit of analysis (FLFN).  To accomplish these objectives, the research question 
was explored through an instrumental case study.  The holistic nature and approach of the case 
study was a suitable strategy of inquiry for this thesis-based project.  Based on this approach, it 
also sought to ascertain as well as highlight the ways in which one First Nation community (i.e., 
FLFN) has employed, and continues to employ, successful economic development strategies as it 
actively and effectively participates in the Canadian and global economy.  In the pre-data 
collection stage, great effort was made to understand thoroughly the systematic processes 
involved in case study methodology especially where a single case (or unit of analysis) is the 
subject being studied.  Furthermore, it was recognized at the outset that insider research may 
affect the conceptual issues of generalizability, reliability, and validity in this case study.  With 
these in mind, this social science inquiry has firmly centred itself within a conceptual approach 
to research with the objective of upholding these methodological issues so that the pursuit and 
attainment of empirical and theoretical knowledge can be viewed and accorded as legitimate 
research. 
In this chapter I present the strategy of inquiry, data collection methods, and analytical 
techniques employed in this project as well as the ethical review and approval processes.  
Paradigmatically, this study is qualitative in nature and process; it does, however, incorporate 
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quantitative data to supplement this case study.  Qualitative research is a “process of examining 
and interpreting data in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical 
knowledge” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p. 1).  Methodologically, the choice of research strategy 
has been determined by the research questions presented earlier.  The central and subsidiary 
research questions reflect the “how, why” (Yin, 2003, p. 5) form of questioning; this 
determination has justified the applicable strategy of inquiry: the case study.  Bouma, Ling, and 
Wilkinson (2009) claim that a “guiding principle of all good research is to let the research 
question determine the data collection strategy rather than the other way around. Good 
researchers will use the method that best answers the research question posed” (p. 40).   
2.1 Negotiating Researcher Dualism 
As a Treaty member of the Frog Lake First Nation, I have been, and will continue to be, a 
contributor in various capacities—linguistically, socially, ceremonially, and intellectually—to 
my home community.  As an insider, my personal, cultural, and political connection to FLFN is 
ineluctable; at the same time, the Indigenous scholar within propels me to assume the 
responsibility to the contribution of knowledge to two seemingly opposing worlds—Aboriginal 
society and the academy.  Due in large part to the positive aspect of this exploratory study (as 
opposed to the identification of a problem or problems to be addressed or resolved), the 
elicitation of participants’ responses has been a relatively effortless task.  In fact, the rapport in 
the interviews provided eager and enthusiastic responses in the telling of the story of FLERC.  In 
an effort to address the methodological issue of over-rapport, I reminded each participant to see 
me as they would an outsider researcher.  Further, despite my insider status, I conducted 
myself—both in appearance and in the manner in which I posed questions—with a professional 
comportment of a qualified social science researcher.  Though access to the community or 
 21 
 
participants was based on prior relationships, my insider status did not guarantee automatic 
approval from the FLFN Chief and Council to conduct this case study.  In September 2011, after 
a formal presentation made to Chief and Council in Frog Lake, Alberta, my research proposal 
received unanimous approval via motion pursuant to the policy of Band Council meetings.  
Undeniably, insiders have certain research advantages within their home communities.  Robert 
Innes (2009) explains that “[t]heir insider status, however, gives them a deeper contextual insight 
into the community. This insight allows them to develop better research questions that challenge 
preconceived notions of the group and expand scholarly understanding of the subject” (p. 447).  
Regardless of whether done by an insider or outsiders, this case study is about a success story of 
one First Nation community in Canada that saw an opportunity to become economically self-
sufficient with the goal of improving their socioeconomic circumstances, while preserving their 
cultural identity, language, and way of life.  This, in itself, significantly and impressively 
outweighs some of the futile or pointless critiques on insider research advanced relentlessly by 
positivists and objectivists alike.   
2.2 Strategy of Inquiry: The Case Study 
In qualitative case study research, “the case study is used in many situations to contribute 
to our knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social, political, and related phenomena” 
(Yin, 2003, p. 1).  A case study, operationally framed within a bounded system, is intended to 
isolate and capture the complexity and uniqueness of a specific case or cases (Stake, 1995).  
Nagy Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011) claim that, “because the case is investigated from many 
different angles and pays attention to many different dimensions of the issue, case study is 
typically able to avoid the kind of essentialist and context-free analyses that have historically 
been harmful to disempowered groups” (p. 256).  Uniquely and definitively characteristic of the 
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case study approach, O’Leary (2010) claims that a “case study is all about depth; it requires you 
to dig, and to dig deep. You need to delve into detail, dig into context, and really get a handle on 
the rich experiences of the individual, event, community group, or organization you want to 
explore” (pp. 173-74).  For Eisenhardt (1989), she defines case study “as a research strategy that 
focuses on the dynamics present within a single setting” (p. 534).  It should be noted that data 
collection in case study research is typically extensive, drawing on multiple sources of 
information, such as interviews, direct and participant-observations, documents, archival records, 
and physical artifacts (Yin, 2003; Creswell, 2007).  Additionally, the “methods can vary 
depending on the case and related research questions but often include interviews, oral history, 
ethnography, and document analysis” (Nagy Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2011, p. 256).   
  Let us now turn to the type of case study employed in this research.  Stake (2005) 
identifies three types of case studies: (1) intrinsic case study (to understand the particular case 
holistically); (2) instrumental case study (a case is studied to generalize or provide insight into a 
larger topic); and (3) multiple case study (multiple cases are studied together to investigate a 
larger phenomenon or population from which the cases are drawn) (cited in Nagy Hesse-Biber 
and Leavy 2011, p. 258).  Methodologically, this social science inquiry employed the 
instrumental case study—as it was the best methodological strategy to answer the proposed 
research questions, which ultimately identified the factors that contribute to the economic 
success of FLFN as well as it assessed and determined the extent of the theoretical applicability 
of the NBM.  In addition, the case study findings have implications on the current oil and gas 
enterprise and business strategies of FLERC, and the local economic development program and 
policy, while serving as a model for other First Nations in similar circumstances.  Because this 
case study is an empirical inquiry into the successful economy of FLFN and evaluation of the 
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applicability of the NBM within the case site, the instrumental case study approach was 
strategically applicable as it captured the FLFN’s perspectives of success and strategies 
employed by FLERC; in addition, it provided a unique opportunity to test the NBM within this 
context.  In both exploratory and explanatory in nature, this instrumental case study produced a 
description of the economic development strategies and produced an economic development 
model predicated on the unique circumstances of FLFN; and it has also applied the theoretical 
model of the NBM, thereby contributing—as empirical research—to the larger picture of AED 
with the aim of providing insight into the complexities of First Nations economic development 
within the oil and gas industry.   
2.3 Data Collection Methods 
The process of data collection occurred in two phases.  The first phase was an extensive 
review of documentary material on the subject of AED, the Harvard Project, and the FLFN.  The 
second phase consisted of semi-structured in-depth interviews with seven individuals for this 
study (to be discusses below).  Equally important, I want to make clear of other unconventional 
data collection methods that played at large part in this case study: non-face-to-face interviews 
via email, telephone, and (with one particular participant) text messaging.  While the semi-
structured in-depth interviews were conducted with participants present, I employed the use of 
emails, telephone calls, and even text messaging to follow-up on areas or responses that I either 
did not completely comprehend, or whereupon it implicated other areas, or where I needed 
clarification or confirmation.  As such, these methods proved effective.  
2.3.1 Documentary Analysis 
As secondary data, an extensive examination of a number of documents, records, and other 
written material was conducted.  Considered an unobtrusive data collection method, document 
analysis, or sometimes referred to as content or textual analysis, is a systematic and intensive 
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process of collecting, reviewing, interrogating, analyzing, and labeling themes or categories in 
various forms of text as well as the examination non-textual materials such as photographs, 
music, television, and so forth (Nagy Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2011; Wisker, 2008; Bell, 2010; 
O’Leary, 2010).  Traditionally, the content analysis method was the systematic examination of 
written text or information in the context of quantitative research, where researchers would count 
or quantify the occurrence of variables or recurring concepts.  Increasingly, “[m]any researchers 
now don’t think in terms of qualitative or quantitative when they think about content analysis—
content analysis merges these categories and can be considered a hybrid” (Nagy Hesse-Biber and 
Leavy, 2011, p. 232).   Characterized as having hybrid and unobtrusive qualities, “[t]he strength 
of this method is that it enables researchers to examine patterns and themes within the objects 
produced in a given culture. Researchers can analyze preexisting data to expose and unravel 
macro processes” (Nagy Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2011, p. 233).    
First, initial documentation (i.e., community meeting minutes, select band council minutes, 
band council resolutions (BCR), capital monies requisition documents, and correspondence from 
external agencies) were examined to understand the socio-economic, cultural and political 
factors behind the community’s decision which resulted in the materialization of FLERC.  
Second, economic development documentation (i.e., FLERC annual financial and audit reports, 
community meeting minutes with emphasis on community business plans and investment plans, 
joint venture agreements, consultation documents, and a 10 Year Review report by FLERC) 
were examined to identify emerging themes which, part of an interrelationship of factors, 
contribute to the economic success of Frog Lake.  Third, community-specific documentation 
(i.e., economic development policies, annual band and program progress reports, community 
meeting minutes, Windtalker newspaper editions, and community website) were examined to 
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develop a collective mental picture of the community in relation to FLERC.  Finally, evaluative 
documentation (i.e., awards, government publications such as the Alberta Chamber of Resources, 
business publications such as the Native Business Development Magazine, and websites such as 
the National Aboriginal Achievement Awards Foundation [now called Indspire]) were examined 
to develop an external viewpoint by various agencies in relation to the economic growth as 
evidenced through FLERC.  In addition, Indian Oil and Gas Canada (IOGC) supplied necessary 
royalty financial information of FLFN as well as information regarding the nature and extent of 
Aboriginal-owned oil companies in Canada.  Beyond documentary analysis of materials 
specifically on FLFN and FLERC, I had to also consult academic, state, and independent 
literature to fully understand the technical-based subject area of the oil and gas industry 
including the market structure, specialized jargon, and IOGC’s role as well as the systematic 
processes in the exploration, drilling, and production of oil.  In other words, I had to educate 
myself about the oil and gas industry and how it related to the topic in this case study. 
2.3.2 In-Depth Interviews 
A large component of the empirical data gathered in this research has been obtained 
through conducting semi-structured in-depth interviews.  Semi-structured interviews propose “a 
series of set questions to be asked and space for some divergence,” (Wisker, 2008, p. 195).  The 
types of questions within the interviews focused on producing data on why and how factors 
contribute to the economic success of FLFN.  As a guide, I devised a set of questions for each 
respondent to encourage unsolicited discussion and thereby elicit “thick descriptions” (Geertz, 
1973).  The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed; the physical integrity of the audio-
recordings and transcriptions were safeguarded in my home office throughout the entirety of this 
project.  While some debate surround the use of audio-recordings in interviews, Seidman (2006) 
claims that tape-recording is a form of “…preserving the words of the participants, researchers 
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have their original data. If something is not clear in a transcript, the researchers can return to the 
source and check for accuracy” (p. 114).  He further argues that “[t]ape-recording also benefits 
the participants. The assurance that there is a record of what they have said to which they have 
access can give them more confidence that their words will be treated responsibly” (p. 114).  As 
such, all interviews have been audio-recorded.   
As dictated by the research questions, the data collection method of in-depth interviewing 
focused on substance-rich areas.  Eight formal interviews were conducted with seven key 
participants, where each signed a Consent Form (see Appendix A) consenting to his or her 
involvement via interviews.  FLERC CEO Joe Dion, a non-community member, was interviewed 
twice on 11 October 2011 and 8 June 2012; as an instrumental figure, his involvement with 
FLERC pre-dated its incorporation in 2000 and still involved to the present day.  FLERC 
Chairman John Zahary, also a non-community member, was interviewed on 17 October 2011 at 
his office in Calgary, Alberta.  FLERC President Raymond Quinney, a community member, was 
interviewed on 8 June 2012 at the FLERC Headquarters in Frog Lake, Alberta.  In his capacity 
as FLERC Oilfield Liaison Melvin Abraham, community member as well, was also interviewed 
on 1 June 2012 at the FLERC Headquarters.  FLFN Councilor Wayne Faithful was interviewed 
at his office at the Frog Lake Administration Office on 1 June 2012.  In another, FLFN 
Councilor Angeline Berland, a veteran politician, was interviewed at her home in Frog Lake, 
Alberta on 2 June 2012.  FLFN Financial Controller Kevin Price, a non-community member, 
was interviewed at my home office in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan on 16 June 2012.  All interviews 
were approximately one hour in duration.  All except one interview was recorded digitally.  An 
interview guide was utilized where questions were not part of the interview guide.  In a fluid 
manner, subsequent questions were also presented based on the responses of the participants.     
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Equally important, upon completion of the interviews—namely with Joe Dion, Raymond 
Quinney, and Melvin Abraham—I found it extremely helpful when the participants, with the aid 
of several maps of FLFN, visually explained the joint venture operations, identified activity areas 
with high hydrocarbon deposits as well as explained the systematic process in how FLERC 
makes the final determination to participate (or not participate) in the drilling of oil wells with its 
joint venture partners.  John Zahary also explained technical terms and processes in the drilling 
and production of oil on FLFN reserve lands.  This exercise proved effective; for example, some 
technical terms, such as ‘working interest’, were clarified.  FLERC, based on the evaluation of 
its own geologists and engineers, would possess a certain percentage of the working interest on 
the wells it initially participates.  Needless to say, their explanations were extremely helpful as 
my comprehension of the technical nature of oil and gas development was limited. 
2.4 Analytical Techniques 
The qualitative data generated from this case study has been analyzed using the data 
analysis strategies described by Creswell (2007).  Drawing upon qualitative data analysis 
techniques from Huberman and Miles (1994) (see also Dey, 1993; Patton, 1980; Agor, 1980; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Punch, 2005; Wellington, 2000), Creswell identifies four stages of data 
analysis: data management; memoing; interpretation; and representation.  Data management is 
organizing the collected data into easily-accessed and retrievable files and units.  The memoing 
of data is the reflection, the writing of fieldnotes in margins that capture short phrases, ideas or 
key concepts to the researcher all within the initial process of exploring the database.  The 
interpretation, description and classification of data involve the development of themes through a 
classification system in light of researcher’s views or views of perspectives in the literature.  
Essentially, the researcher must describe what he or she sees in the context of the setting.  In the 
 28 
 
final phase, researchers present the data, a packaging of what was found in text, tabular, or figure 
form.  To show different levels of abstraction, researchers may use tables, tree diagrams, or 
matrices to fully capture induction of themes and conclusions of the study (Creswell, 2007, pp. 
150-154).   
Based on the above strategy, the data followed a process of transcription, coding, 
analysis, and presentation of results.  Upon receipt of the Transcript Satisfaction and Release 
form, I began the process of coding the data.  The coding process involved the identification and 
categorization of common themes, topics and phrases.  Specifically, using a cross sectional 
technique, I identified common themes, topics and phrases to isolate a group of factors 
contributing to the economic success of FLFN; as well, I further isolated segments of the 
transcriptions to capture the relationship between the identified factors and the outcome of each 
project (with each joint venture partner).     
2.5 FLFN, Departmental and Ethics Committee Approval 
The proposal for this thesis project was first reviewed and approved by an advisory 
committee at the Department of Native Studies, University of Saskatchewan.  Using a required 
template, the proposal was then subsequently reviewed and approved by the University of 
Saskatchewan Behavioural Research Ethics Board (Beh-REB), which found the proposal to be 
acceptable on ethical grounds.  In hard-copy form, a Certificate of Approval was issued by the 
Ethics Board, which was presented to the FLFN Chief and Council as well as each participant in 
the study.  On 13 September 2011, I made a formal presentation to the FLFN Chief and Council 
seeking their approval to conduct the case study on the successful economic development of 
FLFN.  All members of Chief and Council approved the case study.  On behalf of Council, Chief 
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Stanley signed the Research Agreement (see Appendix B) and designated Councilor Wayne 
Faithful to review the final draft of the thesis.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
Review of the Literature 
3. Introduction 
This review explores academic, state, and independent literature on Aboriginal economic 
development.  This review exercise will not only describe what researchers have done and 
identify what they found in their research, but it will also advance the position that this case 
study will contribute to the current state of knowledge by filling unexplored or neglected areas in 
the literature on AED.  Specifically, this case study will increase our understanding of the joint 
venture as an economic strategy employed by FLFN in the oil and gas industry.  In addition, this 
case study will identify what and how such a strategy contributes to the sustained economic 
development of FLFN.      
The bulk of this chapter is presented in one section that is further partitioned into three 
subsections.  As a brief historical context, the first subsection will present literature on AED that 
emerged in the first two-thirds of the twentieth century.  The second subsection will present 
recent literature with the aim of identifying some common themes, and more importantly, 
identifying some gaps in the literature as it pertains to the topic of this case study.  Some of the 
common themes include Aboriginal participation in the capitalist system as a way to address and 
thus improve their socioeconomic circumstances; the coexistence of traditionalism and 
capitalism in the modern approach to development; and the need for sustained capacity 
development at various levels.  This subsection also examines the extent to which the literature 
speaks to the utilization of joint ventures in various industry sectors.  As you will see, the joint 
venture—as a strategic economic model—in the oil and gas industry is virtually unexplored and 
thus utterly neglected in the various bodies of literature.  The final subsection will examine in 
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detail the elements in the NBM formulation and relevant commentary on the Harvard Project.  
This review will end with a summary that identifies the main points of this systematic review 
exercise.   
3.1 Aboriginal Economic Development: Reviewing the Literature 
3.1.1 Brief Historical Context on AED 
Early studies that explored Aboriginal people and societies rarely included economic 
development.  Among the first of those early studies touching upon First Nations economies was 
the comprehensive anthropological assessment by Diamond Jenness in 1932.  For many, “the 
standard work in native history from 1932 until the mid-1960s, Diamond Jenness’ The Indians of 
Canada has had enormous influence on our understanding of native history” (High, 1996, p. 
250).  In his hypercritical, if not derogatory and deterministic, assessment of First Nations 
history, Jenness applied the modernization theory on Aboriginal economic development and 
concluded that they “lagged behind in the march of [economic] progress” (1932, p. 28).  As he 
observed that Aboriginal peoples failed to develop or maximize the use of the resources available 
to them, Jenness was quick to determine the fate of his subjects under study, where he 
concluded: “Socially they are outcasts, economically they are inefficient and an encumbrance. 
Their old world has fallen in ruins, and helpless in the face of a catastrophe they cannot 
understand, they vainly seek refuge in its shattered foundations. The end of the century, it seems 
safe to predict, will see very few survivors” (1932, p. 350).  Evidently, Jenness’ speculations 
proved wrong.  Due in large part by the influence of Jenness’ seminal work, later studies 
examined economic development upon the supposition that First Nations people were unwilling 
to participate in the market economy or attempt to stimulate economic growth in their 
communities (High, 1996).  In short, First Nations were viewed as unable to understand the 
capitalist system and that somehow capitalism—intertwined with individualism—was a foreign 
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poison to their traditional way of life—intertwined with collectivism (Stanley, 1936).  Like 
Jenness, George Stanley (1936) argued that Aboriginal nations “were unfitted to compete with 
the whites in the competitive individualism of white civilization, or to share with them the duties 
and responsibilities of citizenship” (p. vii).   
After the end of the Second World War, the socio-political landscape was changing in 
Canada and other parts of the world.  It can be argued that, in some ways, WWII was a necessary 
international development for Indigenous peoples worldwide; without exception, this global 
event was inextricably linked to the national and regional political resurgence of the Aboriginal 
peoples in Canada.  In short, the national character of post-WWII Canada was changing: a shift 
in societal attitudes was an emerging national phenomenon.  In addition, while “[t]he postwar 
decolonization movement throughout the world raised questions among thoughtful Canadians 
about how long Canada could go on treating native communities as internal colonies” (Miller, 
1989, p. 223), the 1960s civil rights movement in the United States also provided a unique 
opportunity for Aboriginal Canadians to not only reject Canada’s discriminatory policies but to 
also reclaim their rights to self-determination (Miller, 1989).   
In spite of the changes in the Indian Act in 1951, the 1950s and 1960s saw little or no 
progress for First Nations as they continued to live in abject and intractable poverty.  By this 
time, increasing political resurgence resulted in the formations of national and regional (or 
provincial-based) political organizations by various Aboriginal groups; in effect, the efforts of 
these organizations, along with increasing Canadian public awareness, prompted a 
comprehensive study led by anthropologist Harry Hawthorn.  The Hawthorn Report, formally 
titled A Survey of the Contemporary Indians of Canada: Economic, Political, Educational Needs 
and Policies, was released in 1966.  As one of the senior staff of this comprehensive inquiry, 
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Allan Cairns (2000) reveals that the “Hawthorn Report of the mid-1960s was a federal 
government inquiry into the socio-economic, political, and constitutional conditions of status 
Indians, with the task of advising policy makers of the route to a better future for the Indian 
peoples of Canada” (p. 11).  While the Hawthorn Report advanced 151 recommendations, the 
“report rejected assimilation as a certainty, proposing instead the concept of “citizens plus” to 
further emphasize that Indians should benefit from Canadian citizenship while also maintaining 
those rights guaranteed as a result of status and treaty arrangements” (Belanger & Newhouse, 
2004, p. 135).    Incontrovertibly, the Hawthorn Report was a first of its kind.  It recommended 
systematic changes in numerous and various areas to improve socio-economic circumstances, 
and encouraged a renewed relationship between the Canadian state and First Nations.  The 
Hawthorn Report came to an end when “Pierre Trudeau’s Liberal government upon its ascension 
to power in 1968 arbitrarily dismissed the report” (Belanger & Newhouse, 2004, p. 135).  
Modernizationist in orientation, the federal government’s 1969 proposal—the Statement of the 
Government of Canada on Indian Policy—commonly referred to as the White Paper “called for 
the end to the separate legal status for Indian people” (Belanger & Newhouse, 2004, p. 136), 
among other things.   
Though Canada’s White Paper was, by far, the most “breathtaking governmental recipe 
for equality” in Canada-First Nations relations (Dickason & McNab, 2009, p. 371), the proposal 
had quite the reverse effect.  In short, the White Paper, a typical colonialist document, was a 
direct, top-down program to—once and for all—solve Canada’s ‘Indian problem.’  Among the 
objectives of the White Paper included the abolition of the Indian Act, elimination of Aboriginal 
rights as well as the termination of the Numbered Treaties.  Categorically, the White Paper 
represented the Canadian state’s deterministic approach to unilaterally re-institutionalize First 
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Nations people into the Canadian polity that was based on a liberal concept: equality.  At the 
forefront of widespread opposition to the White Paper was the famous Unjust Society by the Late 
Harold Cardinal who served as the President of the Indian Association of Alberta (IAA)—one of 
the most powerful First Nations political organizations—during this period.  In his castigation, 
Cardinal (1969) not only denounced the White Paper and its sweeping proposals for change, but 
he also advanced a particular approach to economic development.  Fundamental to this 
framework, Cardinal (1969) stressed: “[o]ne key factor remains, Indian involvement. Our people 
want the right to set their own goals, determine their own priorities, create and stimulate their 
own opportunities and development” (p. 64).  Cardinal and other organizations clearly 
understood that the White Paper was deeply rooted in its dogmatic tenets of paternalism, 
assimilation and modernization; inadvertently, the White Paper, which was not intended to fuel 
the national and regional political resurgence of Aboriginal groups across Canada, was the 
impetus for the Aboriginal self-determination movement.  After widespread opposition to the 
White paper, Aboriginal organizations and communities increasingly asserted self-
determination—and with it—an economic development component based on their approach.  It 
is from this context that literature on AED began to surface in the 1970s and onward. 
In spite of the White Paper still looming around, the Canadian government established 
the Indian Economic Development Fund (IEDF) in 1970 in an attempt to foster economic 
development in Aboriginal communities.  While this initiative was the first of its kind, Peter 
Elias (1991) argued that, “[b]y the late 1970s, aboriginal organizations and communities were 
coping with government’s narrow focus on economic development through individual initiative. 
There was little room for political and cultural development or communal interests in 
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government approaches” (p. 25).   The IEDF was replaced almost twenty years later by the 
Canadian Aboriginal Economic Development Strategy (CAEDS) in 1989.   
In 1971, the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood (MIB), which became one of Canada’s more 
powerful Native organizations, released the Wahbung: Our Tomorrows (Belanger, 2010, p. 204).  
MIB’s response “was a landmark in the evolution of an indigenous approach to development” 
(Elias, 1991, p. 11).  In terms of economic development, Wahbung appealed to Canada:  
We would ask the private business community to become concerned and 
knowledgeable about problems of the socially deprived and the economic 
underprivileged, that they take the trouble to inform themselves as to the 
extent of this problem, and together with Indian people seek to find ways 
and means of bridging about a more equitable distribution of wealth and 
prosperity. Business can provide the vehicle for economic regeneration 
and we ask that you use your power and influence to participate with us 
in accomplishing that which the State has not been able to accomplish for 
the past 100 years (Wahbung, 1971, p. 174). 
While other Aboriginal organizations released their respective formal responses to the White 
Paper during the early 1970s, “Wahbung’s ingredients have since been essential in most 
aboriginal approaches to development” (Elias, 1991, p. 13).  Wahbung and other formal 
statements by Aboriginal organizations, as a whole, “provided Canadians with the policy 
directions that Native people would pursue in the coming years to achieve a stronger, more self-
reliant economic base” (Belanger, 2010, p. 204).  Its national counterpart, the National Indian 
Brotherhood (NIB), unsatisfied with the development framework of the imposed IEDF, released 
the Strategy for the Socio-economic Development of Indian People in 1977.  This NIB report was 
important because it not only identified the federal development framework to be inconsistent 
with Aboriginal aspirations, but it was instrumental in pushing forward an alternative form of 
development that was more conducive to the social, political, and economic development 
objectives of First Nation communities (Elias, 1991).  While grey literature such as those 
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produced by the state and Aboriginal organizations dominated much of the growing body of 
literature in the 1970s, academic literature began to slowly emerge in the same period.   
Pre-1970s studies tended to focus singularly on “cultural explanations of 
underdevelopment” among Aboriginal groups in Canada (Elias, 1975, p. 2).  The inadequacy of 
those perspectives not only explained part of the problems in which Aboriginal people found 
themselves, but that those orthodox perspectives offered little hope for social change.  By the 
1970s studies (such as Daniels 1970; Dunning 1964; Elias 1975) shifted away from cultural 
contextual perspectives to established economic theories of Aboriginal development with the 
objective of explaining socioeconomic circumstances and how those new approaches provided 
an empirical opportunity to earnestly improve social and living conditions through federal 
policies and programs.  To illustrate Peter Elias’ (1975) employment of the metropolis/hinterland 
model in a case study in Churchill, Manitoba found that, despite non-Aboriginal workers in the 
hinterland who used their labour to participate in the peripheral economy spurred by the 
exploitation of the metropolis, Aboriginal workers were systemically excluded from the 
hinterland’s wage labour economy and thus became a “permanently unemployed class subsisting 
on social assistance” (p. 2).  Elias’ work makes significant contribution and thus exposed that 
capitalist development creates and perpetuates a permanent social underclass of Aboriginal 
people in the metropolis/hinterland economic system in northern Canada.   
 By the mid-1980s the “integrated approach had once more been set aside by Ottawa, and 
a more singular view of development took precedence—economic development” (Frideres, 
1998, p. 431).  From this context a growing body of research began to emerge in response to 
development strategies that narrowly focused on economics alone as well as on the increasing 
exclusion of culture as part of the development process.  Among the few books published in the 
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1980s on the emerging, demanding field of economic development was a comprehensive case 
study by Fred Wien (1986), Rebuilding the Economic Base of Indian Communities: The Micmac 
in Nova Scotia.  Incorporating large amounts of empirical data and various theoretical 
perspectives in an attempt to elicit a general conceptual framework, Wien found and thus 
proposed for the increased role of the public sector in its institutional, interventionist approach to 
development; its role should essentially support community-designed development initiatives to 
create a solid economic base.  While Wien’s study contributes to knowledge and literature in 
which he also identified the necessary development of institutional capacity on Micmac 
communities, he was part of a vanguard of academics that began to identify necessary 
development elements and processes based on their research findings.    
By the early 1990s economic development can be described as stand-alone field of 
inquiry.  As such, AED literature was making a presence and demanding its place.  Accordingly, 
academic literature on AED—in the form of books (for example, Wien, 1986; Bone, 1991; 
Ponting, 1991; Elias, 1991, 1995; Notzke, 1994; Sloan & Hill, 1995)—began to appear.  Among 
those studies were Peter Elias’ Development of Aboriginal People’s Communities (1991) and 
Northern Aboriginal Communities: Economies and Development (1995) that provided much-
needed source for Aboriginal people, academic and policy-makers alike.  Though justifiably yet 
highly descriptive, Elias’ first book produced a detailed study on various initiatives and 
approaches to economic, social and political development employed by Aboriginal communities 
and businesses across Canada.  As editor, his second book—with an appended annotated 
bibliography—provided detailed case studies on economic and business initiatives undertaken by 
northern Aboriginal communities in their involvement in development.  According to Elias, 
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“there is now enough reliable information about Northern aboriginal communities, that planners 
and decision makers can (sic) use of it to guide development initiatives” (1995, p. 23).   
3.1.2 Reviewing Relevant Literature: Some Themes and Gaps 
There is general consensus that the proliferation of AED research in Canada was directly 
influenced by the release of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) in 1996.  It 
can be observed that the field of AED first appeared in the 1970s and more so in 1980s, 
bourgeoning into a demanding distinctive research field by the 1990s.  There is general 
agreement among research communities that economic development is key to sustained 
development as an effective approach.  This observation is based on the systematic production of 
knowledge by researchers in the various research communities; it is an acknowledgement that 
contributes to the emerging picture of the field of AED as a distinct form of economic 
development.   
As part of the construction of AED as a valid discipline, the academic community has 
taken on the task to not only define AED, but also seeks to build a conceptual structure around it.  
And, to a lesser extent, the academic community has generated some theoretical frameworks.  As 
an emergent discipline, Hindle and Moroz (2009, p. 19) claim that embryonic disciplines tend to 
“begin on the periphery of existing paradigms,” Hindle and Lansdowne (2005, p. 133) found the 
lack of a formal “structure in the literature,” while Kayseas, Hindle and Anderson (2006a, p. 
225) found that “[r]esearchers interested in developing a better understanding of Indigenous 
entrepreneurship must essentially act as pioneers in the field.”  Kayseas et al. (2006a, p. 225) go 
on to suggest some critical points: “New theoretical frameworks must be developed, cumulative 
research efforts must begin, and the boundaries of Indigenous entrepreneurship must be 
developed. There is still not yet a critical mass of researchers in this field.”  In terms of the 
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definition, while Australian scholars refer to AED as Indigenous entrepreneurship, AED remains 
the preferred term in the Canada.  Hindle and Lansdowne (2005) define Indigenous 
entrepreneurship as 
…the creation, management and development of new ventures by 
Indigenous people for the benefit of Indigenous people. The 
organizations thus created can pertain to either the private, public or non-
profit sectors. The desired and achieved benefits of venturing can range 
from the narrow view of economic profit for a single individual to the 
broad view of multiple, social and economic advantages for entire 
communities. Outcomes and entitlements derived from Indigenous 
entrepreneurship may extend to enterprise partners and stakeholders who 
may be non-Indigenous (p. 132). 
Canadian scholar Robert Anderson (2002) defines AED within a context of a unique set 
of circumstances affecting Aboriginal peoples and communities.  He writes: 
The Aboriginal people approach to economic development is 
predominantly a collective one, centered on the individual First Nation or 
community.  
For the purposes of: 
1. Attaining economic self-sufficiency as a necessary condition for the 
realization of self-government.  
2. Controlling activities on traditional lands. 
3. Improving the socioeconomic circumstances of Aboriginal people.  
4. Preserving and strengthening traditional cultures and values. 
Involving the following processes: 
5. Creating and operating businesses that can compete profitably over the 
long run in the global economy, to build the economy necessary to 
support self-government and improve socioeconomic conditions.  
6. Creating and operating businesses to exercise the control over the 
economic development process.  
7. Building capacity for economic development through: (i) education, 
training and institution-building, and (ii) the realization of the treaty and 
Indigenous rights to land and resources.  
8. Forming alliances among themselves and with non-Indigenous partners 
to create businesses that can compete profitably in the global economy 
(p. 12). 
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Building on the above definition, Anderson goes on to define entrepreneurship and its 
role in the Aboriginal approach to economic development:  
Entrepreneurship is a process that involves the application of the 
technology of management (a set of principles and tools) to the building 
of enterprises, organizations and institutions that satisfy society’s needs 
and wants (Anderson, 2002, p. 51). 
Though it has become common knowledge that Aboriginal participation in the capitalist 
system has created sustained economic development with the aim of improving their 
socioeconomic situations, I want to stress—if not confirm—this prevailing theme across research 
communities in the literature.  It provides a general conceptual framework by which research 
efforts can begin or increasingly focus on AED as this has been, and continues to be, the overall 
determinant in the positive development of Aboriginal societies in modern times.  To support 
this claim, one not only needs to look at the volume of studies that has increased since RCAP’s 
release in 1996, but also the substance and recommendations in those studies.  Undeniably, a 
significant part in the RCAP report viewed economic development as a vehicle to achieve 
sustained development.  At the same time, the Commissioners warned that, if nothing is done, 
“the cost of the status quo could increase by 47 per cent over the next 20 years, from $7.5 billion 
to $11 billion by 2016” (RCAP, vol. 5, p. 49).  Academic research was also echoing the need for 
special strategic approaches in the field of economic development.  In his reasoning Anderson 
(2001) hypothesized that: 
The current socioeconomic circumstances of Aboriginal people in 
Canada are unacceptable and they will worsen over time unless 
‘something’ is done. The cost of failing to do ‘something’ will be 
immense and will be borne by all Canadians not just Aboriginal people. 
The ‘something’ that needs to be done is economic development (p. 41). 
As academic research was quick to incorporate (or critique) the RCAP findings and 
recommendations, other significant state research efforts have also provided some of the 
 41 
 
initiatives, processes, and conditions necessary to foster economic development in Aboriginal 
communities.  In The Promise of the Future: Achieving Economic Self-Sufficiency Through 
Access to Capital, the National Aboriginal Financing Task Force (1997) identified an eight-step 
process for Aboriginal communities to achieve economic sufficiency. Among those 
recommendations was the need to develop businesses: “The most effective way (and probably 
the only way) for Aboriginal/First Nations communities to address their current socio-economic 
challenges is to create wealth through business activity” (p. 14).  While this report was 
suggestive in nature, the joint project by the Native Investment and Trade Association and 
Growth Strategies International (1998) found that: 
The factors that influenced the success of Aboriginal enterprises to the 
greatest extent were a determination to innovate by developing new 
products and processes, to develop core competencies like marketing 
skills, and to find new customers and markets. The more that companies 
did these, the more successful they were (p. 4). 
In a presentation to the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples (2007), 
Matthew Coon-Come not only addressed the need for economic development, but also the need 
for Aboriginal involvement in the process.  He stated: 
I do not think any First Nation community is anti-development, whether 
we are talking about hydro-electric development, forestry, mining, the tar 
sands or the pipe lines. The Aboriginal people are talking about having a 
share in the wealth of this country. I am talking about revenue sharing 
and having a say in the way that development takes place (p. 69).  
While the above statement underscores and necessitates a relationship between 
Aboriginal people, state, and the provinces, Kayseas, Hindle, Anderson, and Camp (2005) 
observed that: 
Many see economic development as the key to success. This is certainly 
true for the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada (the First Nations, Métis and 
Inuit). Through entrepreneurship and business development they believe 
they can attain their economic and ‘nation-building’ objectives. Many 
Aboriginal groups in Canada believe they can achieve these purposes 
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through participation in the global economy and have adopted processes 
that reflect this belief (p. 1).  
Among the common themes in the AED literature is the coexistence of the Aboriginal 
worldview with Western capitalism.  More specifically, recent studies have shown that 
successful economic development in Aboriginal communities—through the participation in the 
global capitalist system—continues to be based on the incorporation of their cultures, histories, 
and belief systems.  As such, this new form of development can be described as an alternative 
approach to development.  This alternative approach, while still predicated on the tenets of 
capitalism as it seeks to create wealth and prosperity, is being applied within a unique set of 
circumstances experienced by First Nations people and communities.  Mohawk scholar David 
Newhouse (2009), who coined the phrase ‘capitalism with a red face,’ argues that Aboriginal 
societies are undergoing, if not already embracing, the ubiquitous process of modernization: 
“[t]his process is resulting in the development of new identities and new social, political, cultural 
and economic institutions within aboriginal societies” (p. 108).  He goes on to argue that “[t]hese 
institutions … will be primarily Western in nature and will be adapted to operate in accordance 
with aboriginal traditions, customs and values (Newhouse, 2009, p. 108).  In another highly 
descriptive study, Indigenous scholar Wanda Wuttunee (2004), while drawing heavily on the 
Elements of Development model by Salway Black (1994), found that the blending of tradition 
with capitalism among eight community-owned businesses can be economically successful in the 
wider Canadian economy.  In Sharing Canada’s Prosperity—A Hand Up, Not a Handout, the 
Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples (2007) concluded that “it is evident that 
Aboriginal Canadians want to benefit from economic development, but “own their own terms” 
… [and that] economic opportunities must fit into their cultural framework” (pp. 4-5).   
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Capacity development is another common feature in the AED literature.  Capacity 
development is used to describe the development of human, social, and financial capital 
necessary to create and sustain economic development.  In its report From Vision to Venture: An 
Account of Five Successful Aboriginal Businesses, the Conference Board of Canada (2008) 
identified nine keys critical to success.  In terms of experience and expertise, they said: 
Aboriginal entrepreneurs that have education, training, and/or workplace 
learning in business are better equipped to succeed, particularly if that 
expertise is industry related. Aboriginal businesses that encourage a 
learning environment in the workplace and facilitate knowledge transfer 
reap the benefits of the improved productivity and work quality of their 
employees (p. 42). 
Recent and much research share this need for human capacity; moreover, it is a theme that tends 
to dominate independent research.  In addressing external investor confidence in relation to 
human capital, Tim Raybould (2006) reveals some of the concerns investors may have in their 
investments in Aboriginal communities: 
‘Human capital’ is, of course, as vital as physical capital, so an investor 
might well ask “What is the availability of a labour workforce?” “How 
well trained is it?” “What educational facilities exist nearby?” (p. 15). 
In fact, what these themes refer to is the construction of a process to building (or 
rebuilding) areas in the community to create sustained economic development and community 
well-being.  For some, the emphasis of process is along different lines.  For example, Cynthia 
Chataway (2002) argues that social capital is just as important as other forms of capacity in the 
development process.  She posits that “generalized trust (social capital), and a capacity to discuss 
rather than suppress conflict (social cohesion), are crucial to long-term success in economic 
development and self-government” (Chataway, 2002, p. 76).  The feature of financial capacity is 
another concern that permeates the literature.  Not only at the individual level, but it is a far 
greater challenge for First Nation communities to secure capital (or loans) due to the inflexibility 
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of the regulatory regime of the Indian Act (RCAP, 1996).  In one of its annual reports, the 
Auditor General of Canada said: 
First Nations told us they have difficulty accessing capital. Investing in 
economic development activities requires capital. Most of the First 
Nations we visited do not have large investment funds and, under the 
provisions of the Indian Act and other agreements, they cannot use 
reserve land, often their most valuable resource, as collateral for loans 
(Economic Development of First Nations Communities: Institutional 
Arrangements, 2003, p. 7). 
Thus far this case study has presented some of the emerging themes in the literature on 
AED.  Recent academic, state, and independent studies have observed and identified specific 
economic strategies as part of the approaches to development employed by Aboriginal people.  
Among those strategies is the joint venture—the focus of this case study.  In fact, a considerable 
number of economically successful First Nation communities in Canada have and are utilizing 
joint ventures (also referred to as corporate/Aboriginal alliances or strategic partnerships) as the 
primary vehicle to sustained economic development in their participation in the global capitalist 
economy (Kayseas, Hindle, Anderson & Camp, 2005; Anderson, 1997).  This case study—
through FLFN as the single unit of analysis—seeks to expand on this discussion of joint ventures 
with the objective of increasing our understanding about how this strategy is being employed to 
create wealth, jobs, and other benefits within the oil and gas industry.  Not only have First 
Nations built sustainable economies through joint ventures, but their successes have been 
showcased and thus serve as a model for other First Nations who wish to create sustained and 
viable economies.  In its most basic form, a joint venture is “an economic partnership” (Ferrazi, 
1990, p. 15).  More specifically, a “joint venture is a contractual arrangement between two or 
more investors to share the control of an activity…. Usually a joint venture is formed for a 
particular business purpose or project…. [It is] a written, legally binding agreement that clarifies 
the terms of the venture, including the rights and responsibilities of the investors….” (Anderson, 
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2002, p. 104).  As well, “[c]ontrols, revenues, and other benefits are divided between the partners 
based on a negotiated agreement and the proportion of the shares held by each partner” (Fraser, 
2002, p. 42).   
 Among earlier studies on joint ventures was the study by James Frideres (1984).  
Focusing on natural resource development among First Nation communities in Alberta with large 
fossil fuel or hydrocarbon deposits, Frideres’ (1984) exploratory study outlined the types of 
strategies (or agreements) used to exploit natural resources which include three methods: 
concession, the most common approach, requires little or no capital from the band and its 
involvement minimal; joint venture, where two (or more) partners pool their interests such as 
capital, capacity, and land in order to develop the resource potential; and service contract, as 
opposed to a concession where band transfer title of lands to developers, an oil company is hired 
to extract the oil for a contractual price (p. 59).  In a later study Frideres (1998) found that First 
Nations were also utilizing other methods in the development of on-reserve natural resources, 
which included the co-management partnership, management agreement, community 
development corporation, and local producers’ cooperatives (pp. 446-449).  Though the 
exploratory research by Frideres (1984, 1998) was essentially describing some of the First 
Nations economic strategies employed in resource development, his studies were important 
because it not only underscored emerging economic opportunities in the oil and gas industry, but 
he found that economic strategies can be used to further develop communities that go beyond 
First Nations as simple beneficiaries of royalties.   
 By the 1980s, Aboriginal groups in Canada were forging new links with the mainstream 
economy; they saw an economic opportunity that can be achieved through a form of partnership 
with private business partners in various industries.  For many this new partnership was based on 
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the joint venture model.  While Frideres (1984) explored some of the ways in which First 
Nations can exploit their natural resources in relation to DIAND’s policy, Gabriele Ferrazzi 
(1989) further examined joint ventures in various industries and some of the associated benefits 
(and trade-offs) as well as the lack of research available for joint venture partners and policy-
makers.  Gabriele Ferrazzi (1989) argued that Aboriginal people have been drawn to the joint 
venture model out of necessity, and saw this approach as the only way to overcome barriers such 
as the lack of capital, technical and managerial capacity.  He identified some of the benefits in 
joint ventures including the obtainment of sufficient capital to finance a venture; attainment of 
some form of control over development; receiving a portion of venture profit; achieving greater 
local employment; transferring of managerial and technical skills; and sharing of risk (Ferrazzi 
1989, p. 18).  Ferrazzi (1989, pp. 20-21) found that Aboriginal groups were creating economic 
partnerships in various industries:  
testing, manufacturing and marketing a new irrigation hose (Membertou 
Band and a Texas Entrepreneur);  
designing, manufacturing and marketing fiberglass canoes (James Bay 
Cree and Yahama);  
dressing and dyeing operation (Nipissing Indian #10 and de’Medici & 
Company of Milan, Italy);  
resource development-related trucking industry (Lac La Ronge Indian 
Band and Trimac Transportation);  
manufacturing chopsticks (Sturgeon Lake Band and Harbin International 
Corporation for Technology and Economic Development); and  
drilling and service rig operations (Denendeh Development Corporation, 
Métis Development Corporation, and Esso combined to form Shehtah 
Drilling Ltd.).     
Ferrazzi not only found that the joint venture model has been the preferred and perhaps the most 
effective method employed by Aboriginal people as part of their approaches to economic 
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development, but he also warned that “the successful management of the joint venture, including 
its highly charged political context, will be hampered by the dearth of relevant research 
conducted to date that could provide useful guidance to practitioners and government policy 
makers (1989, p. 27).  He observed that “practitioners and government facilitators are learning as 
they go along, with all of the inefficiencies this entails.”  To avoid this, Ferrazzi encourages that 
“more researchers, government policy makers and practitioners [must] choose to formalize and 
disseminate the learning so that potential joint venture partners will avoid some pitfalls and not 
have to reinvent the wheel” (1984, p. 28).   
While academic inquires by Frideres (1984, 1989) and Ferrazzi (1989) were highly 
exploratory in that they were describing the emerging trend of economic development through 
the use of joint ventures in various industry sectors, Sloan and Hill (1995) have taken a different 
approach which looked at corporate ‘partnership’ policies and programs—in both the public and 
private sectors—“designed to build constructive partnerships with communities and expand 
employment and business opportunities for Aboriginal people” (Sloan & Hill, 1995, p. ix).  This 
trend in corporate Canada, Sloan and Hill (1995) observed that “[t]he number of Aboriginal 
relations programs in Canada has grown significantly in each of the past three decades, with the 
greatest growth in activity taking place in the last five years” (p. x).  In one of their case studies, 
they found that the corporate policy of Syncrude—one of Canada’s largest oil producer in the oil 
sands—has resulted in job creation for Aboriginal workers as well as contractual work for 
Aboriginal businesses.  Aside from the misnomer of the book’s title Corporate Aboriginal 
Relations: Best Practice Case Studies, Sloan and Hill (1995) neglected to incorporate some of 
the joint venture arrangements between First Nations and industry partners; instead, they focused 
on the goodwill of the public and private sectors, and not on joint venture arrangements already 
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in place which are often characterized as equal partnerships.  While Sloan and Hill’s (1995) 
research was intended to assist corporations in developing and implementing Aboriginal 
programs, Lewis and Hatton (1992) published a much-needed practical and useful guide titled 
Aboriginal Joint Ventures: Negotiating Successful Partnerships to assist Aboriginal communities 
considering the joint venture as an economic strategy with the overarching goals of “maximizing 
benefits while reducing risks” (p. 54).   
Among empirical research that began to increase our understanding into joint ventures is 
the case study of the Meadow Lake Tribal Council’s (MLTC) forestry activities by Anderson 
(1997).  He found that, while First Nation businesses—who appealed to the corporation’s ‘profit 
motive’—resulted in “lasting business alliances” (p. 1491), “an increasing number of companies 
are [also] adopting a strategy involving business alliances with aboriginal people in order to 
penetrate their market and/or gain access to their resources” (Anderson, 1997, p. 1499).  He also 
found that joint ventures and/or collectively owned businesses were the preferred business forms 
in MLTC’s economic strategies; these business forms did well for MLTC from the “perspective 
of revenue, long-term profitability and the creation of permanent employment” (Anderson, 1997, 
p. 1499).  Similar to the results of the above case study, Kayseas, Hindle and Anderson (2006a), 
in another case study involving the Osoyoos Indian Band (OIB), found that strategic partnerships 
were effective economic strategies in the service and winery industries.  Critically, central to 
these industries was OIB’s main resource: land.  In fact, the “Osoyoos Indian Band have 
mobilized their real estate assets from potential capital into annual revenues—even while it is 
still under the authority of the Department of Indian Affairs” (Kayseas et al., 2006a, p. 235).    
 Researchers such as Frideres (1984, 1998), Ferrazzi (1990), Anderson (1997, 1999, 
2002), Fraser (2002), and Kayseas, Hindle, Anderson and Camp (2002) have increased our 
 49 
 
understanding of joint ventures as economic strategies and its use into various industries.  With 
the exception of a very brief discussion of a joint venture between White Bear Oil and Gas and 
Tri Link Resources Ltd in Anderson’s (1999) work, in-depth academic analyses of joint venture 
partnerships between First Nations and oil companies are virtually unexplored and thus neglected 
in the literature.  What are readily available are countless oil industry joint venture partnerships 
and success stories among state research.  The extent to which state research claims successful 
joint ventures is merely informative rather than a critical examination of them.  As such, this case 
study contributes to this unexplored area; as well, it is important to fill this gap as more and more 
First Nation communities are seeking the joint venture as an economic strategy in their 
approaches to economic development.  As contemporary Aboriginal leaders demand for 
increased revenue sharing, perhaps the method to achieve this can be accomplished via joint 
venture model.   
Recent studies on AED and joint ventures have made strategic use of the case study 
method.  Hindle and Moroz (2009) claim that “the emergent Indigenous entrepreneurship canon 
features more conceptual than empirical works and what empirical studies do exist tend to be 
case studies. This is not an unusual situation for an embryonic discipline” (p. 19).  In fact, it is 
abundantly clear that case studies dominate much of the research communities (for example, 
Anderson, 1994, 1999, 2002; Vodden, 2002; Slowey, 2008; Innes & Pelletier, 2008; Wuttunee, 
2004; Kayseas, Hindle & Anderson, 2006a; Kayseas, Hindle & Anderson, 2006b; Hindle, 
Anderson, Giberson & Kayseas, 2005; Anderson & Bone, 1999; Goodfellow-Baikie, 2006; 
Conference Board of Canada, 2008; Johnstone, 2008; Belanger, 2005; Smith, 2002; Boyd & 
Trosper, 2010; GBC Group Inc., 2010; Inkster, 2009).  Undeniably, this methodological choice 
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of research has provided, and will continue to provide, for an in-depth understanding of AED 
among diverse Aboriginal groups in various industry sectors in Canada and elsewhere.     
3.1.3 The Harvard Project 
As part of the theoretical component in this case study, the nation-building model—as the 
primary theoretical framework—was employed to determine the applicability in the context of 
the successful economic development of FLFN.  The following subsections will examine the 
components that comprise the NBM and some of the leading critiques, commentaries, and 
observations on the Harvard Project.   
3.1.3.1 The Nation-Building Model 
By the 1980s a discernible pattern of economic success was emerging among Native 
American tribes in the United States.  Though few in number, Native American tribes were 
breaking away from historic and established patterns of poverty.  From this observation led to the 
research efforts of the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development (Harvard 
Project) to explain this phenomenon in ‘Indian Country.’  Founded in 1987 by sociologist 
Stephen Cornell and political economist Joseph Kalt at the Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University, their primary (or original) research has taken them to over sixty-seven 
Native tribal communities in the US.  After years of research, the Harvard theorists identified a 
three-point formulation, which was later supplemented with two additional elements, called the 
nation-building model (NBM).  The Harvard Project now operates in association with the Native 
Nations Institute (NNI) at the University of Arizona’s Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy.   
The Harvard Project sought to answer three questions: “What works? Where does it 
work? Why does it work? In other words, what accounts for the economic success of some 
Indian nations, while others continue to struggle?” (Simeone, 2007, p. 1).  After years of 
research, the answers to those questions have led to the final formulation of key determinants of 
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economic development success and sustainability.  As a theoretical model, the NBM is about 
achieving: de facto sovereignty, effective governing institutions, cultural match, strategic 
orientation, and effective leadership.  In addition, the “most consistent predictors of sustainable 
economic development on Indian reservations are not economic factors such as location, 
educational attainment or natural resource endowments but rather largely political ones” 
(Cornell, 2006, p. 13).  The central characteristics of the nation-building approach are described 
below: 
 
Figure 3-1 The Nation-Building Model 
 Source: Cornell & Kalt, 2007, p. 19. 
In terms of de facto sovereignty or practical self-rule, Indigenous leaders must assert and 
exercise real decision-making authority at the local level.  Key to sustainable development, 
Cornell and Kalt (2007) argue that practical sovereignty not only positions the development 
agenda in Native hands, but it also increases the degree of leadership accountability in which 
decisions and their consequences lead to better decisions (p. 21).  In other words, “once decisions 
move into Native hands, then the decision makers themselves have to face the consequences of 
their decisions” (Cornell & Kalt, 2007, p. 21) or reap the benefits of those decisions.  Harvard 
theorists hypothesize that if federal (or other external) funding agencies continue to set the 
development agenda on Indigenous communities—typically through a model that is externally-
based and top-down in approach—the results of that decision-making process will not reflect the 
communities’ goals, values and needs that are critical to long-term and sustainable development.  
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In short, the nation-building approach requires Indigenous leaders to assert decision-making 
authority so that the development agenda remains an exclusive area to Indigenous governments. 
 The second determinant is effective governing institutions.  This means that Indigenous 
communities must establish effective and capable institutions to not only support local decision-
making, but to create an environment conducive for business growth (Calliou, 2008).  To the 
Harvard theorists, “[t]his is a matter of governing institutions” (Cornell & Kalt, 2007, p. 22).  
They argue that the assertion of practical sovereignty—by itself—is not enough to create 
sustained economic development.  Rather, practical sovereignty requires the institutional support 
of local administrative bodies to “get things done reliably and effectively” (Cornell & Kalt, 2007, 
p. 23); an established, depoliticized ‘set of rules’ such as dispute resolution mechanisms and 
regulations on the treatment of businesses and enterprises for both local and outside investors; 
and the separation of the political and business spheres (Calliou, 2008).  A stable environment 
will “send a message to investors—from community citizens considering taking a job with a 
tribal or First Nation government to those thinking of starting business on Indigenous lands—
that they will be treated fairly and that their investments of time, energy, ideas, or money will not 
be [held] hostage to politics” (Cornell, Jorgensen, Kalt & Spilde, 2005, p. 5).  They stress their 
key research finding in that—typically—Native American tribes have “developed a reliable and 
politically independent court system” (Cornell, Jorgensen & Kalt, 2002, p. 4), ensuring a 
separate judicial process on the resolution of disputes from political interference.   
The third determinant is cultural match.  This requirement, the Harvard theorists argued, 
is “a fit between those governing institutions and indigenous political culture—in short, the 
institutions had to match indigenous ideas about how authority should be organized and 
exercised; otherwise, it would lack legitimacy with the people being governed and would lose 
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their trust and allegiance” (Cornell, Curtis & Jorgensen, 2004, p. 7).  In other words, cultural 
match refers to the legitimacy of governance; with it, community members view their 
government as the politically appropriate unit responsible for the strategic directions of the 
community.  Conversely, “[w]here cultural match is low, legitimacy is low, and governing 
institutions are more likely to be toothless, ignored, disrespected, and/or turned into vehicles for 
personal enrichment” (Cornell & Kalt, 2003, p. 202).   
The fourth prescription is strategic orientation, albeit less systemically addressed in their 
research.  The Harvard theorists found that economically successful communities are those that 
“moved away from crisis management and opportunistic, quick-fix responses to development 
dilemmas and toward long-term decision-making that incorporates community priorities, 
concerns, circumstances, and assets” (Cornell, Jorgensen & Kalt, 2002, p. 5).  They argued that 
Indigenous nations should approach community development by asking one fundamental 
question: “what kind of society are we trying to build?” (Cornell & Kalt, 2007, p. 25).   
The final determinant in the NBM formulation is effective leadership.  Essentially, 
leaders must possess the capacity and serve as nation builders and mobilizers.  Proactive—as 
opposed to reactive—in nature, leadership is effective when “[t]here is some group or set of 
individuals who are willing to break with status quo practices in development and governance, 
can articulate a new vision of the nations’ futures, and can both understand the effectively 
encourage the foundational changes that such visions require” (Cornell, Jorgensen & Kalt, 2002, 
p. 5).  Like strategic orientation, effective leadership has received less systematic analysis in 
their field research; however, they strongly believe that, as their evidence suggests, effective 
leadership is a critical factor in fostering sustainable economic and community development.   
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In their circumspection, the Harvard theorists claimed simultaneously that the “nation-
building approach is no guarantee of economic success, but vastly improves the chances that 
economic development will take root and be sustainable. It is far more likely to produce 
prosperity for the nation and its people” (Cornell & Kalt, 2003, p. 193).  They claim that once 
these five criteria are in place, “natural resources, location, financial capital, and other assets 
begin to pay off.”  Conversely, they further contend that, “[w]here they are absent, such assets 
are more often squandered, failing to deliver sustainable economic performance or lasting 
improvements in community welfare” (Cornell, Jorgensen & Kalt, 2002, p. 5).   
3.1.3.2 Review of Commentary 
Warren Weir (2007) argues that since the mid-1990s, “much of the discussion about 
Aboriginal economic and business development came to Canada via researchers located south of 
the border.  Many of these ideas came from the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic 
Development” (p. 10).  Though Weir’s assertion is impugnable, the fact remains that the Harvard 
Project has, and continues to have, extensive influence on the economic development of 
Aboriginal people in Canada and elsewhere in the world.  While academic, state, and 
independent research make reference to the NBM, there is a lack of analytical research on the 
Harvard Project in terms of its applicability in unique First Nations circumstances in Canada.  
Specifically, the growing body of research on the Harvard Project tends to focus on the 
conceptual analysis of the NBM, while any empirical analysis of it is virtually absent.  Aside 
from a few academic studies that applied the NBM such as Christina Dowling (2005) and Robert 
Innes and Terrence Pelletier (2008), there is virtually no qualitative (or quantitative) case studies 
that effectively apply the NBM in a uniquely First Nation context in Canada.  Among other 
things, this has made Canadian observers—both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal alike—unsettled 
and thus question the validity of the Harvard Project theoreticians’ claim that the NBM can be 
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easily (and ought to be) applicable in the Canadian First Nations contexts.  Undeniably, the 
Harvard Project “has become increasingly familiar in Canada over the past decade, particularly 
among government policy-makers and Aboriginal leaders” (Simeone, 2007, p. 1).   
Perhaps one of the more important reports that has scrutinized the findings and 
recommendations of the Harvard Project has been the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
(RCAP).  Though the Commissioners share and reaffirm some of the necessary conditions and 
factors of the Harvard Project, they nevertheless claim that, “[w]hether in a Canadian or a U.S. 
context, it is not likely that a particular nation or tribe will be strong in all areas, nor is this 
necessary …. In general, however, the more elements in place, the better the nation’s prospects” 
(RCAP, Vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 825).  As part of its closing analysis of the Harvard Project, RCAP 
argued:  
The situation in Canada is somewhat different from that in the United 
States; for example, Aboriginal rights and the treaty relationship, 
including the terms of the treaties and comprehensive land claims, are 
significant factors shaping the context for economic development in 
Canada. In addition, factors that Cornell and Kalt take as given, such as 
the degree of political autonomy and the endowment of land and natural 
resources, remain unresolved to a large degree in Canada—indeed, they 
are the subject of this Commission’s mandate and recommendations 
(RCAP, Vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 825). 
Tonina Simeone, a researcher from the Library of Parliament of Canada, is stupefied and 
unsettled as she observes that, “[g]iven the wide acceptance of the prescriptions of the Harvard 
Project, the absence of any substantive Canadian analysis is puzzling” (2007, p. 10).  Though 
stating the obvious, Simeone further notes that the “Harvard findings are, by themselves, largely 
unexceptional in that local decision-making capacity, good governance and properly functioning 
institutions have long been understood as important determinants of economic success; indeed, 
these conclusions extend well beyond the field of Aboriginal policy and are widely accepted in 
general management literature” (2007, p. 6).  She shares others’ views in that “[c]riticisms of the 
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Harvard Project centre mainly on the study’s key findings that, apart from effective self-
government, nothing else has worked to alleviate the conditions and poverty experienced by 
Indian nations (Simeone, 2007, p. 6).    
In First Nations and the Canadian State, Canadian political scientist Alan Cairns is 
extremely cautious of the manner upon which contemporary Aboriginal leaders and governments 
desire to push self-government arrangements.  In his discussion, Cairns, addressing the aspect of 
self-government—or de facto sovereignty—of the Harvard Project, contends that:  
The achievement of self-government will probably fall short of the goals 
of its most passionate supporters. It remains, nevertheless, a desirable 
goal. The attainment of self-government, however, does not mean that 
the relation of federal and provincial governments to self-governing First 
Nations and their people suddenly becomes irrelevant. The small size of 
First Nations and the limitations on governing capacities that necessarily 
involves mean that many policies, regulations, and services will continue 
to come from federal and provincial governments. Self-government, no 
matter how ambitious and successful, is not enough. Virtually all the 
great affairs of the state will continue to be handled by federal and 
provincial governments. Further, the needs and desires of the 60 percent 
of the Aboriginal population that is mainly urban, which is heterogeneous 
and lacks a land base, requires sympathetic policies from the federal, 
provincial, and municipal governments. We need to think of the total 
constitutional order, not just the limited escape from its functioning 
offered by self-government for small populations (Cairns, 2005, p. 21). 
Cairns does admit, however, that the Harvard Project “criteria do not guarantee success, but they 
do increase the possibility of attaining it more frequently. They are criteria that seek to mobilize 
local leadership in tune with local culture and local economic and other realities” (2005, p. 20).   
Cairns’ position is premised on his acute observations of Canadian First Nations’ circumstances 
which are, among other things, fundamentally different than the U.S. experience—and most 
importantly, he believes that the Harvard theoretical model is inapplicable within the Canadian 
context.  To elucidate, Simeone explains:  
… Canadian scholar Alan Cairns finds that the authors of the Harvard 
Project have advanced their findings without testing, or accounting, for 
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other causal variables, such as population size, proximity and access to 
markets, and government investments in infrastructure and other services. 
For example, American Indian nations, such as the Navajo and Cherokee 
nations, have populations upward of 250,000. In Canada, two-thirds of 
First Nations have on-reserve populations of fewer than 500 people and 
many are isolated and remote (2007, p. 7). 
In an extensive judicious analysis, Martin Mowbray, an Australian scholar, critically 
anatomizes the Harvard Project’s methodologies, findings and recommendations.  In his critique, 
Mowbray identifies and thus addresses key weaknesses of the Harvard Project.  Not unlike 
Cairns he notes that there are legitimate and realistic concerns about the policy implications of 
the Harvard Project that could be detrimental for communities or regions not sharing or 
resembling that of the experience of Native American tribes.  In terms of methodology, 
Mowbray vehemently claims that, “[t]aken as a whole, the empirical justification for the Harvard 
Project claims is weak. The limitations of these empirical data are so serious that Cornell and 
Kalt should be much more circumspect in drawing their repeated, adamant and widely 
disseminated conclusions” (2006, p. 98).  Specifically, Mowbray claims that the Harvard Project 
researchers, inter alia, used old data, relied on small and subjective sample sizes which led them 
to assert the determinant of cultural match, discount important variables such as college, 
university or trade qualifications as determinants for economic success, and obscure, if not 
conflate, their analysis in terms of correlation and causation (2006, p. 99).  Mowbray critiqued 
the Harvard Project in the conclusion of his article as follows:  
The defects in the evidence that underpins the Harvard Project findings 
and recommendations are serious. They give rise to a number of 
problems of omission. One of these is that the Harvard Project 
researchers do not control (or test) for numerous other potentially 
important causal variables. Some of these are as fundamental as the 
possible effect of settlement size on economic prospects, the proximity of 
large cities, or the potential effect of significant and heavily targeted 
federal or state funded infrastructure or services…. analytic concepts that 
followers of other schools of thought find important are excluded from 
the analysis. For example, the concepts of state, class, and even race or 
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racism are discounted. So is gender. This means the Harvard Project 
analysis does take into account some explanations for the outcomes of 
past government interventions…. One of the most serious points 
concerns the use that is made of such deeply problematic research. Given 
the implications of the conclusions that Cornell, Kalt and others base on 
flawed data, the situation is remarkable. Just how their claims are 
sustained, especially in jurisdictions as remote from the USA and as 
different from each other as Australia and New Zealand, is an evocative 
question. Amongst other things, it raises a further query about the extent 
to which policy makers and their advisers need to verify the claims of 
researchers…. The Harvard Project also conveys the notion that 
Indigenous sovereignty is achievable through local governance. 
Indigenous leaders and others also need to be cautious about the way in 
which endorsement of the Harvard Project findings may be to legitimate 
the idea of governments transferring responsibility for solving problems 
to unprepared Indigenous communities (Mowbray, 2006, pp. 100-101). 
Like Mowbray, Patrick Sullivan, another Australian commentator, addresses the 
methodological issues increasingly detected in the Harvard study.  Sullivan claims that the 
“Harvard Project studies are an impressive body of work, but two things are apparent: the link 
between the conclusions and the data is, at best, not demonstrated, and the conclusions of the 
papers themselves are considerably more complex than the three-point formula inherited by 
Australia” (2006, p. 6).  While Sullivan notes that the Harvard Project’s first principle 
‘sovereignty’ is a rather contentious term in the Australian context due in part by the political 
sensitivity attached to it and that the word itself has been replaced with ‘political jurisdiction,’ he 
agrees with Cornell and Kalt that there should be some form of sovereignty or authority 
exercised by community leadership.  Though a given, he agrees with the syllogism: “[w]here 
people are asked to make decisions without any real control, they may make extremely 
irresponsible decisions because of lack of repercussion on the person making the decision; or 
they make decisions with good will that are nevertheless ill-informed; or decisions may be made 
by those who just don’t care one way or another” (2006, p. 9).  Interestingly, Sullivan finds that 
the Harvard Project is “not primarily concerned with the existence of significant commercial 
 59 
 
resources. Where they depart quite radically from other development studies is in the 
identification of governance processes as crucial to development, not the ownership of resources 
with commercial value (2006, p. 10).  He further adds that “[t]heir approach to good governance 
is founded in standard business management principles” (Sullivan, 2006, p. 10).    
Like RCAP, Cairns, Mowbray and Sullivan, Christina Dowling (2005) critiques what the 
Harvard Project fails to account in its widely disseminated analysis.  From an anthropological 
perspective, Dowling finds that some contemporary First Nations cultures—more specifically, in 
their diverse systems of social organization—are highly egalitarian and exhibit “multivocality—a 
concept alien to the Harvard Project” (2005, p. 126).  Emphasizing and accounting for the 
ideological differences, Dowling holds that the “Harvard Project embraces western style 
economics, underpinned by an individualistic orientation and acceptance of authority based on 
self-interest” (2005, p. 120); in effect, this means that First Nations, who are highly egalitarian 
and multivocal, will likely be a mismatch in the conceptualization and operationalization of the 
Harvard model.  And even more disturbing, it could have undesirable consequences for 
Aboriginal communities not anticipated by the Harvard researchers if nation-building 
arrangements are implemented.  “Instead of a building block approach,” writes Dowling, 
“grounded in First Nation traditional economies, Cornell and Kalt propose working ‘backwards’ 
from the requirements of capitalistic economic activity” (Dowling, 2005, p. 120).  In terms of 
cultural match, Dowling counters with some valid questions:  
How can anyone [i.e., First Nations] reconcile environmental 
guardianship with a resource-based, profit-driven, westernized notion of 
economic development that does little more than pay lip service to the 
idea of ‘sustainable economic development’? How can anyone create a 
cultural match between a hegemonic society which reveres individual 
success, and one which values community and equality? (2005, p. 126). 
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Based on preliminary evidence, Indigenous scholar Bob Kayseas (2006a), along with 
Hindle and Anderson, found that some First Nation communities have achieved economic 
success despite the Harvard Project’s findings.  In fact, they found that the restrictive nature of 
the Indian Act system has not limited First Nation communities from achieving sustained 
economic development—that is, they found that the ‘assertion of de facto sovereignty’ was not a 
prerequisite for creating sustained economies in some First Nation communities in Canada.  As 
such, Kayseas et al. (2006a) believe that the “applicability of some of the [Harvard Project] 
conclusions may be in question – at least in regards to Canadian Indigenous communities” (p. 
237).   
While a proliferating number of critical observers reject, whole or in part, the Harvard 
Project’s methodologies, findings and recommendations, a significant body of literature has also 
surfaced which embraces the Harvard Project’s NBM.  Supporter of the NBM, John McBride, a 
community organizer and contributor to the Urban Aboriginal Economic Development National 
Network in Canada, holds that the “extensive work that Harvard Project investigators have been 
invited to conduct for Canadian Aboriginal groups is an indication that what they have found 
about development in the American context, especially the identified 5 important factors, is 
applicable to Canadian circumstances (2010, p. 5).  In his M.A. thesis, McBride draws heavily 
on the influence and impact of the Harvard Project in the Canadian context.  He explains: 
It has been the research of the Harvard Project on American Indian 
economic development in the mid 1980s that has changed the approach 
to Aboriginal CED. Authors Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt identified 
the success factors that accounted for some American Indian tribes being 
successful, while others were not. The Harvard research has had a 
definite impact on Canadian Aboriginal development. Cornell made an 
influential presentation to the Royal Commission which found its way 
into their proceedings. The Harvard Project findings have had a dramatic 
impact on Aboriginal economic strategies in both the United States and 
Canada (McBride, 2004, p. 10).   
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In addition, McBride’s theoretical approach is littered with pro-Harvard Project concepts 
and terms as well as very similar lines of reasoning in his analyses.  The thesis employed the 
Harvard model as one of its theoretical frameworks in addressing the barriers to economic 
development in three First Nation communities in British Columbia.  Seemingly, it appears that 
McBride’s analyses lack, or are absent from, a thorough examination of other critical factors 
which may account for successes or failures in the First Nation communities under study.  When 
he poses the question, “Success factors: What makes Aboriginal economic development work?”, 
McBride, uncritically relying on the assertions of the Harvard Project, claims, without 
verification, that, “We now know from the Harvard Project research that the factors that make 
Aboriginal communities successful in their economic development are not the usual economic 
factors of access to markets, trained workforce, amount of capital, and access to resources” 
(2004, p. 18).  In the Conclusions and Discussion section, McBride categorically affirms the 
Harvard Project’s principles in a Canadian context.  He wrote: 
The most important factor, corroborated by the research of the Harvard 
Project on North American [sic] Economic Development, is the 
governance structure of the First Nation community. Without a 
recognized structure for governance there are few decisions that are 
considered legitimate. Business requires certainty to encourage the 
entrepreneur’s investment of skills, time, and money in the community.  
 
Secondly, also corroborated by the Harvard Project, the institutions of the 
community need to be culturally appropriate. Often this means that the 
band or tribal council have utilized an institution form and structure that 
matches the traditional cultural form. Additionally, the band 
administration needs to be functional. The administration and its various 
departments need to be arms-length from business, and need to be able to 
get the day-to-day work done in a professional manner…. 
 
Third, the band or tribal council need to have a strategic approach. If the 
community has been involved in the evolution of a community plan then 
it is apparent to everyone the direction the community plans to take… 
(McBride, 2004, pp. 130-131). 
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It is undeniable that the Harvard Project has had much influence in Canada and elsewhere 
in the Indigenous-occupied corners of the world—especially in the Canadian context.  As Daniel 
Salée notes, “The chapter on economic development in the report of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples (Canada 1996, vol. 2, chap. 5) bears its mark in part, while CANDO officials 
regularly refer to it approvingly and several chiefs across the country have sought the advice of 
Cornell and Kalt or espoused their perspective” (2006, p. 14).  Though there have been serious 
methodological concerns documented (see Mowbray, 2006; Sullivan, 2006) about the age and 
defects in data, the absence of operationalizing of other variables (such as gender, class, etc.), 
and the conflation between correlation and causation, there is a growing, palpable Canadian 
audience who—theoretically—echo the Harvard model for sustainable economic development in 
the name of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples.  The Canadian audience is varied and includes 
Aboriginal leaders, tribal councils, theoretical or applied academics, policy-makers, politicians, 
Royal Commission and Senate committees, public policy organizations or institutes, and so 
forth.   
The Aboriginal Leadership and Management program, which focuses on leadership 
development at the Banff Centre, has been, and continues to be, an excellent forum designed to 
assist Aboriginal leaders and others—through programming and forums—in developing 
effective leadership and management skills.  Brian Calliou, Aboriginal scholar and director of 
the Aboriginal Leadership and Management program, has recently produced two detailed 
compositions—one being summary proceedings of a conference while the other is a literature 
review, respectively—with special emphasis on Aboriginal economic development in the 
Canadian context.  In the 2007 report, Calliou clearly had reservations in which he cautioned the 
applicability of the Harvard Project in the Canadian context.  He said:  
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The leading research in the United States regarding tribal economic 
development is that done by the Harvard Project on American Indian 
Economic Development, ... There has not been any comparative study 
done looking into the legislative and relational differences that separate 
[sic] First Nation’s issues in Canada and the United States. These 
differences result in very unique regulatory and political environments 
that need to be accounted for before we wholeheartedly adopt the 
Harvard nation-building model in the research of Aboriginal economic 
development in Canada (Calliou, 2007, p. 4). 
 
In his summary of Manley Begay, Jr.’s presentation, Calliou reveals that “Manley Begay stated 
that in the US experience, from the moment when the decision-making turns over to the tribe, it 
takes about 20 years to achieve the results of success” (2007, p. 8).  This is surprising and 
perplexing because nowhere in the Harvard writings do we see an approximate turn-around time 
to achieve economic success.  The 20-year approximation would make sense in long-term 
strategies, but what about other successes that have achieved success in half or less than half the 
time as suggested by Begay? For some, this may be too long. 
By 2010, Wesley-Esqimaux & Calliou (2010) published a literature review on Aboriginal 
community development where ultimately a change in tone is evident.  His once-adamant 
position that adoption of the Harvard Project cannot “wholeheartedly” be applied without 
accounting for the “unique regulatory and political environments” (Calliou, 2007, p. 4) in the 
Canadian situation has been an ephemeral one.  In the literature review, Wesley-Esqimaux & 
Calliou (2010) select “13 studies because they gave empirical data for their conclusions and 
provide practical knowledge” (p. 7) of which the Harvard Project is placed at the top of the list.  
They also claim that, “[o]ne of the best known studies of successful Indigenous economic 
development is the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development (HPAIED)” 
(Wesley-Esqimaux & Calliou, 2010, p. 7).   
3.2 Conclusion 
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This review has explored academic, state, and independent literature on Aboriginal 
Economic Development.  From an historical context to an examination of recent literature, this 
review has explored what some researchers have done and identified what they found in their 
research.  In the process, this review has also extracted some of the common themes prevalent in 
the literature, and more importantly, it identified an area that remains neglected—the joint 
venture.  Furthermore, this review demonstrated that the joint venture—as an economic 
strategy—remains unexplored especially in the oil and gas industry.  While joint ventures 
between First Nations and private partners in the oil industry have received little attention in the 
literature, FLFN, too, has received even much less attention despite its economic success in the 
oil and gas industry and its financial contributions to Aboriginal national organizations such as 
Indspire (formerly the National Aboriginal Achievement Awards Foundation).  Therefore, both 
FLFN and its joint ventures within the oil and gas industry needed to be explored, analyzed, and 
documented.   
In summary, the literature included some common themes: Aboriginal participation in the 
capitalist system as a way to address and thus improve their socioeconomic circumstances; the 
coexistence of traditionalism and capitalism in the modern approach to development; and the 
need for sustained capacity development at various levels.  It also examined the elements that 
comprise the NBM framework as well as some relevant commentary on the Harvard Project.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Frog Lake Energy Resources Corporation: An Economic Success  
4. Introduction 
In this chapter, I concentrate on the factors that contribute to the economic success of 
FLFN, and the economic strategy employed by its economic arm, Frog Lake Energy Resources 
Corporation (FLERC).  I advance the thesis that the joint venture is the most effective economic 
model that contributes to the sustained economic development of FLFN.  Primarily utilized in 
the oil drilling and production programs, the joint venture model has generated, and continues to 
generate, substantial wealth for FLFN, oilfield-related and administrative jobs for members, and 
economic benefits for the community.  Under this focus, I begin with an historical background 
on the development of FLERC.  I then identify a set of factors that contribute to the economic 
success of FLERC, thereby answering the case study’s primary research question.  It is followed 
by an examination of the joint venture model and how it is applied to foster economic 
development in the oil industry, which answers another question at the subsidiary level.  Finally, 
I examine the generation of wealth, economic benefits and spin-offs as a way to measure the 
economic success of FLFN; in addition, I briefly examine an award which recognized the joint 
venture partnership between FLERC and Twin Butte as well as some of the philanthropic 
initiatives and financial contributions made by FLFN and FLERC.  
4.1 Historical Context 
Since the early 1980s, the petroleum industry has been part of the economic culture of 
FLFN.  In this period, non-Aboriginal corporations largely characterized the community’s 
strategic economic plan—if there was such a document—in the development of reserve lands 
through the extraction of non-renewable resources base of oil and gas.  In those early years, 
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FLFN’s involvement was very modest.  In a simple lease agreement, FLFN would agree to lease 
out identified tracts of lands for oil and gas exploration to an operating energy company; beyond 
this was another step that required the approval of Indian Oil and Gas Canada (IOGC), a federal 
regulatory body for the management and regulation of on-reserve oil and gas resources.  Husky 
Oil Operations Ltd. (Husky) and Canadian Natural Resources Ltd. (CNRL) were among the 
main oil producers that set up oil and gas extraction programs—and, in return, royalties were 
paid indirectly to FLFN which was held in trust by DIAND, a paternalistic system which still 
remains in place today.  In one particular lease agreement FLFN—with the objective of 
expanding the drilling program, creating employment, and forging a long-term commitment and 
relationship with private industry—made Husky CEO John Lau an Honorary Chief of FLFN, and 
with it, a Plains Cree name: ôkimaw askiw’awasis, which translated to Chief Earth Child 
(Sexsmith, 2000, p. 13).   
By 2000, the global commodity of oil impacted the oil and gas industry—from the 
international market to the local level.  In fact, the volatility of the price of crude oil remained at 
record lows; in other words, there was no significant global demand for crude oil, and as a result, 
the slow production of oil was a ubiquitous global reality.  Due in large part by his designation as 
Honorary Chief, CEO John Lau—viewed as an important member of the community—continued 
the oil production program in FLFN despite plummeting or unfavorable oil prices.  He was also 
cognizant of the fact that FLFN was highly dependent on revenues generated through oil 
production, albeit that an oil production program was not economically feasible during this 
period.  According to FLERC CEO Joe Dion, this traditional relationship has had a positive 
economic impact for the community (Dion, personal interview, October 2011).  In 2005, Lau’s 
commitment—directly or indirectly—was much more pronounced when Husky reluctantly 
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acquiesced to sell all its working interest and assets to the newly-created FLFN oil and gas 
company: Frog Lake Energy Resources Corporation.   
On 3 August 2000, FLERC was incorporated under the Business Corporations Act in 
Alberta.  In 2003, an opportunity presented itself that FLERC capitalized on to not only develop 
itself into a capable, viable operating oil company with the aim of fully participating in oil 
extraction programs, but also to accelerate the generation of capital through its economic strategy 
for the benefit of the community.  To do this, FLERC engaged in joint venture arrangements 
with various oil companies.  The first of those joint ventures was with Petromin Resources Ltd. 
(Petromin), which still remains active today.  In geographical proximity to FLFN was an oil 
exploration and production program undertaken by Petrovera Resources Limited (“Petrovera,” 
which was later acquired by CNRL).  President of Petrovera at that time, John Zahary, who 
currently serves as chairperson of FLERC, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
with FLFN.  Based on that mutual accord, Petrovera agreed to a joint venture partnership with 
FLERC.  No longer was it FLFN’s economic policy of leasing out lands to non-Aboriginal oil 
companies; in fact, FLFN essentially leased out lands to itself—something unique for a First 
Nation to do at the time.  Specifically, FLFN (i.e., the lessor) leased out its reserve lands to 
FLERC (i.e., the lessee), which, in turn, entered into a contractual relationship—through an 
agreement called a ‘farm-out’—with Petrovera.  Upon acquisition by CNRL, the farm-out 
arrangement was also transferred, thus making CNRL a joint venture partner on the original 
tracts of land for oil and gas production.  The joint venture relationship with Buffalo Oil 
Corporation (“Buffalo,” which was later acquired by Twin Butte Energy Ltd.) was perhaps the 
most instrumental to the initial corporate development of FLERC.  In the period 2003-2004, the 
crude oil price cycle was closing at very low levels, where oil prices ranged from approximately 
 68 
 
$25 to $35 per barrel (Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, 2012).  Despite this 
economic downturn, Husky remained determined to continue its production program on FLFN; 
conversely, this meant that Husky’s unrealistic and uneconomical enterprise was losing money.  
Their joint venture agreement in place, FLERC, along with Buffalo, approached Husky to sell all 
assets and rights on FLFN lands.  In July 2005, Husky agreed to sell its interests, assets, and 
rights to the joint venture initiative of FLERC and Buffalo at $5.2 Million.  In the words of 
FLERC CEO Joe Dion: “All of sudden the oil price took off…  It was a sweetheart deal—that’s 
when we got our break” (Dion, personal interview, October 2011).   
Since the joint acquisition of Husky’s assets, the administration of FLERC has been 
executed primarily through the Buffalo office then subsequently Twin Butte.  As its main joint 
venture partner, “it was easier for Joe to run the business out of Twin Butte office, sitting 
alongside Twin Butte’s people” (Zahary, personal interview, October 2011).  By 2009, 
FLERC—with the aim of seeking similar ventures or opportunities—established its first official 
office in Calgary, Alberta.  As FLERC Chairperson John Zahary points out, “It was established 
in Calgary because there was a plentiful supply of engineers, geologists, geophysicists, lands 
people, and so on. Essentially, all of the head offices of the six hundred or so companies are in 
Calgary—irrespective of who owns them, most of the technical people live in Calgary” (Zahary, 
personal interview, October 2011).  In January 2012, FLERC officially opened its head office in 
the core area of FLFN, while its corporate office remained in Calgary.   
In 2008 oil production exceeded approximately 1,000 barrels per day (FLERC Review, 
2012).  Due in large part by favorable oil prices and increasing volumes, FLERC commenced an 
accelerated drilling program in 2009.  In a strategic effort to foster this program, FLERC secured 
foreign investment to finance yet another energy company—called Windtalker Energy 
 69 
 
Corporation (Windtalker)—where a joint venture partnership was the result.  The unique aspect 
of the Windtalker arrangement is that it involves 100 per cent Chinese investment, while FLERC 
brings a highly skilled management team—possessing an extensive knowledge of the industry, 
technical expertise, and competency.  In addition, FLERC owns 3 million shares in Windtalker 
with the option of acquiring more in the future, if it so chooses.  By 2011 the average daily oil 
production exceeded 3,000 barrels per day at a success rate of approximately 80 per cent 
(FLERC Review, 2012).  This means that FLERC’s post-exploration participation pursuant to 
the farm-out agreements with its primary partners Twin Butte and now Windtalker will likely see 
increased economic returns.  
The genesis of FLERC was the effort of the FLFN council in the late 1990s.  In spite of 
the relative success in maintaining an economic relationship with private industry where it 
garnered oil and gas royalties through the leasing method, FLFN lacked a written comprehensive 
economic development plan (or even a division or program) designed to create, promote, and 
sustain economic development or economies at the community level.  Stated differently, without 
a community-designed economic strategy to foster development, FLFN, in comparison with 
other First Nations, was in a state of delayed progress.  Admittedly, the need for community 
development through economic and business enterprises was in the minds of leadership and 
community members alike—it just was not documented to what can be referred to as an 
economic development strategy.  Within this conventional mindset, the FLFN government 
proposed the idea of creating an oil and gas company as a way to become more self-sustaining, 
economically.  The successful corporate development of FLERC has been, and continues to be, 
part of the community’s strategic economic development strategy—whether written or not.  
FLERC’s success is not only reflected in the community’s sense of pride, but it has also 
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triggered, if not assisted, in other business development enterprises at both the individual and 
community levels, namely in the energy sector. 
4.2 FLERC: The Golden Goose 
4.2.1 What is Frog Lake Energy Resources Corporation? 
FLERC is a subsidiary company that is wholly-owned by Frog Lake First Nation.  As a 
private energy company (which means that it is not publicly-traded on the stock exchange), it 
engages in the exploration, development, acquisition and production of petroleum and natural 
gas (FLERC Audit Report, 2011).  In fact, “Frog Lake Energy has become the most successful 
First Nations wholly-owned energy company in Canada” (Alberta Chamber of Resources, 2010, 
np).  According to IOGC, there are twenty Band-owned oil and gas companies (BOC’s) that 
have 151 active subsurface agreements on First Nation lands comprising a total of 103,400 
hectares, with FLERC holding 17 (11%) of these agreements on 7,854 hectares (8%).  In 2012, 
“almost all of the BOC’s are paper companies without any oil and gas operations and that they 
joint venture with oil and gas operating companies” (Uhryn, email interview, 8 March 2012).  
Unlike FLERC, this means that those BOC’s lack the capital assets and financial capacity to 
fully participate alongside their joint partners in oil drilling and production programs.  As such, 
FLERC is perhaps among the very few that can fully and actively participate as an independent 
oil company in Canada.  However, according to Joe Dion: “FLERC is the only ‘operating’ 
energy company in Canada that can fully participate in oil drilling and production programs 
(Dion, personal interview, October 2011).  In addition, what demarcates FLERC from other 
BOC’s is that it invests in the drilling and production programs, thereby assuming an associated 
and calculated risk on post-exploration projects (Dion, personal interview, October 2011).  To 
the people of FLFN, FLERC is their golden goose; figuratively, their golden goose keeps laying 
eggs (i.e., jobs, economic benefits, etc.).  FLERC is not an idly observer, but rather as an active 
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participant with the assumption of considerable risk in jointly-invested projects.  John Zahary 
explains,  
What makes FLERC unique—as an Aboriginal business—is that it 
actually is the same as all the companies—it’s what Husky does, Harvest 
does, or CNRL does—it’s doing the same thing. It does the same thing 
all those companies do. Whereas, in many case, most aboriginal oil 
companies have just owned the mineral rights. Sometimes First Nations 
have set up oil companies to own the mineral rights, so it’s just doing the 
same thing the Nations are doing through a separate entity. What’s 
unique about FLERC is that it is actually the operating oil company—so 
it’s doing the same job that CNRL would do. It’s acting like an oil 
company in its own right—that almost makes it unique within First 
Nation oil companies (Zahary, personal interview, October 2011).   
Despite its newly-elevated status, FLERC’s approach to develop the resource potential on 
FLFN lands is the same process by which non-Aboriginal oil companies seek to obtain the rights 
to drill for and produce oil.  In its most basic form, “FLERC really owns the contract—at its 
substance—it owns the contract from Frog Lake to exploit to develop the resource potential of 
the lands of which it drills wells” (Zahary, personal interview, October 2011).  Once in place, a 
contract (or lease) then allows FLERC to engage in joint venture partnerships—through the 
farm-out process—to develop the resource potential with other established non-Aboriginal oil 
companies.  In other words, FLERC not only owns the right to drill for oil, but it also possesses 
the right to farm-out (to be discussed later) leases to operating oil companies—based on its 
terms.  Once an oil well site reaches a producible state, FLERC—if oil prices are favorable—
generates capital based on its proportion of the joint venture agreement.  In addition, FLERC 
owns the surface equipment, facilities, pipelines, and the tank.  Conversely, it does not own the 
drilling rigs, service rigs, or fluid hauling trucks—that is all contracted services that FLERC, 
along with its joint partner, must pay for.  FLERC, like any other operating oil company, must 
assume the associated risk in oil drilling and production programs as well as the continual 
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maintenance of those oil lease sites.  Undoubtedly, FLERC has entered a new economic frontier, 
thus paving the way for other First Nations to create wealth in the energy sector. 
4.2.2 Corporate Vision 
The corporate vision of FLERC is to maximize benefits for members of Frog Lake First 
Nation as much as possible, without taking undue risks.  In the “10 Year Review” report of 
FLERC, it states: “FLERC continues to work with its shareholder to identify new business 
opportunities which will benefit the Nation’s membership. While the main focus has been on 
oilfield related activities, diversification into other areas will also be considered and 
encouraged.”  Elected member of the FLFN council and a member of the FLERC board, 
Councilor Wayne Faithful emphasizes the vision as he states: “FLERC is about many things all 
at the same time. First, FLERC has to continue to grow as our oil company. [Second,] it must 
continue to jointly venture with other companies in the oil industry and in other sectors so that 
more sustainable sources of revenue come to the band. [Third,] FLERC must create jobs; 
creating employment will greatly help band members get off welfare and hopefully out of 
poverty” (Faithful, personal interview, June 2012).   
4.2.3 Governance Structure and Management 
The shareholders of FLERC are the FLFN membership.  The chief—who represents the 
community—holds the shares in trust for the Nation.  FLERC is governed by a Board of 
Directors that provides general direction for the company.  Of the eight board member positions, 
four are allocated for members of FLFN council.  The board then hires a qualified and competent 
team to operate the company.  The management is responsible for the ongoing work in drilling 
and production programs (see Figure 4-1).  Recently, FLERC has been mandated to explore 
other areas to diversify its approach to sustainable economic development.   
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Figure 4-1 Organizational Chart for FLERC  
4.3 Factors Contributing to Economic Success 
This section identifies the four key factors that contribute to the economic success of 
FLFN (see Table 4-1).  In doing so, it will also answer the primary research question of this case 
study: what factors contribute to the economic success of FLFN?  Recent literature has identified 
common factors that contribute to Aboriginal economic development, while some studies have 
articulated a unique set of factors demanded or influenced by particular industries.  The results of 
this case study are reflective of both literature categories.   
Table 4-1 Factors Contributing to Economic Success 
 Effective Leadership’s Vision, Support and Conduct 
 Strategic Economic Development Plan 
 Institutional Capacity 
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 Access to Land and Resources 
 
4.3.1 Effective Leadership’s Vision, Support and Conduct 
The consistency of the composition of elected leadership has been a remarkable feature 
of the sociopolitical landscape of FLFN.  To extrapolate, the consistency of leadership has not 
only reflected a particular political-economic ideology in community projects and affairs, but it 
also engenders a consciousness among leadership to continuously promote an improved 
socioeconomic well-being for its members.  Due in large part to a recent corrective development 
in the financial administration regime of the band, FLFN is no longer under some form of 
financial co-management or intervention.  Before this, FLFN had been under a DIAND-imposed 
hybrid form of remedial and co-management intervention programs approximately the last thirty 
years (Price, personal interview, June 2012).  This, along with other recent developments such as 
sound financial policy regimes at the band administrative level, has propelled a transformative 
influence at the political decision-making table of FLFN; equally important, the backdrop of 
recent positive developments also sends a clear message that collaborative directionality among 
all stakeholders in the community is paramount.  As such, the community shareholders’ vision 
demands accordance to FLERC’s corporate statement of vision.  
Since the inception of FLERC, the current FLFN government as well as past chiefs and 
councils have been very supportive in the ongoing business and management of FLERC.  This 
support is manifest in the composition of the Board of Directors, where four of the eight board 
member positions are allocated for elected leadership.  This ‘partnership approach’ has served 
the company quite well; each sphere aims to bring perspectives to the table, while they work 
toward common economic goals.  Unlike some First Nation-owned corporations where the 
political sphere is separated from the business sphere, FLERC is predicated on the 
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complementary relationship between the two spheres.  Incontrovertibly, the ongoing support by 
leadership has created a foundation upon which FLERC has generated, and continues to 
generate, wealth via oil drilling and production programs as well as recent discussions—at the 
board level—on diversifying its economic strategy to include significant investments outside the 
community and perhaps even outside the industry.  In fact, FLERC CEO Joe Dion confirms that, 
“past chiefs and councils, and this chief and council, have been very responsible in how they 
conduct themselves as trustees and board members” (Dion, personal interview, October 2011).  
One of the founders of FLERC, Angeline Berland, FLFN Councilor and FLERC board member, 
vehemently claims: “[a]s politicians, we have to look at the wider picture of the community; we 
sit on the board for this reason so that we can achieve the objectives of the community.  We are 
not concerned of the day-to-day business administration of FLERC; that is why Joe Dion and the 
rest of the FLERC team are there, so that they can effectively run FLERC as a business and it 
should always be that way” (Berland, personal interview, June 2012).  Though positive interplay 
characterizes the connection between elected leadership and the business management of 
FLERC, there is, however, a real, dormant concern that increased political interference could 
threaten the economic viability of FLERC as there are no protocols (or procedures) in place that 
clearly defines members’ roles and responsibilities.  So far, current and past elected leadership 
have not politically advanced agendas contrary to the business management of FLERC, thus 
ensuring that economic ventures remain operational, profitable, and sustainable.  
4.3.2 Strategic Economic Development Plan 
It was not until 2003 that a more pronounced strategic community development plan was 
taking shape.  In conjunction with FLFN leadership, FLERC developed an industry-responsive 
economic strategy with the initial objective of guaranteeing FLERC as a participating joint 
venture partner in oil drilling and production programs.  According to FLERC officials, the 
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strategic development plan involved a process of identifying the economic opportunities in the 
oil and gas industry, taking into consideration the strengths and weaknesses of the community as 
well as the human resources available (Dion, personal interview, June 2012).  Under broad 
guidelines of the plan, both FLFN and FLERC were expected, if not required, to work together 
to foster the economic development to achieve desired goals through the oil extraction activities 
of FLERC.  Essentially, the strategic development plan encompassed several critical elements 
that were necessary to achieve sustained economic development.  The central element was the 
joint venture.  Without strategic partnerships, FLFN likely would not have had access to capital, 
the market, and operational expertise.   
At the outset FLERC—which essentially began as a one-man administration—was fully 
cognizant of the substantial amount of capital needed to finance its soon-to-be activities.  Due to 
the capital-intensive nature of oil extraction programs in the oil industry, FLERC, instead of 
gaining access to government capital funding or through assistance programs, requested $1.2 
million from FLFN, which was appropriated via the band’s capital trust account held in trust by 
DIAND (Dion, personal interview, October 2011).  Not unlike First Nations who have been 
fortunate to rely and utilize own source revenue in their economic development project 
proposals, FLFN, too, turned to their own source revenue as part of this nascent movement 
toward economic self-sufficiency among a vanguard of economically-conscious First Nations 
communities.  Though accessing trust capital was met with the restrictive processes at the 
DIAND level, FLFN was, at first, unable to access its capital.  What is even more interesting is 
that the requested capital through the Band’s trust account was not utilized in the start-up of 
FLERC; rather, FLERC, which became the working interest owner in all lease agreements with 
FLFN, was able to capitalize on this positional strategy as a way to guarantee favourable terms 
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and conditions in the joint venture agreements.  In a quick turnaround, FLERC eventually got its 
‘house in order’ without the band’s initial financial support.  However, the requested amount 
later arrived only to augment an already viable operating oil company.  In addition, DIAND 
released the requested amount of $1.2 million based on the strategic development plan that 
highly emphasized joint ventures as the method for achieving sustained economic development.  
Otherwise, it is presumed that DIAND would not have approved the requested amount if FLFN 
were to exploit the non-renewable resources on its own.   
By 2011 FLERC generated substantial economic returns from its participation in oil 
drilling and production programs.  As part of the economic strategy, a significant amount of 
retained earnings have been reinvested in ongoing extraction programs, while portion of the 
payout of producible wells become part of the total net income of FLERC.  In fact, by 2008, 
accessing substantial capital to participate in the extraction programs was not an issue; that is, 
FLERC reached the critical capacity of viability and sustainability in that it relied solely on its 
own source revenue—specifically, retained earnings—to continue in the ongoing extraction 
programs.  Consequently, this allowed FLERC to begin the process of diversification into other 
related or unrelated areas.   
While the joint venture approach provided a basis that permitted FLFN to access its own 
capital trust funding, it also provided—for the first time—access to the market.  Moreover, the 
strategic economic development plan made clear that joint venture partnerships would not only 
allow access to the industry, but it would also allow full participation by FLERC as an operating 
oil company—which it did.  Without joint venture partnerships, access to the global market of 
the petroleum industry would have been very difficult or unlikely.   
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Though FLERC CEO Joe Dion has extensive knowledge of the oil and gas industry, 
FLERC nonetheless remained a junior company with relatively little or no experience as an 
operating oil company as well as the fact that it lacked the institutional capacity to effectively 
participate in the oil industry.  FLERC—with no prior participation in the operational matters, 
association of investment risk, and functionality of corporate management—capitalized on the 
first-hand experiences of the inner-workings of operating oil and gas companies primarily 
through the work of its joint venture partner, Twin Butte.  Irrefragably, joint venture partnerships 
secured by FLERC have been beneficial not only in terms of establishing permanency in the 
industry, but in terms of the acquisition of management, business, and technical skills.  Simply 
stated, the creation of strategic alliances with private industry was a way for FLERC to get its 
foot in the door.   
4.3.3 Institutional Capacity 
Among the factors that have contributed to the economic success of FLFN has been the 
institutional capacity of FLERC.  There are many forms of capacity that FLERC possesses in 
order to promote and sustain a viable economic development program for FLFN.  For example, 
the primary function of FLERC—as a working interest owner—is to actively participate in the 
drilling and production of oil.  To do this, FLERC must have the financial, operational, and 
technical capacity to contribute its portion pursuant to joint venture agreements.  Increasingly, it 
has done so during the last nine years.  Today, FLERC is a fully-functional operating oil 
company that engages in the drilling and production of oil; it is a sophisticated First Nation oil 
company that possesses the institutional capacity that can expand its operations even beyond the 
reserve boundary.  Building the institutional capacity of FLERC to create wealth for FLFN has 
been one of the main objectives of the strategic economic development plan (Dion, personal 
interview, October 2011).    
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As part of this institutional capacity, FLERC, over a period of nine years, has achieved or 
acquired the following essential elements:  
(1) Directional Capacity 
a. Council as members of the Board 
b. Chief as Trustee 
c. Incorporated as per Business Corporations Act in Alberta 
(2) Management Capacity 
a. CEO 
b. President 
c. Chairperson 
d. CFO 
e. Accountants 
f. Legal Counsel 
(3) Financial Capacity 
a. Retained earnings 
b. On-going investments in oil production programs 
c. Acquisition of businesses 
d. Contracted services (e.g., service rigs) 
e. Lease site construction 
(4) Technical Capacity 
a. Geologists 
b. Lands Officer 
c. Engineers 
d. Contractors 
(5) Infrastructural Capacity 
a. Head office 
b. Corporate office 
(6) Support Staff 
a. Oilfield Liaison 
b. Secretarial 
(7) Training and Educational Capacity 
a. Technical Training Programs (via on-reserve HRD program) 
b. Post-secondary scholarships for FLFN students 
c. Indspire Scholarship Fund 
(8) Accountability Framework 
a. Annual Audits 
b. Annual Community Reports 
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c. 10 Year Review Report 
(9) Royalty and Dividend Capacity 
a. Royalty payments to FLFN held in trust by IOGC 
b. Dividend payments directly to FLFN 
When posed the question of whether or not FLERC possesses institutional capacity, 
FLERC Chairperson John Zahary remarked: 
Well, to use a generic definition of what an effective institution is—and 
without question—the effectiveness is almost proven by the success, that 
it has proven to be a very effective institution by virtue of the fact that it 
started out with essentially nothing. It had no money; it had no people. It 
was somebody’s idea 12 years ago—to get to the state that it is in 12 
years is a remarkable success (Zahary, personal interview, October 
2011).   
While FLERC was initially set up as an industry-specific business arm of the community, 
it has recently assumed the characteristics of an investment company for FLFN.  As a capable oil 
company with a current net worth of $175 million and growing, it is confident and eager to 
expand its operations into related sectors and/or new markets as part of its diversification 
strategy.  In many ways the institutional capacity can be attested by virtue of the fact that FLERC 
has been recognized for its active participation success in the oil industry.  In 2010 the Alberta 
Chamber of Resources awarded FLERC for its business acumen in the joint venture partnership 
with Twin Butte.  Not only is this accolade a recognition of a joint venture partnership, but it is 
also a recognition of the institutional capacity of FLERC as an operating oil company, while 
highlighting the economic self-sufficient efforts of FLFN in their economic development 
strategy.  Beyond this, FLERC has come a long way in terms of institutional capacity.  Prior to 
achieving effective technical capacity of its own, FLERC utilized technical resources already 
established through its joint venture partner Buffalo and then subsequently Twin Butte.  Since 
then, FLERC now operates along the same lines as other non-Aboriginal oil companies.  Though 
it does not compare to large corporations (such as CNRL) in terms of size, the production of oil 
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or the number of projects in various parts of Canada and elsewhere in the world, FLERC is 
nonetheless firmly established as an effective institution in proportion to current oil drilling and 
production programs.  In short, institutional capacity means competence, profitability, and 
sustainability for FLERC.  Currently, imminent projects in Viet Nam and the Oil Sands in Fort 
McMurray and Cold Lake will form part of the economic strategy as FLERC continues to grow 
in size, capacity, and as an Aboriginal leader in the oil industry (Dion, personal interviews, 
October 2011 & June 2012).    
4.3.4 Access to Land and Resources 
Another important factor that contributes to the economic success of FLFN is the access 
to land and resources.  At the outset, FLFN leadership along with FLERC management, which 
was essentially FLERC CEO Joe Dion at that time, collectively decided to strategically lease out 
reserve lands to FLERC as a way to access its land and resources.  This strategy was significant 
for a number of reasons.  First, FLERC consequently obtained legal recognition as the ‘working 
interest owner’ (or lessee) to develop the resource potential on reserve lands.  Second, by virtue 
of its newly-acquired corporate status, FLERC had the authority to further farm-out reserve lands 
to joint venture partners.  Lastly, FLERC’s working interest participation in oil production 
programs provided a timely opportunity to mature and become an independent operating oil 
company.   
It is also important to note that, before IOGC granted approval on permits and 
subsequently leases to FLERC as the lessee, it had to meet basic requirements in the process, 
such as financial obligations and environmental assessments (Dion, personal interview, June 
2012).  Under the restrictive regimes of the Indian Act, Indian Oil and Gas Act, and Indian Oil 
and Gas Regulations, 1995, First Nations are required to surrender its minerals (such as oil, gas, 
coal, etc.) underlying reserve lands back to the federal Crown and the fiduciary jurisdiction of 
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IOGC before oil and gas exploration and production can proceed.  In the late 1990s, IOGC’s 
policy was that a “First Nation [was] not allowed to win and extract oil and gas on its own, no 
matter how sophisticated its operations and no matter how great the benefits might be to the First 
Nation” (Rae, 1998, p. 8).  Since then, the policy environment in this area has changed in that 
First Nations are now permitted to lease out reserve lands to their band-owned companies as a 
way to accord them more control over their natural resources.  In short, this was how FLFN was 
able to lease out its reserve lands to FLERC (Dion, personal interview, October 2011).  
Irrefutably, FLERC’s access to land and resources continues to be one of the deciding factors in 
the sustained economic development for FLFN.   
4.4 Economic Development Strategy 
FLFN’s overall economic development strategy is illustrated in the figure below (see 
Figure 4-2).  The strategy is comprised of three programs that are designed to promote, create, 
and sustain economic development at both the individual and collective levels.  Before we 
examine in detail the joint venture approach employed by FLERC, let us briefly examine the 
other two areas that are worthy of mention. 
 
Figure 4-2 FLFN Economic Development Approach 
As part of this strategy, FLFN has recently created an Economic Development Program 
(EDP) to assist and train local entrepreneurs in business development, while also providing 
 83 
 
equity contributions (up to 25 per cent) to suppliers or banks for capital purchases on behalf of 
the community member entrepreneurs.  Through the entrepreneurship program, FLFN 
encourages its members to seek self-employment, capitalize on the various local markets 
available, and develop viable businesses with the aim of acquiring the necessary skills, 
experience, and knowledge demanded in particular economies (Price, personal interview, June 
2012).  FLERC Oilfield Liaison Melvin Abraham, who also serves as the Chair of the EDP 
Board, informs: “To date, there are fourteen viable businesses as a result of the EDP, while 
twelve more proposals are pending approval” (Abraham, personal interview, June 2012).  Active 
since 2009 the EDP has been effective in promoting entrepreneurship among a growing number 
of community entrepreneurs.   
In terms of investments and partnerships, FLFN has invested, and will likely continue to 
invest, capital into partnerships and local businesses.  Among those investments in the 
surrounding economy is Pimee Well Servicing Ltd (Pimee); as a shareholder, FLFN owns 15 per 
cent and receives an annual dividend payment.  Specialized in servicing rigs in and around the 
Frog Lake area, Pimee is collectively owned by six First Nations: Frog Lake, Saddle Lake, 
Kehewin, Goodfish Lake, Beaver Lake, and Heart Lake.  “Since its inception in 1984, operating 
with one service rig, the company now boasts seven rigs and associated equipment” (FLFN 
website, 2012).  Not only does FLFN receive annual dividends, but its members are guaranteed 
employment by virtue of FLFN’s shareholder status.  As part of the strategic approach to 
business development and increasing revenue sources, FLFN—through FLERC’s internal cash 
flow—recently bought out a local oilfield services company, which it acquired 99 per cent 
ownership.  Now called Frog lake Oilfield Services (FLOS), it is intended to provide a wide 
range of oilfield services including service rigs, fluid hauling, and steam, vacuum and pressure 
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truck services.  Beyond its shareholder relationship in Pimee, FLFN has also partnered with 
Pimee through FLOS in a 50-50 arrangement on two service rigs in Frog Lake.  Again, the 
capital was provided by FLERC on behalf of FLFN, where each service rig was worth $700,000.  
Through this situation-specific strategy, FLFN has not only created an opportunity to develop 
and build FLOS as an emerging, competitive oilfield services provider within the surrounding 
oilfield economy, but it has also generated an additional revenue source through the economic 
partnership with Pimee, while further creating and ensuring more jobs for qualified community 
members and other related spin-offs.   
4.4.1 Joint Venture: An Economic Tool 
This subsection will address the first of two subsidiary research questions in this case 
study.  It sought out to answer the following: what strategic economic model contributes to the 
successful economic development of FLFN?  As will be demonstrated below, the most effective 
economic strategy employed by FLERC is the joint venture model that contributes to the 
sustained economic development of FLFN.  Ultimately, the joint venture has been, and continues 
to be, the central vehicle by which FLFN generates substantial wealth, creates jobs, and other 
economic benefits for its members (see Figure 4.3).  Among past attempts that have failed to 
create sustained economic development, the joint venture has opened many opportunities for 
FLFN.  Beyond this, it has also provided the opportunity for the acquisition of business and 
technical skills among senior management; in addition, the joint venture has been the means for 
greater control over natural resources in FLFN.   
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Figure 4-3 Joint Venture Model 
Currently, there are four joint venture agreements in place.  In each, FLERC has certain 
rights and privileges under the joint venture agreements; at the same time, FLERC, along with all 
oil companies drilling on FLFN lands, has contractual obligations to pay royalties to FLFN as 
part of the lease agreements with FLFN.  Under the joint venture agreements, FLERC undertakes 
a certain participation percentage—anywhere from 5 to 50 per cent.  Among other things, the 
terms of the joint venture ensures that FLERC is not subject to the risks and costs of exploration; 
more importantly, FLERC has the further option—based on the recommendations of its 
geologists and engineers—to fully participate and risk its financial proportion in post-exploration 
drilling and production programs.  If it chooses not to participate, FLERC still receives a portion 
pursuant to the agreement called a gross overriding royalty (GORR) at 5 per cent.  Conversely, if 
it chooses to participate, FLERC must contribute its portion to cost share the entirety of a well to 
a state of ongoing production.  Oil drilling and production programs will continue until it is no 
longer feasible to do so; the productivity per well is approximately ten years.  In 2011, 
“FLERC’s production is now at 3,000 barrels of oil per day and growing” (FLERC Annual 
Report, 2011).  As of May 2012, there are a total of 527 producing wells that are jointly owned 
by FLERC and its partners (see Map 4-1).  Below is a list of joint ventures with FLERC and their 
respective working interest participation percentage (Dion, personal interview, October 2011): 
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 Petromin 60%, FLERC 40% 
 CNRL 75%, FLERC 25% 
 Twin Butte 50%, FLERC 50% 
 Windtalker 55%, FLERC 45% 
In 2009 FLERC introduced an accelerated oil drilling and production program.  To do 
this, FLERC raised money from a foreign country to finance these operations under Windtalker 
Energy Corporation (Windtalker).  Under this joint venture agreement, FLERC was able to 
negotiate better terms which will allow for increased economic returns; this is in sharp contrast 
with the other existing joint venture agreements currently in place.  More specifically, the 
Windtalker agreement brings substantial amounts of capital from Chinese investors, while 
FLERC contributes the necessary technical expertise in oil drilling and production projects.  In 
his annual report, FLERC CEO Joe Dion reveals: 
Our arrangement with Windtalker Energy Corp requires that they take 
100% of the drilling risk on all earning wells with FLERC retaining a 
carried interest in the production. FLERC has the option of participating 
in subsequent development as well or, if it deems the locations to be 
excessively risky, foregoing the capital investment and remaining in an 
over-riding royalty position. Windtalker drilled three test wells prior to 
fiscal year end and several more subsequent to year end with encouraging 
results (FLERC Annual Report, 2011, p. 3). 
Uniquely, Windtalker is about strategy.  It is an entrepreneurial response to an industry 
that holds economic benefits.  In essence, the Windtalker strategy is an enhanced joint venture 
model: its purpose, while to create successful economic development, is to take FLFN beyond 
reserve boundaries with the intent of identifying new business opportunities and creating wealth 
through those opportunities.  In the Windtalker arrangement, FLERC CEO Joe Dion claims: 
Windtalker Energy Corp is a totally separate company controlled by 
Chinese investors from China. FLERC has shares in Windtalker and will 
have representation on the Board. Windtalker like Twin Butte Energy Ltd 
and CNRL are farm-in partners of FLERC on the Frog Lake lands. 
Windtalker was established by FLERC as a subsidiary in 2009 with the 
intent of raising the money to farm-in on FLERC permit lands granted by 
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FLFN. In other words, rather than going to Twin Butte or CNRL to farm 
in, FLERC was able to raise the money through Windtalker Energy and 
farm-in on better terms then Twin Butte or CNRL proposed. This is 
unique for a First Nation to do (Dion, electronic correspondence, June 
2012). 
The Windtalker agreement is unique for a number of reasons.  First, FLERC—as 
counterparty to the Windtalker agreement—owns 3 million shares with the option of obtaining 
more in the future.  Unlike the joint venture agreements with Petromin, CNRL, and Twin Butte 
where FLERC is simply a joint partner without shareholder status in those corporate entities, 
FLERC is not only a joint venture partner in the Windtalker agreement, but it is also a 
shareholder.  Essentially this means that, while FLERC will finance its proportion on an ongoing 
basis in extraction programs with Windtalker and make a profitable return, it will also benefit 
financially as a shareholder of Windtalker.  Second, the superimposition of the administration of 
FLERC, which possesses technical knowledge and experience in the oil industry, onto 
Windtalker projects will ensure a calculated, low risk approach.  FLERC’s technical team will 
not only assist in increased oil production through Windtalker, but it will also maintain 
production programs at profitable levels.  Third, the Windtalker approach is unique in that it 
becomes a central element within FLERC’s enhanced economic strategy.  Through the 
substantial financial support of Windtalker, FLERC plans to undertake larger projects and 
investments in the oil and gas industry; those planned projects will likely ensure a high capital 
return for FLFN and FLERC in various parts of the world. 
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Source: Frog Lake Energy Resources Corporation (FLERC), 2012. 
An estimated 1 million barrels of oil remain untapped underlying FLFN lands (Dion, 
personal interviews, October 2011 & June 2012).  To expedite this process, FLERC has been 
looking into technological innovations—such as directional and thermal drilling methods—
which will likely result in increased oil production volumes and profits, if the price of crude oil 
stays at $60 or more per barrel (FLERC Annual Report, 2011, p. 4).  While ongoing oil 
MAP 4-1 Oil activity on Frog Lake First Nation 
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extraction programs on reserve lands will ensure continual economic returns, FLERC has been 
identifying other markets to further maximize on new business opportunities.  What became 
immediately perceptible was the evolving nature of the economic strategy; that is, the strategy, it 
seemed, was an effort to move away from operationally participating in oil production projects to 
investing capital in oilfield related projects or into new business opportunities.  In fact, FLERC 
CEO Joe Dion is confident that the investment approach to economic development will generate 
capital on a continual basis: “as these [oil wells] begin to dry up, FLERC is looking for longer-
term revenue sources; FLERC basically becomes an investment arm—the cash cow. We are not 
solely relying on on-reserve projects; we are starting to look at off-reserve projects …” (Dion, 
personal interview, June 2012).  To do this, he further explained “this is where Windtalker comes 
in, they [Chinese investors] want to get into more oil industry projects and they also want to go 
into the casino business—so anything they do, we want a piece of what they do. This guarantees 
revenues continually for the nation, the community” (Dion, personal interview, June 2012).   
FLERC’s strategic direction to increasingly invest in projects is predicated on the need to 
diversify its business portfolio.  While the process of diversification will entail an examination of 
new business opportunities with the aim of expanding into similar or other markets, 
diversification will also increase revenue sources, the number of jobs, and so forth.  Especially at 
the local level, the strategy to diversify its approach will likely create a local entrepreneurial 
environment conducive for self-employment (Dion, personal interview, June 2012).  To do this, 
FLERC has increased its public relations efforts as a way to market its host of services in the oil 
industry.  Increasingly, its reputation has demanded the attention of larger energy corporations—
something that is very unique for a First Nation to accomplish in the oil industry.  Just recently 
FLERC, among its surrounding First Nations counterparts, led negotiations in a proposed 
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pipeline construction by Enbridge, where a signed agreement was the result.  Specifically for 
FLERC the agreement secured a contract to either build the pipeline (in whole or in part), or 
supply material for the project.  On a collective level, FLERC was successful in ensuring that 
each participating First Nation community will receive $19,000 from Enbridge for educational 
and cultural programs—a downstream benefit for other areas at the community level.  In terms of 
capital investment, FLERC, through Windtalker, is currently in discussions with large oil 
companies to develop the resource potential of the oil sands in the Cold Lake area and/or the 
construction of oil and gas facilities.   
In short, the economic strategy that has been used to create profitable joint ventures will 
remain in place until no longer feasible, while a change in the strategic direction to begin 
investments into similar or other projects will now be the focus of FLERC’s economic strategy.  
To the people of FLFN, this is about survival through the participation in the wider economic 
system.  They have found economic prosperity within the petroleum industry.  From this context, 
their experience has given them the knowledge and advantage not only to continue to respond to 
the market needs in the oil and gas industry, but also to diversify its strategic approach to 
penetrate other industry markets with the goal of maximizing profits and benefits for FLFN.  
Because FLERC is now a sizeable corporation with sufficient capital, it is proposing 
infrastructural development in the community such as a mall to house a grocery store, post 
office, and so on.  This central hub for local businesses will create jobs as well as keep the 
money in the community as opposed to funneling millions to surrounding town economies.   
4.5 Measuring Economic Success of FLFN 
In strict economic terms, the overall amount of wealth generated through FLERC’s oil 
and gas operations has been unprecedented and substantial.  Virtually all accumulated wealth 
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thus far has been generated through on-reserve extraction programs.  Since 1990, $288.6 million 
in production royalties have been paid to IOGC in trust for FLFN (IOGC, Annual Indian Oil 
Production Report, 2012).  Royalties have been generated from oil and gas activity on FLFN 
lands by various oil and gas companies.  Of this amount, FLERC contributed approximately $55 
million in royalties as of 31 March 2012 (FLERC, 10 Year Review, 2011).  In addition, FLERC 
has paid approximately $10 million in shareholder dividend payment to FLFN (FLERC, 10 Year 
Review, 2011).  As indicated above, FLERC’s royalty contribution has been unprecedented and 
substantial, comprising almost one-fifth of the total royalty revenues generated to date.  And, 
what is even more important is that the generation of capital will continue to increase 
exponentially if oil drilling and production programs remain at an accelerated pace as well as on 
the favourable demand and price of oil in the global markets.  Furthermore, the above does not 
include other lucrative revenue sources as a result of the Band’s investments, ownerships, and 
partnerships with various surrounding businesses.  While royalty and dividend payments serve as 
good indicators in measuring the economic success of FLFN, these revenues are used to improve 
the socioeconomic circumstances among the people of FLFN.  
FLERC released a ‘10 Year Review’ report in which it declared that 2011 “was Frog 
Lake Energy Resources Corp.’s most successful year since incorporation over a decade ago” 
(FLERC, 10 Year Review, 2011).  Within a decade, FLERC has not only reached institutional 
and operational capacity as an independent operating oil company, it has built a net worth of 
approximately $175 million (Dion, personal interview, June 2012).  This substantial capital base 
will allow for the expansion of its economic development ventures, as stated in the Review:  
FLERC continues to work with its shareholder to identify new business 
opportunities which will benefit the Nation’s membership. While the 
main focus has been on oil field related activities, diversification into 
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other areas will also be considered and encouraged (FLERC, 10 Year 
Review, 2011). 
4.5.1 Benefits to the Community 
Indisputably, community members stand to benefit from the economic success of FLFN 
in many ways.  There are two primary capital sources that can be withdrawn for the benefit of 
the community.  As indicated elsewhere, all operating oil companies—including FLERC—must 
pay royalties to FLFN which are held in trust by DIAND.  Royalties are then deposited in the 
Band’s capital trust account.  Indirectly, this funding can then be requested for the use and 
benefit of the community via Band Council Resolution which often requires a rigorous set of 
requirements and procedures to be met by the Band.  The other capital source, which is directly 
issued to FLFN, is the shareholder dividend payment.  If it meets the financially feasibility test at 
the board level of FLERC, quarterly dividend payments are issued throughout a given fiscal 
period.  Below is a breakdown that describes the areas or programs that benefit from the two 
primary capital sources available to the Band:    
(1) Capital Trust Account (held in trust for FLFN): 
a. Subsidization of service delivery programs 
b. New housing projects 
c. Per Capita Distribution (PCD) distributed semi-annually 
d. Capital projects (such as the arena, etc.) 
(2) Dividend Payments (directly issued to FLFN) 
a. Post-secondary programs 
b. Elders’ Program (e.g., utilities paid by the band) 
c. Cultural programs (e.g., Sundances) 
d. Business acquisitions (such as FLOS) 
e. Investment partnerships with industry partners (such as Pimee) 
f. Educational and technical scholarships 
g. Women’s program 
h. Youth activities 
i. Supplemental financial support for the EDP 
j. Other Band-related programs 
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In 2011 FLFN provided 50 residential units for its members, while another 50 units are 
scheduled in 2012 at a total cost of $25 million.  Without financial contribution from DIAND, 
the two housing projects have been paid entirely by FLFN through the capital trust account 
(Price, personal interview, June 2012).  Excluding capital projects such as new housing projects, 
over half of the $20 million-dollar total operating budget derives from the Band’s capital (and 
revenue) trust funding.  Through its other primary revenue source, dividend payments from 
FLERC are used to financially sponsor an increased number of students in post-secondary and 
trades programs in the past several years, for example.  These payments are also used to 
supplement existing and much-needed social service program such as the hot lunch program at 
the local school, while some dividend capital has been invested in local service rig operations 
with private industry partners such as Pimee—thus increasing revenue sources and generating 
more wealth and jobs for the community. 
While FLFN members benefit economically in various ways, the qualified workforce also 
benefits from the spin-offs created through joint ventures.  The creation of jobs is also another 
indicator that can be used to measure the economic success of FLFN.  To date, FLERC—
primarily through joint ventures—provides oilfield-related employment for over 60 qualified 
members including pumper operators, fluid haulers, and so forth.  In addition, it employs 
members at the administrative and support staff levels at FLERC’s headquarters in Frog Lake.  
Through joint ventures, the majority of the oilfield workforce consists of qualified band member 
employees, while some are contractors that provide oilfield-related services.  Due in large part to 
the capital-intensive and industry-specific nature of FLERC’s operations, there is accordingly a 
relatively low number of jobs.  Unlike industries such as hotels that require a large labour pool, 
FLERC’s operations require more capital than labour in its oil drilling and production programs.  
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In addition, FLERC has been instrumental in assisting FLFN in creating other partnerships and 
businesses outside of its own business framework; this has resulted in the creation of more jobs 
for members in related sectors and increased revenue sources for the Band.  This move towards 
economic growth is captured in the Review as follows: 
Frog Lake Energy Resources Corp. has, over the years, paid cash 
dividends to its sole shareholder, Frog Lake First Nation. The funds have 
been used by the Nation in acquiring other businesses, creating joint 
ventures and forming limited partnerships for the purpose of creating 
economic growth. These ventures have generated employment for the 
Nation’s membership, fostered the learning of new skills and provided 
the opportunity for First Nation individuals to become self-employed 
(FLERC, 10 Year Review, 2011) 
4.5.2 External Recognition and Contributions of FLERC and FLFN 
On 19 February 2010, the joint venture partnership of FLERC and Twin Butte Energy 
received the coveted Alberta Chamber of Resources and Alberta Aboriginal Relations 
Rewarding Partnership Award.  The Alberta Ministry of Aboriginal Relations declared: “This 
joint venture has resulted in the most successful wholly-owned First Nations energy company in 
Canada” (Orator, 2010, p. 2).  Interviewed by the Alberta Sweetgrass on the economic success of 
FLFN, FLERC CEO Joe Dion commented:  
FLERC believes that Aboriginal residents need to be developing the 
resources themselves rather than leasing out their lands to non-Native 
companies. As a result, income from royalties will benefit our own 
people directly and, through our company income, provide a double 
whammy of benefits (Sweetgrass, 2010, np). 
Beyond this, Joe Dion was recently presented an award for his outstanding personal 
achievements in Business and Commerce by Indspire in 2011.  Since then, FLFN—through 
FLERC—has set up an annual endowment of $100,000 to support the educational and technical 
initiatives by Indspire for Aboriginal people across Canada (Dion and Quinney, personal 
interviews, June 2012).   On 24 February 2012, “15 outstanding Indigenous people were 
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recognized with the support of Frog Lake Energy Resources Corp. (FLERC) and Frog Lake First 
Nation at the 19
th
 Annual National Aboriginal Achievement Awards,” claimed Roberta 
Jamieson, President and CEO of Indspire.  In another case, FLFN and FLERC also donated 
$20,000 to assist the Native Studies graduate students from the University of Saskatchewan in 
presenting their research at the Native American and Indigenous Studies Association (NAISA) 
conference in Sacramento, California in 2011. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This case study’s primary objective examines the perspectives, experiences, and 
strategies of FLFN during the course of its successful economic development.  To do this, it 
posed the primary research question: what factors contribute to the economic success of FLFN?  
In addition, it posed a subsidiary question regarding FLFN’s economic strategy: what strategic 
economic model contributes to the successful economic development of FLFN?  Before this 
chapter set out to answer those questions, it provided the necessary discussion on the historical 
business development of FLERC.  This background served as a context upon which FLFN’s 
economic development strategy started to emerge.  This chapter then proceeded to demonstrate 
four factors that have been, and continue to be, critical in creating sustained economic 
development for FLFN: effective leadership; strategic community development plan; 
institutional capacity; and access to land and resources.   It was followed with a detailed 
discussion that identified the joint venture as most effective economic model that contributed to 
the successful economic development of FLFN.  This case study is important because it 
examined one First Nation’s strategic use of the joint venture in the economic exploitation of 
non-renewable natural resources on its reserve lands.   
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For FLFN, the joint venture has been the central component in the economic 
development strategy that benefits the community in a number of ways.  Joint ventures have 
resulted in the generation of substantial capital that benefits different segments of the community 
in many ways; in fact, royalties can be indirectly accessed through DIAND, while shareholder 
dividend payment can be directly accessed through FLERC.  In terms of employment, it has 
created numerous oilfield-related jobs in the joint venture projects as well as employment at the 
administrative and support staff levels for community members.  Equally important, joint 
ventures provided an environment conducive for the acquisition of business management and 
technical skills for FLERC senior management.  While joint ventures enabled greater control of 
land and resources by FLFN, they have also significantly increased revenue sources for the 
Band.  Clearly, the joint venture is the most effective economic model and preferred business 
form that has resulted in sustained economic development for FLFN.    
This chapter ended with an attempt to measure the economic success of FLFN by using 
some indicators.  In terms of capital, it is undeniable that FLFN is economically successful and 
sustainable.  What is even more important is that, while FLERC contributed $55 million in 
royalties paid to DIAND in trust for FLFN since 2003, the economic strategy will ensure an 
increased number of sources as well as an increased generation of capital for FLFN as it plans to 
identify new business opportunities in related or other markets.  Clearly, FLFN is successful 
through the economic lens.  Another indicator that was used to measure economic success was 
the creation of jobs.  Over 60 jobs were created as a result of the joint ventures in place, where 
most of the employment focused on the labour side.  In terms of awards, the success of the joint 
venture was recognized through a special award by the Alberta Chamber of Resources that 
acknowledged FLERC’s joint venture and economic development efforts—clearly another sign 
 97 
 
of its success.  Another indicator of success was the philanthropic initiatives of FLFN and 
FLERC to some academic and non-profit Aboriginal institutions in Canada.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Ascertainment of the Theoretical Applicability of the Nation-Building Model 
5. Introduction 
This chapter will concentrate on the theoretical applicability of the nation-building model 
in the context of the successful economic development of Frog Lake First Nation.  The practical 
intent of this case study is to ascertain the economic development experiences, perspectives, and 
strategies of FLFN where it can serve as a model or practical guide for other First Nations 
communities in similar circumstances.  In this case study, exploring the theoretical applicability 
of the American-based NBM in this uniquely Canadian First Nation context will not only serve 
to contribute to the empirical and theoretical discourses on AED, but it will also increase our 
understanding in the nascent, demanding research field of AED both inside and outside the 
academy.  In what follows, each of the five determinants which comprise the formulation of the 
NBM—de facto sovereignty, effective governing institutions, cultural match, strategic 
orientation, and nation-building leadership—is applied where appropriate to determine the 
degree of applicability.  As will be demonstrated, the NBM applies in some areas within the 
context of the economic success supported by the experiences or situations of FLFN, but not in 
most areas.  Overall, this case study advances the thesis that the NBM does not fully apply in this 
uniquely Canadian First Nation context; this resultant position is predicated on the results of the 
theoretical applicability of the NBM’s five main determinants in this case study. 
An economic development theory, the NBM is a holistic and multifaceted strategy that 
approaches development from a political perspective rather than an economic perspective 
(Cornell, 2006, p. 13)—a clear demarcation from conventional theories of economic 
development.  What is perplexing in the literature is that a significant, sizeable group of 
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observers among the academy, Aboriginal, government and public policy circles as well as the 
laity tend to uncritically accept and endorse the findings of the Harvard Project without, for 
example, taking into consideration variables specific to First Nations in Canada—and, more 
importantly, those supporters do so without any substantive analysis and contributions from 
empirical works (Simeone, 2007).  In addition, other scholars have focused on methodological 
issues, claiming that inherent defects form the basis of the NBM formulation (Sullivan, 2006; 
Mowbray, 2006), while others point to the lack or neglect of the operationalization of variables 
that are unique to other Indigenous-occupied parts of the world such as Canada (Cairns, 2005).  
Though these concerns are valid observations in the Harvard study, these critiques, which also 
demand further inquiry, are beyond the scope of this case study.    
5.1 Assessing the Theoretical Elements of the Nation-Building Model 
5.1.1 De Facto Sovereignty 
The NBM approach begins with the assertion of de facto sovereignty, which Cornell and 
Kalt (2007) define as “practical decision-making power in the hands of Indian nations” (p. 19).  
In other words, tribal or band governments must assert jurisdictional control—or self-
governance—over community affairs if sustainable development is to occur.  Cornell and Kalt 
(2007) claim that de facto sovereignty—an indispensable prerequisite—is key to development 
because it “puts the development agenda in Native hands” and that “self-governance means 
accountability [where] [i]t marries decisions and their consequences, leading to better decisions” 
(p. 21).  Although this prescription is somewhat difficult to quantify, there is ample evidence in 
this case study to strongly suggest that the assertion of practical sovereignty was not a necessary 
condition or requirement at the beginning and throughout the course of the successful economic 
development of FLFN.  FLFN leadership—despite the restrictive regimes of co-management and 
the Indian Act—has been able to set the economic development agenda for the community 
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without any real form of increased jurisdictional control.  Under these oppressive regimes, local 
decision-making authority was far removed from the hands of elected leadership and 
departmental programs; in fact, much of the authority on which community priorities and 
projects proceeded rested on the discretion of co-management officers—oftentimes unilaterally.  
As such, any form of a strategic effort for increased de facto—let alone de jure—sovereignty 
was far from discussions at the community level.  In fact, FLFN has been, and still very much 
remains, highly dependent on the governance frameworks provided in the Indian Act.  For the 
community, systems of accountability were already in place that were provided through the 
Indian Act; policies on accountability were an accepted and learned system and very much a part 
of the sociopolitical culture of FLFN—arguably, even to the present day.  In other words, 
jurisdictional control was systematically removed from leadership and departmental programs, 
thereby further removing community responsibilities of accountability.   
What became immediately perceptible was the fact that FLFN leadership was not in a 
position to assert any form of increased local decision-making authority under the co-
management and Indian Act regimes during the last thirty years and, more so, in the opening 
decade of 2000.  In fact, current FLFN Councillor Angeline Berland, who also served on band 
council during most of the period of the co-management system, made the following observation 
regarding co-management:  
Co-management kept us from creating economic and social development 
for our people; that system took away our [governing] powers as elected 
leaders. We had no choice to accept the department’s ultimatum, if we 
didn’t, all our funding to support programs would stop even though these 
were necessary services like water hauling, education or social welfare 
services…. We were put in a position to only be accountable to the 
department, not towards our community. So, it was almost impossible to 
start something for our community; co-management is not something that 
bands want to be in. It’s not a healthy situation to be in, it wasn’t 
progressive at all for the community. As councillors, our hands were tied, 
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and the community as a whole was suffering (Berland, personal 
interview, June 2012).   
Since the early 1980s to February 2012, FLFN had been subject to various forms of financial 
intervention regimes—namely co-management and remedial management plans—imposed by 
DIAND, despite the fact that their financial co-managers were hired every year to resolve 
endemic financial problems.  Due in large part to disqualified FLFN annual audits (i.e., audit 
reports that rendered a ‘denial of opinion’), continuous financial co-management regimes not 
only created an environment where outsiders dictated the development agenda (if any), but it 
also had wider implications in that economic development projects and programming were not a 
prioritized area at the band level (Berland, personal interview, June 2012).  By the mid-1990s 
elected leadership was becoming, inter alia, an extension of DIAND; leadership, it seemed, was 
preoccupied in the maintenance of accountability to and as defined by DIAND, not towards the 
community.  According to the Harvard Project, this situation would fit neatly into the standard 
approach—an approach in opposition to the NBM—where the development agenda and projects 
were determined by DIAND and its co-managers, thus creating an environment not conducive to 
community development—on any level.   
Recent academic research indicates that the Harvard Project findings may not be as easily 
transferable to First Nations in Canada as claimed by Cornell and Kalt and their proponents.  
One such empirical study conducted by Kayseas, Hindle and Anderson (2006a) found that the 
prescription of de facto sovereignty was not an essential element for some First Nations in 
Canada engaged in successful economic development activities and all within the restrictive 
confines of the Indian Act, thereby concluding that the Harvard Project “research may not be 
transferable from American Indian tribes to Canadian bands” (p. 237).  It is obvious that FLFN 
would be one among economically successful First Nations described by Kayseas et al. (2006).  
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When asked whether or not de facto or practical sovereignty would have resulted in the 
economic success now enjoyed by the community, FLFN Councillor Wayne Faithful remarked:  
Yes, I guess it would have resulted in the amount of success we are in 
today, but that kind of control at the band level was not necessary to get 
where we are today…. Even though the Indian Act and its sister the 
Indian Oil and Gas Act control a lot of areas that we should be 
controlling ourselves already, these government Acts still allowed us to 
develop the community economically, socially, culturally. If it wasn’t for 
them, I mean the people at Indian Oil and Gas, to approve the permits 
and leases under FLERC’s applications, we wouldn’t have been able to 
get our foot in the door. Even though the band had its ups and downs 
when we were trying to start up FLERC as a real oil company, Indian Oil 
and Gas policies were pretty good in allowing the band to get economic 
development going for the nation…. So to answer your question about 
sovereignty, it wouldn’t have been possible anyways because of past co-
managements in place that hardly recognized the elected body of Chief 
and Council, let alone our decisions at the community level…. What’s 
quite amazing is that we didn’t have to have more local authority to be 
one of the most successful First Nations oil companies in the oil industry. 
And that, had we focused on and tried to fight for more authority or 
control, I think it would’ve just set us back in economic development 
with FLERC and with other ventures (Faithful, personal interview, June 
2012).  
Increasingly, it is clear the assertion of de facto sovereignty was not a necessary 
prerequisite in the context of the successful economic development of FLFN.  That is, the 
circumstances and development behind the economic success of FLFN appear to contradict the 
Harvard Project—at least in regards to this prescription.  Remarkably, the innovation and 
entrepreneurial spirit of FLFN not only created sustained economic development which have 
had, and continue to have, much benefit for community and non-community members alike, but 
it has done this within the restrictiveness of the co-management and Indian Act systems.   
5.1.2 Effective Governing Institutions 
In terms of effective governing institutions, Cornell and Kalt (2007) remind us, “If 
sovereignty is to lead to economic development, it has to be exercised effectively. This is a 
matter of governing institutions” (p. 22).  More specifically, Indigenous governments must have 
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effective governing institutions in place to not only back up jurisdiction or self-rule, but it also 
“means putting in place rules that encourage economic activity that fits the community’s shared 
objectives” (Cornell & Kalt, 2007, p. 23).  Stated differently, it is about “setting up rules and 
mechanisms on how to relate in a community committed to business growth” (Calliou, 2008, p. 
335).  According to their research, the Harvard theorists proposed several features that are key to 
the institutional organization of Indigenous communities: stability, separation of day-to-day 
business and program management from political interference, depoliticized court system (or 
other mechanisms of dispute resolution), and effective and competent bureaucracies (Cornell & 
Kalt, 2007).  In this subsection, the prescription of effective governing institutions for economic 
development will be analyzed based on the features immediately described above.  It will be 
detected that, upon closer examination, some of the prescribed features described here apply in 
the context of the sustained development of FLFN.  However, some features cannot be assessed 
because some of the requirements advanced by the Harvard Project are non-existent in FLFN 
such as a depoliticized court system or council of elders to adjudicate competing claims.   
FLFN recently has begun extensive policy development in various areas but mainly in 
program delivery.  Increasingly, it appears the institutional environment is beginning to take 
shape to the extent that policies will provide a framework on the interaction between 
government, its programs and services, and the community at large.  In terms of a specific 
community policy designed to regulate the business environment of the community and how its 
members organize action, cooperate, and interact amongst each other and with outside investors, 
there is neither such sophistication nor actual development at the policy level—for example, a 
constitution, set of codified bylaws or a council of elders—that speaks directly to the business 
side in the community.  Aside from the Band’s EDP which only targets local entrepreneurs, there 
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is no community-designed set of rules that is committed to the business growth in the 
community—at both the insider and outsider investment levels.   
The extent to which rules govern the interaction and provide investment security for both 
FLFN and joint venture partners (as outside investors) are provided via Indian Oil and Gas Act 
and Indian Oil and Gas Regulations, 1995.  In fact, the regulatory regime of IOGC, which is 
currently undergoing a process of modernization, protects the investments and assets of all 
operating oil companies including FLERC.  Conversely, the regulatory regime provides 
environmental protection as well as the preservation of cultural, historical and ceremonial sites 
on FLFN lands.  Aside from few community blockades at oil lease site locations in the past, all 
resource extraction operations on reserve lands are protected by the force of law.  Though some 
have argued that IOGC wields too much authority in the regulation and control of reserve lands 
and natural resources, the IOGC system nonetheless provides an environment conducive to 
economic development for FLFN in its industry-specific approach to development.  And it has 
served, and continues to serve, FLFN quite well.  As such, it is safe to claim that, despite the fact 
that IOGC continues to regulate oil and gas development on FLFN reserve lands, the stability of 
a systematic set of rules under the IOGC system continues to be a determinant in the sustained 
development for FLFN, while providing a system that can be trusted by both FLERC and joint 
venture partners—thus making it difficult, if not impossible, for investments to be held hostage 
to corruption or partisan politics.  While the regulatory regime of IOGC provides the necessary 
set of rules committed to the business growth for the community primarily in the oil and gas 
industry, there is yet to be an organized set of rules that regulates other industries in local 
economies such as service sectors.   
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Among the findings of the Harvard Project is the separation of politics from quotidian 
management of businesses or enterprises.  This finding was based on the empirical observation 
that “Nation-owned enterprises insulated from political interference are nearly five times as 
likely to be profitable as those that are not” (Begay, 2012, p. 26).  This finding seems to apply in 
the case of FLFN.  As noted earlier, four council members occupy allocated positions on the 
FLERC board of directors during their two-year terms, while some have maintained board 
member status upon re-election.  To a significant degree elected officials as board members 
determine the general management and direction of FLERC.  They have been doing so since 
FLERC’s inception; in fact, these board members are accorded considerable decision-making 
authority at monthly and/or quarterly FLERC board meetings as well as through their mandatory 
written approval as a board in documents where necessary.  While councillors as board members 
undoubtedly play a significant role at the broader business level of FLERC, current and past 
councils—whether board members or not—have neither politically influenced nor interfered in 
the day-to-day business management of FLERC in areas such as hiring, firing and so forth (Dion, 
personal interview, June 2012).  Accepting an award on petroleum industry partnerships from the 
Alberta Chamber of Resources in 2010, FLFN Chief Clifford Stanley, among other things, made 
reference to the separation of politics and business: “Truly, FLERC is an example of success 
when politics is kept away from business” (Alberta Chamber of Resources, 2010).  From the 
day-to-day business side, FLERC Chairperson John Zahary captures this connection between 
politics and business quite well:  
I think it’s difficult to get government out of business because 
government is so extensively involved in regulating or managing 
business investments. When people say getting the government out of 
business, what they mean is getting it out of the day-to-day aspect of 
business. Personally, I think it’s very helpful to FLERC to have 
significant involvement from Chief and Council so that FLERC would 
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have an understanding of Chief and Council want to do. But I also think 
it’s somewhat helpful for FLERC to have its own responsibilities that it 
conducts through the board—working in the Nation’s best interest 
(Zahary, personal interview, October 2011). 
The prescribed requirement of effective governing institutions as reliable and competent 
organizations that provide effective administration is clearly evident in FLERC.  As an 
independent operating oil company, it is fully capable in the administration of oil extraction 
programs as part of the joint venture agreements as well as comply with IOGC’s regulatory 
requirements in terms of environmental assessments, production royalties, and so forth.  As a 
nascent economic force in the local petroleum industry, the efficiency, reliability, and stability of 
FLERC clearly resulted in the generation of substantial capital, creation of jobs, and other 
economic benefits for the community.  These observations support the Harvard Project’s finding 
that effective institutions must be part of the process of creating sustainable development in 
Indigenous communities.  Without FLERC possessing the necessary institutional capacity, FLFN 
would not have the economic success it now enjoys (Faithful, personal interview, June 2012; 
Berland, personal interview, June 2012; Dion, personal interview, June 2012; Zahary, personal 
interview, October 2011).   
5.1.3 Cultural Match 
In terms of culture match, the Harvard Project reminds us that “[s]uccessful tribal 
economies stand on the shoulders of culturally appropriate institutions of self-government that 
enjoy legitimacy among tribal citizens. Given a diversity of Native cultures and circumstances, 
tribes are challenged to equip themselves with institutions (e.g., constitutions, economic systems, 
etc.) that fit their unique societies” (cited in Dowling, 2005, p. 124).  In other words, a cultural 
match can be described as “a fit between those governing institutions and indigenous political 
culture—in short, the institutions had to match indigenous ideas about how authority should be 
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organized and exercised; otherwise, it would lack legitimacy with the people being governed and 
would lose their trust and allegiance” (Cornell, Curtis & Jorgensen, 2004, p. 7).  At the request of 
the Office of the British Columbia Regional Vice-Chief of the Assembly of First Nations to 
examine and critique the First Nations Governance Act (Bill C-61), Stephen Cornell, Miriam 
Jorgensen and Joseph Kalt presented their analysis to the Assembly in July 2002.  In it, they 
heavily emphasized cultural match as one the critical determinants to address dependency and 
poverty with the aim of creating viable, sustainable economies in First Nation communities.  
They argued that, to achieve culturally-responsive governance systems and sustained economic 
development, cultural match means dismantling imposed, anachronistic systems of governance 
in favour of community-derived and culturally-appropriate forms of governance systems.  They 
believe that this approach should be undertaken by First Nations in Canada in order to create 
sustained economic development.  They argued: 
Effective governance is not simply a matter of establishing good 
government practices. It is a matter also of enlisting citizens as willing, 
active participants in the effort to build societies that work, empowering 
them to build those societies in their own ways, and making them feel 
that the future, a significant degree, is in their hands (Cornell, Jorgensen 
& Kalt, 2002, p. 3).   
They go on to argue that imposed governance systems will maintain the status quo among First 
Nations in Canada and that “government practices legislated from outside are less likely to win 
support from communities they govern than those created from within. Without such support, 
they are unlikely to perform well” (Cornell, Jorgensen & Kalt, 2002, p. 11).   
In that report, the Harvard theorists effectively captured the essence of the plight facing 
First Nations in Canada.  While they presented a well-developed argument that calls for a 
locally-driven systematic engineering of a cultural match to create sustained economies, the case 
of FLFN appears to contradict or run counter to their finding on cultural match.  In fact, FLFN is 
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not alone.  Research indicates that some economically successful First Nations in Canada have 
structured themselves upon organizational structures that clearly reflect western and capitalistic 
notions of governance.  Empirical research by Kayseas, Hindle and Anderson (2006a) illustrates 
this point.  They found that at least one First Nation community structures itself as a corporation 
and “has successfully engaged in economic development activities using a political and 
organizational structure—and decision-making rules—that are clearly not Indigenous in origin… 
[thus] contradict[ing] the conclusions of the Harvard study…” (Kayseas, Hindle & Anderson, 
2006a, p. 237).  Like this case in point, FLFN, as you will see, posits the necessary requirement 
of a cultural match as this was not required during the formative years of economic development 
via FLERC.  In fact, there is no documentary evidence—through council and community 
meeting minutes—to support that there were community-led efforts to create a governance 
system that can be described as an attempt to engineer a fit between the community and 
institutions of governance.  Instead, FLFN has managed to work within the restrictive confines of 
the Indian Act to create sustained economic development—something not easily achieved by 
First Nations in Canada.   
As indicated elsewhere, FLFN, for the most part, continues to be profoundly reliant on 
the Indian Act system that, in many ways, it has become entrenched in the Indigenous political 
culture of the community.  This is not to claim that the Indian Act provides the most effective 
governance system; rather, this case study has found that the current institutional foundation 
upon which FLFN continues to sustain development has its origins in the Indian Act.  Its current 
dependence is deeply rooted in the older generation’s fears that other forms of governance 
systems would bring about change for the worse in the community.  Current and long-time FLFN 
Councillor, Angeline Berland, explains in her Plains Cree language: 
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Frog Lake is very dependent on the Indian Act, but we’re in the process 
of trying to change some aspects of it to reflect what the people want 
today. If you look at Frog Lake today, we don’t have our own policies in 
the major areas like an election code, a membership code, a land use 
policy or even our own constitution. The Indian Act does this for us for 
as long as I can remember. We’re still, I think, one of the bands or maybe 
the only band, in this area that relies on the Indian Act for almost 
everything we do…. The reason for this is that, the elders, and many of 
them have passed on, had always said that self-government would 
eventually sell our land where we, our children and grandchildren would 
be even poorer. The Indian Act has protected and helped us since the 
signing of the Treaties; this is what the old people have said. That is why 
the old people have embraced the Indian Act and that is why we still rely 
on it today (Berland, personal interview, June 2012). 
Even though the imposed Indian Act plays a significant role in the Band’s governance 
processes and contemporary political culture of the community, it is a system that is not 
necessarily inimical to development.  FLFN is an interesting case because it provides a unique 
scenario in the application of the NBM.  On the one hand, FLFN supports the Harvard Project’s 
requirement that, when cultural match—or legitimacy—is high, it tends to result in successful 
development.  On the other, FLFN contradicts this requirement by the fact that the Indian Act is 
clearly the source of its cultural and political legitimacy and forms the basis of how the authority 
in the community is organized and exercised.   
As this point, it seems fitting to discuss a recent workshop held in Frog Lake.  On May 24 
and 25, 2012, Dr. Manley Begay—an Indigenous Navajo scholar and ambassador of the Harvard 
Project—conducted a two-day workshop on nation-building.  According to his presentation 
relating to cultural match, Dr. Begay claimed that the Indian Act system has created an 
undeniable cultural mismatch among First Nations communities in Canada that contributes to 
unsuccessful development and economies.  Under this cultural mismatch, First Nations 
governance is characterized as follows: 
 Bands as administrative units 
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 Limited decision-making power 
 Organization dictated by Ottawa 
 No independent judicial function 
 Politicized business management 
While these circumstances can negatively impact development outcomes among First 
Nation communities, some First Nations, like the Osoyoos Indian Band, have created viable, 
sustainable economies including FLFN that continue to be economically successful despite the 
restrictive and oppressive nature of the Indian Act.  To a large extent, the cultural mismatch 
conditions described above reflect the current state of conditions within the governance system 
of FLFN.  In fact, on each point FLFN scores high—thus immediately contradicting these 
findings immediately described above.   
5.1.4 Strategic Orientation 
While less systematically focused in the Harvard Project research and recently added as 
another determinant in the formulation of the NBM, strategic orientation is a process by which 
“community’s leaders determine long-term objectives, identify priorities and concerns, and take 
a hard-nosed look at the assets the nation has to work with and the constraints it faces” (Cornell 
& Kalt, 2007, p. 26), while asking: “What kind of society are we trying to build?” (Cornell & 
Kalt, 2003, p. 206).  Furthermore, strategic orientation involves the following shifts in 
community attitudes and approaches to development: from reactive to proactive thinking, from 
short-term to long-term thinking, from opportunistic to systemic thinking, and from a narrow 
problem focus to a broader focus on the community (Cornell & Kalt, 2007; Begay, 2012).  In the 
preceding chapter, it is clear that strategic orientation was an important component in the 
strategic economic development plan—primarily in regards to the identification and response to 
the market demands in the local oil and gas industry.  As part of the set of factors that contribute 
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to economic success, the strategic economic development plan focused on and identified the joint 
venture model as the central element upon which access to capital, the market, and operational 
expertise was achieved.  As FLFN progressed over the last decade, not only did it create 
sustained economic development, but it also acquired a sense of confidence—and, more 
importantly, competence—in their economic development activities for the future. 
It can be effectively demonstrated that the strategic orientation framework described 
above, if applied at the outset of the economic development program through FLERC, FLFN 
would be highly characterized as reactive, short-term, opportunistic, and looking at community 
problems from a narrow economic perspective—thus contradicting the conditions which result in 
unsuccessful economies.  Today, however, the situation is fundamentally different for FLFN: 
they are undeniably an Aboriginal industry leader in the energy sector with a viable, sustainable 
strategic economic development program.  From this perspective the NBM’s requirement of 
strategic orientation can be assessed within this current context of economic success to determine 
the extent of its applicability.   
Largely due to recent positive developments—namely through ongoing oil extraction 
programs, and the imposed financial co-management regime no longer in effect—a collective 
shift in attitude is detectable and demonstrable in the community.   Among other things, this 
sense of pride has fuelled a concerted effort to further develop the community, not just 
economically, but in other areas as well.  Without an imposed financial co-management regime 
dictating an external agenda and with more resources now in place, the process of community 
development appears to be a challenging yet attainable feat.  Admittedly, this shift in community 
attitude is increasingly reflecting those features described as part of the strategic orientation 
requirement.  When asked whether it is important to approach development with the question, 
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“What kind of society are you trying to build?,” FLFN Councillor Wayne Faithful quickly 
interjected: “Of course, as leadership we have to always be future-oriented in whatever we do at 
the council level; it’s what the elders have instilled upon us. It’s a question that’s always in the 
back of our minds as Frog Lake leadership” (Faithful, personal interview, June 2012).  In another 
interview, FLFN Councillor Angeline Berland was queried if a strategic orientation approach 
was necessary in the development of the community.  She remarked: “Yes, it is always important 
to plan ahead, to plan for the future. We can plan ahead now that we’re out of co-management 
…. Strategic orientation is what we did with FLERC; it is now a successful oil company for the 
band, and growing” (Berland, personal interview, June 2012).   
From the perspective of FLERC CEO Joe Dion, “strategic orientation was the centrepiece 
of FLERC’s success. It was a mandate from chief and council and still is…. You have to have a 
strategic oriented-plan to make it in business; if you don’t, you’ll never succeed…. From 
FLERC, our job is to create a profit in the drilling of oil, and, we’re already in the process of 
looking at other potential opportunities where we can start investing in other projects” (Dion, 
personal interview, June 2012).  Clearly, the element of strategic orientation has been, and 
continues to be, central in FLFN’s approach to development.  In fact, this case study could not 
locate evidence to determine the inapplicability of this factor within the interview material.  As 
such, the evidence in this case study supports this finding that strategic orientation applies to a 
large extent in the context of FLFN’s economic success.  
5.1.5 Nation-Building Leadership 
Though, again, less systematically addressed in their research, nation-building (or strong) 
leadership has also been identified as another determinant important in sustained economic 
development of Indigenous nations.  Nation-building leadership can be described as “some group 
or set of individuals who are willing to break the status quo practices in development and 
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governance, can articulate a new vision of the nation’s future, and can both understand and 
effectively encourage the foundational changes that such vision requires” (Cornell, Jorgensen & 
Kalt, 2002, p. 5).  Like strategic orientation, nation-building leadership as the final determinant 
in the NBM formulation is clearly another given.  The nation-building leadership requirement 
applies—to a large extent—within the context of the economic success of FLFN.   
According to Cornell and Kalt (2007), successful economics are likely the result when 
“leadership’s primary concern shifts to putting in place the institutional and strategic foundations 
for sustained development and enhanced community welfare” (p. 26).  Undeniably, this 
observation clearly reflects the role and strategic efforts by FLFN leadership in their economic 
development approach primarily through FLERC.  According to FLERC CEO Joe Dion, “it was 
through the strategic efforts of past and the current leadership which eventually created the 
foundation for FLERC and other business ventures to flourish and become profitable and 
successful… [and this] in turn created jobs and good incomes for band members” (Dion, 
personal interview, June 2012).  From a similar perspective, FLFN Councillor Angeline Berland 
reveals: “I am happy that we’ve created profitable businesses, especially FLERC, and business 
partnerships with other oilfield companies in the area. But mainly through FLERC, things are 
improving for the people…. [And] with this huge amount of money in our trust accounts, we can 
do a lot more now for the people who need the help especially to provide new housing, post-
secondary and technical trade funding and so on” (Berland, personal interview, June 2012).  
Clearly, sustained development and enhanced community welfare—and undoubtedly other 
economic benefits—have been achieved through the long-term, strategic efforts of past and 
current FLFN leadership.  The state of the economic development of FLFN is sustainable; 
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moreover, it is sustainable to the extent that a clear economic vision continues to guide the 
economic plan and strategies of FLFN.  
5.2 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the NBM was applied in the context of the economic success of FLFN.  
From this context, each of the five determinants that comprise the NBM was assessed to 
determine its degree of applicability.  Before I briefly summarize the degree of applicability on 
each point, I want to make some observations about the NBM which are pertinent in this case 
study, and presumably, in other social science inquiries.  First, the NBM is a very broad 
theoretical framework that incorporates many facets in its logical presentation to explain why 
and how a set of determinants can create a community environment conducive to development.  
In many ways, the broad scope of the Harvard theorists’ approach makes it somewhat difficult, if 
not impossible, for its inapplicability among Indigenous societies in the world.  Second, the 
vernacular language in its presentation makes it comprehensible and straightforward to various 
audiences especially those in leadership capacities in Indigenous communities.  What is also 
unique about the Harvard Project is that, unlike other theoreticians who mainly present their 
theoretical research findings at academic forums and oftentimes to a particular elite, the theorists 
actually present their empirical findings in Indigenous communities as well as in leadership 
forums (or conferences) headed by Aboriginal organizations—thus making the NBM extremely 
accessible to the people they are trying to help.  Lastly, it appears that the recent addition of the 
last two prescriptions—strategic orientation and nation-building leadership—has been a strategic 
theoretical move with the aim to increase the extent of applicability of the NBM.  While the first 
three elements—de facto sovereignty, effective institutions, and cultural match—can be 
effectively demonstrated, if not somewhat quantified to a certain extent, that they may not 
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necessarily be essential in the successful development among First Nations in Canada, the 
acknowledged supposition of the last two elements make it difficult to exclude their importance 
and necessity.   
Based on the results of the exercise of applying the NBM elements, the overall 
assessment is that the NBM does not fully apply in the context of the economic success of FLFN.  
This case study found that de facto or practical sovereignty was not a necessary condition or 
requirement at the beginning and throughout the course of the successful economic development 
in FLFN.  In fact, FLFN leadership—despite the restrictive regimes of co-management and the 
Indian Act—has been able to set the economic development agenda for the community without 
any form of increased jurisdictional control.  In addition, FLFN has been, and still very much 
remains, highly dependent on the governance frameworks provided in the Indian Act.  In terms 
of effective governing institutions, there was ample interview evidence to support the relative 
significance of this requirement.  While some features under this prescription could not be 
assessed because, for example, a depoliticized court system to adjudicate competing claims is 
non-existent in FLFN, the aspect of the separation of politics from day-to-day business 
management was clearly supported in the manner FLFN leadership respected FLERC’s 
jurisdiction on daily business matters as well as in its ongoing oil drilling and production 
programs.  To a large extent, the features under this requirement were applicable and supported 
by examples elicited from interview data. The extent of the applicability of cultural match was 
somewhat mixed.  On the one hand, FLFN supports the Harvard Project’s requirement that, 
when cultural match—or legitimacy—is high, it tends to result in successful development.  On 
the other, FLFN contradicts this requirement by the fact that the Indian Act is clearly the source 
of its cultural and political legitimacy and thus forms the basis of how the authority in the 
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community is organized and exercised.  While there were interview material and documentary 
evidence to support the various levels of applicability of factors within the first three elements, 
there was no evidence to advance claims in contrary to the prescriptions of strategic orientation 
and nation-building leadership. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Conclusion 
6. Introduction 
In this final chapter I present the overall findings of this case study.  While Chapter One 
provided the necessary context, research questions, and objectives upon which this case study 
proceeded, the following section will present the research results from Chapters Two to Five.  It 
is then followed with some reflective commentaries on the research contributions, implications 
for research, and final thoughts of this inquiry.   
Let me succinctly reiterate and thus remind my readers about some of the components in 
qualitative research described in Chapter One.  This case study advanced the thesis that the most 
effective approach to economic development employed by FLFN—through its band-owned oil 
company, FLERC—is the joint venture model applied in the oil extraction programs on its 
reserve lands.  The primary objective of this inquiry examined the perspectives, experiences, and 
strategies of Frog Lake First Nation during the course of its successful economic development 
program. To achieve this objective, this case study sought to answer the central research 
question: what factors contribute to the economic success of FLFN?  It also posed two subsidiary 
questions: (1) what strategic economic model contributes to the successful economic 
development of FLFN? and (2) to what degree does the nation-building model apply to the 
successful economic development within the context of FLFN?  To effectively answer these 
questions, the case study—more specifically, the instrumental case study—was employed as it 
was the most suitable research strategy for this inquiry.  Equally important, the purpose of the 
study was twofold: first, the FLFN economic development approach can serve as a model and 
practical guide for other First Nation communities in similar circumstances; and second, this case 
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study has not only contributed to the newly emergent body of literature on AED, but it has also 
increased our current state of knowledge and understanding through the empirical nature of this 
research and application of an economic theory in a uniquely Canadian First Nation context.   
6.1 Case Study Findings 
In broad terms, this case study demonstrated that economic development can be the key 
to sustainable development for Indigenous societies with the aim of improving the 
socioeconomic circumstances in which they find themselves.  Using FLFN as a case study, it 
confirms that First Nations are participating in the global capitalist economy as a modern, 
adaptive and resilient way of survival—economically, culturally, socially, and politically.  In 
specific terms, it showed that self-managed economic development strategies through joint 
ventures—or strategic alliances—are key to the economic success of Frog Lake First Nation.  
Conclusively, it is safe to assert that the joint venture model is the most effective economic tool 
that continues to create viable, sustainable economies for the community of FLFN.  
Incontrovertibly, the joint venture model continues to be the most effective economic tool simply 
because it generates substantial wealth for FLFN, creates employment for qualified members, 
increases Band control over on-reserve natural resources, and results in economic benefits for 
both community and non-community members.  In addition, joint ventures continue to increase 
revenue sources for FLFN; in fact, these strategic partnerships continue to be used to capitalize 
on other business opportunities and thus maximize economic benefits.  Fundamentally, this case 
study has added to our understanding that the joint venture model can be manipulated and 
enhanced to create conditions (or terms) favourable for First Nations in their economic 
development programs within the petroleum industry. 
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6.1.1 Chapter Two 
Chapter Two sought to provide the research methodology and methods in this social 
science inquiry.  Due in large part to the relatively unexplored nature of joint ventures between 
First Nations and private industry partners within the oil and gas sector as well as the fact that 
FLFN’s economic success has gone unnoticed, the instrumental case study approach was 
employed to seek a deeper understanding of this phenomenon—its complexities, benefits, and 
purposes.  The process of data collection occurred in two phases.  While an extensive review of 
documentary materials captured some of the factors, thematic categories, and exposed macro 
processes within the unit of analysis, eight formal semi-structured in-depth interviews were 
conducted with seven key participants from both the senior levels of FLFN and FLERC that 
captured the perspectives, experiences, and strategies of FLFN in their successful economic 
development.  In terms of data analysis, this case study employed the traditional or conventional 
method including data management, memoing, interpretation, and representation (Creswell, 
2007).  Based on the above strategy, the data followed a process of transcription, coding, 
analysis, and presentation of results.  As well, this case study was not aided by the use of 
interview software, which is becoming quite popular yet useful in qualitative research.   
As part of the ethical component in this research, I obtained unanimous approval to 
conduct this case study on the successful economic development of FLFN from the FLFN Chief 
and Council on 13 September 2011 in Frog Lake.  On behalf of Council, Chief Stanley signed 
the Research Agreement and designated Councilor Wayne Faithful to review the final draft copy 
of the thesis.  Not only did this allow for community input into the thesis, but it also provided an 
opportunity to correct any incorrect factual information inadvertently written by me.  This 
approval by the FLFN government was preceded by approvals from the Native Studies Advisory 
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Committee and the University of Saskatchewan Behavioral Research Ethics Board (Beh-REB), 
which both found the proposal to be acceptable on ethical grounds.   
6.1.2 Chapter Three 
Chapter Three examined various bodies of literature—academic, state, and 
independent—as part of the review of literature.  It began with a brief historical overview during 
the period in the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, and described the extent to which early 
literature contributed to the emerging subject area of AED.  It then examined more recent 
literature which identified some common themes, and more importantly, identified some gaps in 
the literature as it pertained to the topic of this case study.  Some of the common themes included 
Aboriginal participation in the capitalist system as a way to address and thus improve their 
socioeconomic circumstances; the coexistence of traditionalism and capitalism in the modern 
approach to development; and the need for sustained capacity development at various levels in 
Aboriginal communities.  In addition, this subsection also examined the extent to which the 
literature spoke to the utilization of joint ventures in various industry sectors in Canada.  
Specifically, this chapter found that the joint venture—as a strategic economic model—in the oil 
and gas industry remains virtually unexplored and thus utterly neglected in the various bodies of 
literature.  In other words, while joint ventures between First Nations and private partners in the 
oil industry have received little attention in the literature, FLFN, too, has received even much 
less attention despite its economic success in the oil and gas industry through the work its 
operating oil company as well as its financial contributions to Aboriginal national organizations 
such as Indspire.  Therefore, it was found and thus advanced that both FLFN and its joint 
ventures within the oil and gas industry needed to be explored so that it would fill some 
identified gaps in the literature as well as contribute to the current state of knowledge on AED.  
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This chapter ended with a critical examination of the elements of the NBM formulation and 
relevant commentary on the findings of the Harvard Project. 
6.1.3 Chapter Four 
In Chapter Four, I concentrated on the identification of factors that contribute to the 
economic success of FLFN; in addition, I identified the primary strategic economic tool utilized 
by FLERC.  The identification of these factors answered the case study’s central research 
question.  These factors included effective leadership, strategic economic development plan, 
institutional capacity, and access to land and resources.  Hence, it was found that these four 
factors have been, and continue to be, critical in creating sustained economic development for 
FLFN.  This chapter also provided the space to address the first of two subsidiary questions 
posed in this case study.  It is primarily through this chapter that I advanced the thesis that the 
joint venture is the most effective economic model that contributes to the sustained economic 
development of FLFN.  Undeniably, the joint venture has been the central component in the 
economic development strategy that benefits the community in a number of ways.  Joint ventures 
have resulted in the generation of substantial capital that benefits different segments of the 
community in many ways; in fact, royalties can be indirectly accessed through DIAND, while 
shareholder dividend payment can be directly accessed through FLERC.  In terms of 
employment, it has created numerous oilfield-related jobs in the joint venture projects as well as 
employment at the administrative and support staff levels for community members.  Equally 
important, joint venture arrangements provided an environment conducive for the acquisition of 
business management and technical skills for FLERC senior management.  While joint ventures 
enabled greater control of land and resources for FLFN, they have also significantly increased 
revenue sources for the Band.  Clearly, the joint venture is the most effective economic model 
and preferred business form that continues to sustain economic development in FLFN.  And, 
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more importantly, the joint venture model will continue to serve as a vehicle for sustained 
economic development into similar or other markets for FLFN—whether locally or not.   
This chapter ended with an attempt to measure the economic success of FLFN by using 
some indicators.  In terms of capital alone, it is undeniable that FLFN is economically successful 
and sustainable.  What is even more important is that, while FLERC contributed $55 million in 
royalties paid to DIAND in trust for FLFN since 2003, the economic strategies will continue to 
ensure an increased number of revenue sources as well as increased generation of capital for 
FLFN as it plans to identify new business opportunities in related or other markets.  Clearly, 
FLFN is successful through the economic lens.  Another indicator that was used to measure 
economic success was the creation of jobs.  Over 60 jobs were created as a result of the joint 
ventures in place, where most of the employment focused on the labour side.  In terms of awards, 
the success of the joint venture was recognized through a special award by the Alberta Chamber 
of Resources that acknowledged FLERC’s joint venture with Twin Butte as well as its economic 
development efforts—clearly another sign of its success.  Another indicator of success was the 
philanthropic initiatives of FLFN and FLERC to some academic and non-profit Aboriginal 
institutions in Canada.  
6.1.4 Chapter Five 
Chapter Five assessed the theoretical applicability of the NBM within the context of the 
economic success of FLFN.  From this context, each of the five determinants that comprised the 
NBM was assessed to determine its degree of theoretical applicability.  Based on the results, the 
overall assessment was that the NBM did not fully apply in the FLFN context.  This case study 
found that de facto or practical sovereignty was not a necessary condition or requirement at the 
beginning and throughout the course of the successful economic development in FLFN.  In fact, 
FLFN leadership—despite the restrictive regimes of co-management and the Indian Act—has 
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been able to set the economic development agenda for the community without any real form of 
increased local decision-making authority or jurisdictional control.  In addition, FLFN has been, 
and still very much remains, highly dependent on the governance frameworks provided in the 
Indian Act.  In terms of effective governing institutions, there was ample interview evidence to 
support the relative significance of this requirement.  While some features under this prescription 
could not be assessed because, for example, a depoliticized court system to adjudicate competing 
claims was non-existent in FLFN, the aspect of the separation of politics from day-to-day 
business management was clearly supported in the way FLFN leadership respected FLERC’s 
jurisdiction on daily business matters as well as in its ongoing oil drilling and production 
programs.  To a large extent, the features under this requirement were applicable and supported 
by examples elicited from interview data. The extent of the applicability of cultural match was 
somewhat mixed.  On the one hand, FLFN supported the Harvard Project’s requirement that, 
when cultural match—or legitimacy—was high, it tended to result in successful development.  
On the other, FLFN contradicted this requirement by the fact that the Indian Act is clearly the 
source of its cultural and political legitimacy and forms the basis of how the authority in the 
community is organized and exercised.   
While there were interview material and documentary evidence to support the various 
levels of applicability of factors within the first three elements, there was no evidence to advance 
claims that may be contrary to the prescriptions of strategic orientation and nation-building 
leadership.  The ascertainment of the theoretical applicability of the American-based NBM in 
this uniquely First Nation context will not only serve to contribute to the empirical and 
theoretical discourses on AED in the Canadian context, but it has also increased our 
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understanding in the nascent, demanding research field of AED both inside and outside the 
academy.   
6.2 Research Contribution 
The importance of this study is the valuable contribution it makes towards creating 
sustainable and viable economies within the oil and gas industry through the joint venture model.  
As the unit of analysis, FLFN is one example in the empirical contribution to the current state of 
research and knowledge.  As a case study, it brought forth the perspectives, experiences, 
strategies of one First Nation community in its economic development program.  This social 
science inquiry is unique because it identified a set of factors that contribute to economic success 
of a First Nation community within the oil and gas industry; it also identified a strategic 
economic model as part of that successful, sustainable development.  Furthermore, it 
demonstrated that, like the Osoyoos Indian Band, FLFN was able to create sustained economic 
development despite the restrictive regimes of co-management and the Indian Act.  In practical 
terms, the findings of this case study can be used to assist other First Nations in their economic 
development programs and who find themselves in similar circumstances.  Fundamentally, this 
case study contributes to the various bodies of literature and knowledge in that the research 
findings presented here do offer hope for Aboriginal communities through economic 
development.  Principally, other First Nations will find, I believe, that the section on the joint 
venture (in Chapter Four) to be most useful as this section offers much insight into what and how 
joint venture arrangements can be used to capitalize on economic and business opportunities 
within the petroleum industry.  In theoretical terms, the findings of this case study will not only 
begin to fill some gaps in the literature, but it will also contribute to our understanding of AED 
as an emerging, demanding, and valid discipline—worthy of inquiry.   
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6.3 Implications for Research 
In this case study, one First Nation and its economic development strategies were 
examined within the oil and gas industry as a way to improve their socioeconomic circumstances 
through the participation in the global capitalist system.  Though just one unit of analysis was 
under study, the contributions of this case study are significant.  Stated elsewhere, case study 
research tends to be one of the primary methodological approaches into new and developing 
fields of inquiry.  And AED is no exception.  To further increase our current state of knowledge, 
I advocate case study research that involves more than one unit of analysis (i.e., multiple case 
studies) in various industry sectors that could identify common factors of success as well as 
those factors that hinder development.  While theoretical-oriented research would contribute to 
our understanding of AED at the conceptual level, I would advocate empirical-oriented research 
that earnestly involves First Nations communities as part of the research process.  In this way, 
First Nations would not only bring insight into the complexities of AED, but they would also be 
exposed directly to the research findings, which oftentimes does not reach them via theoretical-
oriented research.  If not through the case study approach, I also advocate the grounded theory 
methodology to further increase our knowledge on AED, and, more importantly, to advance 
workable models and practical knowledge for Indigenous peoples in their struggle to rebuild 
their communities through economic development.   
6.4 Final Thoughts 
As a registered member of the Frog Lake First Nation, it gives me great satisfaction to 
tell and lead the story of FLFN’s economic success through the work of FLERC.  FLFN has 
come a long way in the past decade.  Undeniably, FLFN has become an Aboriginal leader in the 
petroleum industry in Canada—something not easily achieved especially within the restrictive 
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confines of the Indian Act system.  Under the economic development umbrella, FLFN has 
created, and will persistently continue to create, the foundation whereupon wealth generation, 
job creation, and economic benefits are commonplace—for community and non-community 
members alike.  Though not easily discerned throughout this case study, the work, dedication, 
and spirit of Joe Dion has helped the community of FLFN—immensely.  Simultaneously, I 
strongly believe that—without his involvement as a perspicacious industrialist and experienced 
capitalist—Frog Lake First Nation would likely not be where it is at today.  With the assistance 
of Joe Dion, FLFN found its new buffalo—the joint venture—in the modern hunting grounds of 
capitalism.  In many ways, Joe Dion has led the way for FLFN into sustained economic 
prosperity; he has taught us an adaptive way of thinking about and engaging within the world of 
capitalism with the aim of preserving our cultural way of life in the modern world for 
generations to come.  As my writing comes to a close, I must now prepare a community report 
on the findings of my research to the leadership and membership of FLFN.  Through FLFN as a 
case study, I feel that I have contributed in some way—especially to my People. Ekosi. 
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APPENDIX A: CONSENT FORM 
You are invited to participate in a research project titled: Frog Lake First Nation and 
Economic Development: A Case Study. Please read this form carefully, and feel free to ask 
questions you might have. 
 
Researcher:  Albert James Berland, B.A. (Honors) 
  M.A. Student 
  Department of Native Studies, Graduate Program, University of Saskatchewan 
  Home Address: 241, 5
th
 Ave. North, S7k 2P3, Saskatoon, SK 
  Telephone: 306-979-2524 
  Email: albert.berland@usask.ca 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Robert Innes 
 Assistant Professor 
 Department of Native Studies 
 125 Kirk Hall, Science Place 
 University of Saskatchewan 
 Saskatoon, SK S7N 5E6 
 Phone: 306-966-2197 
 Fax: 306-966-6242 
 Email: rob.innes@usask.ca 
 
Purpose and Procedure: The purpose of the study is to find out what makes sustainable and 
successful economic development in Frog Lake First Nation (FLFN) through the Frog Lake 
Energy Resources Corporation (FLERC) and understand FLFN/FLERC’s perspectives of 
success within its economic development strategies.  The procedures of the research will be: 
interview participants; transcribe interviews; review FLFN and FLERC documents; code data 
into categories to make sense of them; begin analysis supported by the data; and present data to 
the representatives of FLFN and FLERC.  I will require a time commitment from each 
participant.  Participants will be required from the moment the interview begins to the release of 
Transcript Satisfaction and Release Form to the researcher.  As well, interviews will be held at 
the choosing of the participant; however, it is preferred that interview locations be in a quiet, 
secluded (and distraction free) places.  Even more important, this will also allow for the 
protection of the participant’s confidentiality and/or anonymity.  Findings will be presented to 
the designated representatives of FLFN and FLERC for their interpretations; the data will be 
reported in direct quotations.     
 
Potential Benefits: It is anticipated that there will not be any direct benefits to you as the 
participant.  This study will not guarantee any benefits to the participant.  The study will not only 
profile the economic successes of FLFN but it could serve as a model on for other First Nations 
economic development.  It can also serve to promote and sustain further the economic 
development created by the First Nation.   
 
Potential Risks: The study does not anticipate any foreseeable risks, side effects, or potential 
discomforts for the participants.  In the event the researcher clearly observes or senses any 
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degree of risk, side effects, or discomfort, the researcher will terminate the involvement of the 
participant (and his or her interview material).   
 
Storage of Data:  All identifying information of participants will be kept with the researcher.  
The storage of collected data will be locked in a (key-only) cabinet; the data will be stored and 
retrievable only by the researcher; the data will be kept for the entire duration of the research 
until the thesis is complete.  Further, the digital recorder used for the interviews will be kept 
separate from all identifying information.  Upon thesis completion, I forward all collected data to 
the Department of Native Studies at the University of Saskatchewan, where it will be kept in a 
secure location for the period of five years.  After five is up, all data will be destroyed.  
 
Confidentiality: To ensure the anonymity of the participants, I will use codes to represent names 
of the research participants on the audio-recorder and in the transcriptions.  I will keep these 
digital recordings in a locked cabinet during the writing of the findings.  In addition, I will not 
use any names, but will use the information gathered through the interviews in the writing any 
subsequent articles, reports, or books.  However, if they so desire, participants can sign a Waiver 
of Anonymity form to allow me to use their names. I will securely store the audio-recorded 
interview for a period of five years, after which time the audio-recordings will be destroyed.  
 
To ensure participants’ confidentiality to those who choose not to be named in the published 
quotes will be assigned a pseudonym (a fake name); all identifying material will be removed 
from their transcripts and no personal information will be used in the final draft of the findings.  
In addition, no names of any other individual or community will be used if in the event 
participants inadvertently disclose information.   
 
As well, it is important to understand that, due to the small size of Frog Lake and that most 
people know each and where they have worked or are working, the confidentiality and 
anonymity is not completely guaranteed.   
 
Right to Withdraw:  Your participation is voluntary, and you can answer only those questions 
that you are comfortable with. There is no guarantee that you will personally benefit from your 
involvement. The information that is shared will be held in strict confidence and discussed only 
with the supervisor where appropriate. You may withdraw from the research project for any 
reason, at any time, without penalty of any sort.  If you choose not to participate or withdraw at 
any time, you will not lose any entitlements you currently receive, for example, assistance from 
the band, etc.  If you withdraw from the research project at any time, any data that you have 
contributed will be destroyed at your request.  If you choose to withdraw, the researcher will not 
use the information in the report.   
 
Your right to withdraw data from the study will apply until the results are disseminated.  After 
this it is possible that some form of research dissemination will have already occurred and it may 
not be possible to withdraw your data. 
 
Questions: If you have any questions concerning the research project, please feel free to ask at 
any point; you are also free to contact the researchers at the numbers provided if you have other 
questions.  This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of 
Saskatchewan Behavioural Research Ethics Board on (insert date).  Any questions regarding 
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your rights as a participant may be addressed to that committee through the Ethics Office (966-
2084).  Out of town participants may call collect. 
 
Follow-Up or Debriefing: Once the final draft is completed, I will send a copy to all 
participants at their mailing addresses.  As well, the participants are welcome to contact the 
researcher if they have forgotten important information in the interview.  I will welcome these 
calls and may use the information as part of the data, if appropriate. 
 
Consent to Participate:   
(a)  Written Consent 
I have read and understood the description provided; I have had an opportunity to ask 
questions and my/our questions have been answered. I consent to participate in the research 
project, understanding that I may withdraw my consent at any time. A copy of this Consent 
Form has been given to me for my records.   
 
or 
 
 
(b) Oral Consent 
If on the other hand the consent has been obtained orally, the Consent Form must be dated, 
and signed by the researcher(s) indicating that “I read and explained this Consent Form to 
the participant before receiving the participant’s consent, and the participant had knowledge 
of its contents and appeared to understand it.” 
 
 
___________________________________  _______________________________ 
(Name of Participant)    (Date) 
 
 
___________________________________  _______________________________ 
(Signature of Participant)    (Signature of Researcher) 
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APPENDIX B: RESEARCH AGREEMENT 
 
PROJECT TITLE: Frog Lake First Nation and Economic Development: A Case Study 
 
Researcher’s Responsibilities 
As part of the agreement, I, as the researcher, will:  
1. Conduct respectful and ethical research. 
2. Adhere to community protocol, traditions and customs. 
3. If required, prepare an in-person presentation at a FLFN Chief and Council meeting 
regarding the objectives, data collection procedures, implications, and the dissemination 
of results of the study.  
4. Provide a transcript copy of interview to the interviewees who will have the opportunity 
to review the transcriptions and make necessary additions, deletions, or changes to the 
transcriptions.  Each collaborator will have the right to waive his or her anonymity via the 
Waiver of Anonymity form.  As well, any confidential information will be protected. At 
any time, the interviewees could elect to withdraw from the project; all information 
gathered from interviewees who choose to withdraw will be destroyed.  
5. Incorporate the findings of the study into the M.A. thesis, which will be submitted as 
partial fulfilment for my M.A. degree at the department of Native Studies, University of 
Saskatchewan.  
6. Present a draft copy of my thesis to the Band to review.  
7. Invite community representatives to attend my thesis defense. 
8. Upon successful defense of the thesis, provide the community with: 
a. a copy of the thesis, 
b. an executive summary of the study, and 
c. a community presentation on the findings of the research, if requested. 
Participant’s Responsibilities 
As part of the agreement, Frog Lake First Nation, as the participant, will:  
1. Grant me permission to conduct the research on FLFN and its company, Frog Lake 
Energy and Resources Corporation (FLERC). 
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2. Select any person (or persons) believed to be appropriate to review a draft copy of 
the thesis.  The review will allow for community input into the thesis.  The 
reviewer(s) will: 
a. identify any incorrect factual information. Any corrections will be changed to 
reflect correct factual information.  
b. point out disagreements with any interpretation of the data and provide 
alternate interpretations.  If the alternative interpretation corresponds with the 
data, I will change my interpretation and explain why I have changed the 
interpretations. However, if the alternative interpretation is not substantiated 
by the data, I will not change my interpretation.  Nonetheless, I will include 
the alternative interpretation in the final draft; thereby ensuring the 
community perspective is included in the thesis.   
3. Be provided the opportunity to review any future publication related to FLFN. 
4. If it deems necessary to make changes after a submission of the thesis to the College 
of Graduate Studies and Research, I will incorporate them in any future publications. 
5. If it chooses, be provided the opportunity to review the thesis and/or any future 
publications.  The Band is not required to review and/or provide input into the thesis 
if they choose not to.  If the Band chooses not to review the document, a 
representative of the Band must sign a waiver to review the document.      
6. Attendance the thesis defense will be greatly appreciated, but is voluntary. 
 
Both FLFN and the researcher agree to the above. 
Researcher: 
Name:  (Print) _______________________________________ 
Signature: __________________________________________ 
Date: ______________________________________________ 
 
Representative of FLFN: 
Name:  (Print) _______________________________________  
Position: ___________________________________________ 
Signature: __________________________________________ 
Date: ______________________________________________ 
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